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1 Introduction 
1.1 General situation in Romania 
More than 100 countries have privatized some or most of their state owned companies (IFC, 
1999). In Romania, the reform process has started in 1990 with the privatization of 
agricultural land followed by management buy-outs, direct sales or investments and the 
mass privatization program. However, the findings of a study (IFC,1999) on privatization are 
that in many transition countries, like in Romania, mass and rapid privatization has turned 
over assets to large numbers of people who have neither the skills nor the financial 
resources to run them well. The statement of the EBRD country report (1999) that the 
transition process in Romania has recorded uneven developments in terms of 
macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms supports this view. Moreover, the 
economic data in Table 1 gives evidence of a rather unstable economic situation. In 1997, 
the total external debt amounted to 28,2% of GDP and the total public debt to 26,4% of GDP. 
The real growth in 1997 was negative (-6.6%) and inflation rose to around 151% (to previous 
year) in 1997.  
Table 1 Economic data 
 1990 1994 1997 
Contribution of sectors to GDP, in % to total GDP  
Financial sector*3 
Agricultural sector 
Private sector*4 
 
2.7 
21.1 
16.4 
 
4.7 
19.7 
35.0 
 
1.3 
17.7 
58.2 
Consumer price index 100 7,071 33,076 
Total public debt to GDP n.a. n.a. 26.4 
Total labor forces, in thousand  10,840 10,011 9,023 
Labor forces in agriculture, in thousand*5 
of which in private sector 
3,055 
n.a. 
3,561 
3,240 
3,322 
3,160 
Labor forces in industry, in thousand 
of which in private sector 
4,005 
        n.a. 
2,882 
444 
2,450 
727 
Labor forces in financial sector, in thousand 
of which in private sector 
39 
n.a. 
59 
10 
73 
12 
Cultivated area of private farm sector, in million ha 
total cultivated area  
n.a. 
9.4 
7.3 
9.3 
7.4 
9.3 
Tangible assets of the state (enterprises included), in 
billion lei*2 
3,359 30,103 142,148 
Tangible assets in private ownership, in billion lei *2 22 1,523 36,939 
Savings deposits*1of private households to GDP, in % 29 8 10 
Loans*1 of private households to GDP, in % 2 < 1 < 1 
Source:  NCS 1998 and 1995, own calculations 
Notes: *1  at or from commercial banks,  *2  in current prices of corresponding year  *3  financial sector includes 
capital market, banking and insurance activities and not the adjustment for imputed output of bank 
services (IOBS),  *4  the contribution of the private sector before 1990 is not available,  *5   before 1990, 
the labor forces in agriculture ranged constantly around 3050 thousand  
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 The transformation process has caused heavy changes in some sectors of the economy as 
regards the production structures, the supply and demand. The privatization of the 
agricultural sector started early and caused an allocation of land and labor from large 
specialized agricultural units to a newly created private farm sector, which is poorly equipped 
with real assets (equipment and buildings) and working capital. The privatization process in 
the industrial and financial sector has started late and has evolved slowly. Because of this 
lag the newly created private farm sector faces a slowly developing non-agricultural sector, 
large, state-owned wholesalers and predominantly state owned banks that used to channel 
cheap money to large scale state enterprises. Banks are one part of the financial sector, 
which includes other financial institutions and non-bank financial intermediaries (Schmidt, 
1998). However, at the beginning of the reform process, neither banks nor non-bank financial 
intermediaries exerted any influence on an efficient capital allocation in Romania.  
The main structural features of the agricultural and financial sector can be summarized as 
follows in Romania:  
- The average size of private family farms is approximately 2.68 ha (Otiman, 2000). 
Moreover, there exists a very thin sales and rental market for agricultural land delaying 
the restructuring process in the private farm sector. Highly specialized cooperative farms 
were turned into unspecialized private farms. There are still highly subsidized state farms 
operating with a low capital stock and partly antiquated equipment. Between 1992 and 
1997, the number of people occupied in the agricultural sector hardly changed, while that 
in the industry sector declined.  
- The capital intermediation seems to be rather weak in the total economy. The total 
savings deposits at commercial banks amount to 22% of GDP (1997) of which 10% 
originates from private households. Furthermore, outstanding loans at commercial banks 
represent 35% of total assets of commercial banks (1997), of which only a loan share of 
1.6% of all assets is allocated to private persons. In the absence of state guarantees and 
interest rate subsidies, commercial banks refuse lending to small scale enterprises, 
especially to farms (Schrieder, 1997). Further, they offer financial products and apply a 
credit technology that is more suited for large scale enterprises in urban areas. A capital 
market has developed during the transition process but the number of companies listed 
as well as the traded volume is rather small and insignificant for an efficient capital 
accumulation and allocation. 
Under the influence of theoretical works from Stiglitz, (1985,1993), King and Levine, (1993) 
and others, the importance of the financial sector for welfare and growth of a country has 
been increasingly emphasized (Schmidt, 1999). It is argued that an efficient capital allocation 
through well functioning financial intermediaries supports the overall economic development. 
And vice versa, it is argued that economic development is necessary for the development of 
the financial sector. Taken together, the importance and interdependence of financial and 
economic development is undisputed.  
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 This work recognizes the importance of financial markets development, especially in rural 
areas, of a transition country where the financial intermediation faces many constraints. It 
identifies the low level of capital intermediation through formal financial institutions in rural 
areas as a core problem and focuses on the supply of and demand for credit at the small 
scale farm level. The small scale private farm sector still engages a large part of the people 
in Romania and pre-dominates the economic activities in rural areas. Moreover, to be 
competitive it has to undergo a fundamental restructuring process, which requires a high 
level of liquidity provided through savings at and credits from the financial institutions.  
1.2 Objective and structure of the study 
It is intended to elicit in this work the characteristics and functioning of rural financial markets 
in Romania and to explain the behavior of the market participants. In particular, this work 
focuses on the factors affecting the demand for and supply of credit through financial 
institutions at the private farm level in a transition country. The overall objective of this study 
is to contribute to the research on access constraints for credit at the small private enterprise 
level in Romania. In this context, the study describes the credit approval mechanism and the 
matching of capital demand and supply under the prevailing loan conditions. It takes into 
account the economic and financial situation of the family farms. As discussed in Heidhues 
and Schrieder (2000) in Romania, the individual farmers’ perception of access constraints to 
credit comprise institutional and financial reasons – complicated procedures, loan conditions 
and interest rates accompanied with aversions against credit. The following aspects are 
discussed in detail: 
- A description and comparison of different loan types, their conditions and their approval 
procedure to show the preferences of potential borrowers and analyze the operating 
costs of financial institutions under the prevailing loan application procedure.  
- A quantitative analysis intends to quantify the capital supply and demand under 
restrictions of risk, transaction costs and collateral requirements and to reveal the 
conditions under which the lender and borrower come to a loan agreement/contract.  
- Under Romanian conditions, two factors have been found to be of relevance: collateral 
evaluation and risk behavior. These aspects are qualitatively analysed:  
- An analysis of the diverging collateral evaluation between lenders and borrowers in 
Romania. 
- An analysis of the risk aversion of family farms. 
This study is divided into five sections (Figure 1) where the first section describes the 
objective and structure of the work. The second chapter outlines the problems and features 
of the financial and agricultural sector in Romania and provides the background for the 
discussion on financial and economic development.  
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 The theories, methods and data are discussed in the methodology section (chapter three). It 
explains the production and demand factors specified and elaborates the issues of utility, risk 
aversion and adverse selection.  
The analytical section addresses three topics: the demand and supply side of rural financial 
markets and its links to the agricultural and financial sector. The fist topic discusses the 
problems and interlinkages of the financial and agricultural sector development. It applies a 
theoretical framework which embeds the demand and the supply of capital as well as their 
constraints in a model. The model displays a capital demand function for individual farmers 
as well as a set of possible capital offers of the banking sector. The functions incorporate the 
main factors affecting demand and supply, such as collateral evaluation, interest rates, utility 
of assets, loan size, default risk and transaction costs. The results show which factors or 
combination of factors are actually determining the demand for and supply of capital and to 
which extent they are constraining. The chapter encompasses, second, the impact of 
uncertainty and asymmetric information on loan transactions and, third, the influence of risk 
aversion on loan decisions. These topics are shown to explain the difficulties and overall 
reluctance of financial institutions and farmers to agree on a loan contract.  
The final section of this study summarizes the findings and derives conclusions for rural 
financial market policy in Romania. 
Figure 1 Sections, topics and issues of the study 
Sections  Topics Issues  
Introduction Objective of the study Transformation issues, objective and 
structure of the study 
Changing financial and 
agricultural sector 
Discussion on finance and 
development  
Rural finance and finance in transition 
economies 
 Financial sector in Romania  Characteristics, problems and 
constraints 
 Agricultural sector in Romania  Characteristics, problems and 
constraints 
Methodology Data set Data selection and analysis 
 Methods and Theories Utility and indifference curves, risk 
aversion, adverse selection, production 
and demand functions 
Analysis Rural financial markets Capital demand and capital supply 
under constraints 
 Financial sector – loan 
transactions  
Asymmetric information and 
uncertainty  
 Agricultural sector Risk aversion  
Summary and 
conclusion 
Finance and Agriculture Constraining factors and way to 
overcome them 
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 2 Romania’s economy in transition and the changing financial and 
agricultural sector  
2.1 The discussion on financial and economic development 
The discussion on financial development and rural financial markets emerged in the early 
1950s has intensified during the last decade and now it includes the special features of 
transition economies. A large portion of studies on transition economies describes the 
functioning and problems of these economies, the economic and legal environment as well 
as the potential development of the financial sector in general. There are numerous studies 
on rural finance in developing countries but relatively few combine the issues of rural finance 
and of finance in transition countries. Furthermore, they seldom analyze the special features 
of rural financial markets and of economic behavior in transition economies. It is intended to 
elicit in this work the functioning and characteristics of rural financial markets in transition 
countries. The literature review includes discussions on rural finance and financial markets in 
transition countries.  
2.1.1 Financial markets and rural finance 
Von Pischke et al (1983) defined rural financial markets as relationships between buyers and 
sellers of financial assets who are active in rural economies. The relationship is based on 
transactions that include borrowing, lending and transfers of ownership of financial assets. 
Financial assets consists of debt claims and ownership claims. Debt claims are promises of 
someone else to pay, ownership claims give the owner the right about an asset. The 
literature on rural financial markets covers several decades and starts with the discussion 
about the failure of the market mechanism and policies to direct financial intermediation as 
well as the influence of human behavior1. It includes the importance of technologies, 
organizations, contracts and institutional design for financial development. Recently, the 
forum embodied discussions on prudential regulations and governance structures. 
The market and policy failure approach 
Based on the assumption of a positive relationship between financial and economic 
development, rural credit markets have been at the center stage of often unsuccessful policy 
intervention in developing countries over the last decade (Gonzales, 1994). In the 1950s the 
lack of access to formal credit, the high and dispersed interest rates and short duration of 
loans were perceived as the main problem in rural financial markets. These problems in rural 
financial markets were considered as a reflection of two types of market failure, the 
information problem and monopoly power. This failure served as a justification for 
                                                          
1 Includes the influence of cultural and social factors as well as economic/financial considerations  
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 government intervention (von Pischke, 1996). Early reservations and critics about 
government credit programs in rural areas came from D. Penny (1968) and D. Adams 
(1971). This and the experience with government failure shifted the first message of “policy 
failure” in the 1970s (Gonzales, 1994) to the message “policies continue to matter and 
financial technologies matter too” in the 1980s.  
Efficient financial intermediation and institutional viability 
Already in 1966 Patrick emphasized in his work the importance of the efficiency of financial 
intermediation through the private market mechanism in allocating scarce capital to its most 
productive uses. Under some conditions, however, the private optimal allocation diverges 
from the social optimum, e.g. if the financial institutions avoid risk more than socially 
desirable. In his work on farm credit policy Penny (1968) studied the behavior of farmers in 
eight villages in Indonesia. He found out that farmers differed widely from village to village in 
their attitudes towards economic development and debt. He states that it is not lack of capital 
or credit access in agriculture that inhibits development but lack of farmers’ motivation to use 
the capital or credit sources they already have. 
Analogous to the emerging message of the 1990s “organizational design matters for 
appropriate policies and cost-effective technologies to be adopted and implemented” 
(Gonzalez, 1994) von Pischke and Adams (1980) stressed in their paper on agricultural 
credit projects the importance of the institutional viability. They proposed a strategy that is 
centered on the performance of institutions assuming that target groups are most efficiently 
benefiting when institutions serving them are efficient and financially strong. According to 
their findings, projects which undermine the viability and financial integrity of a credit agency 
should not be termed successes. 
Access to credit and information asymmetries 
In the discussion on access to credit especially for farm households, several financial and 
non-financial features of the borrower may have an influence. According to David and Meyer 
(1980) differences in technology, yield and price uncertainty of farm commodities, 
management ability, product and input prices as well as financial constraints and savings 
may explain differences between borrowing and non-borrowing farm households. The 
conclusion of Lee (1983) in his work on the role of financial intermediation in the activities of 
rural firms and households is that the potential demand for effective financial intermediation 
in rural areas appears to be strong. However, low participation in savings and credit services 
in rural areas is often explained by the local inaccessibility, the high costs and the rigidity of 
services. In this context, a study by Feder (1989) about the demand for agricultural credit and 
farm performance in China suggests that the limited demand for loans goes hand in hand 
with the limited supply of farm input factors. Credit constraints may have been more 
pronounced if the supply of inputs were increased. 
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 It becomes clear from these empirical and theoretical works that the pure focus on socio-
cultural aspects, or the theory of monopolistic moneylenders (Stigler, 1967) and of perfect 
markets with market clearing prices reflecting the high risks and information costs, fail to 
explain all features of rural credit markets. Advances have evolved from the paradigm of 
imperfect information and imperfect enforcement. It says that rural credit markets behave the 
way they do because of the problems of screening, incentives and enforcement (Hoff, 1993). 
There are a direct and an indirect mechanism to partly solve these problems. While the first 
entails an active screening of the borrowers and limiting the range of lending activities to 
particular groups, the latter relies on “the design of contracts by lenders such that, when a 
borrower responds to these contracts in his own best interests, the lender obtains information 
about the riskiness of the borrower, and induces him to take actions to reduce the likelihood 
of default and to repay the loan whenever he has the resources to do so” (Hoff, 1993). 
Braverman (1993) supports this view and argues that the problems with rural agricultural 
financial markets are related to the poor design of incentive systems within financial 
institutions and to government imposed interest rate ceilings. He suggests that the 
apparently large influence of social and cultural factors on the performance of financial 
institutions requires more experimentation among alternative modes of organizations in 
lending and savings mobilization.  
Williamson (1985), Bardhan (1989), Hoff (1990), and Besley (1995) identify and summarize 
the major constraints to financial market development as information asymmetries, lack of 
suitable collateral and high transaction costs. Similarly, in his paper on financial innovations 
to facilitate credit access Meyer (1997) considers collateral as an important factor influencing 
access to credit. According to him, small farmers have fewer assets acceptable as collateral 
so they are more likely than the rich to be credit rationed. But because of the absence of 
complete information about borrowers, banks require collateral either as a mechanism to 
enforce loan payment (Plaut, 1985), or as a screening device to sort borrowers of varying 
riskiness (Bester, 1985). Some informal arrangements require collateral for loans, but 
informal finance has frequently developed effective collateral substitutes using interlinked 
contracts, peer monitoring and group lending (Meyer, 1997). However, these possible 
alternative approaches transfer risk from the lender to the cosigners (Stiglitz, 1993). Besides 
appropriate staff incentives, loan delivery and social mechanisms, Yaron (1994) stresses 
self-sustainability and outreach of the financial institution as important performance 
indicators. One key element for successful institutions appears to be the introduction of a 
social mechanism supplying peer pressure to repay loans.  
Recent discussions emphasize the importance of a supportive legal and regulatory 
framework. The formulation of appropriate prudential banking laws, financial contract laws 
and procedures (GTZ, 1999) as well as strong governance structures for financial institutions 
are important areas for policy interventions and cooperative activities in financial 
development. In this context, Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) pursue an approach which 
7 
 consists of viewing a bank as an ordinary firm. They argue that only the market failure 
stemming from the depositors’ collective action problem requires a regulation. 
The review of approaches and models to explain the functioning and problems of rural 
financial markets shows that many factors as well as their interaction and interrelation affects 
the performance of rural financial markets. The paper by Yaron (1994) on rural financial 
institutions, reviews the policy, modes of operation, incentives and financial performance of 
widely perceived successful institutions and supports this complexity of factors. His 
conclusion is that a solution which works in one socioeconomic environment will not 
necessarily work in another, where social values are different. However, if national policy is 
to foster economic development through financial development, it is necessary to isolate the 
relevant financial variables that constrain the development of financial markets and to 
operationalize them as instruments of economic policy. To do this for the specific situation of 
transition economies is the intention of this study. 
2.1.2 Financial sector development in transition economies 
The transition process to a market economy entails extensive changes on rather different 
levels of a country, e.g. the establishment of a proper legal, institutional and policy 
framework, appropriate education system, governance, property rights, liberalization, etc.. An 
efficient sequencing of these changes is difficult but the reform of equity ownership and the 
restructuring of enterprises were often two essential measures which accompanied the 
process from the beginning. The distribution of equity to individuals does not necessarily 
imply a change in structure or in production practices of a firm (World Bank, 1995). Replacing 
the state ownership of enterprises by private equity holders must be accompanied by 
appropriate sources of financing and a corporate governance structure that imposes 
discipline on managers and reduces the principle-agency problems (Smith, 1993; Walter, 
1993). At this point an efficiently functioning financial sector is vital for a successful 
restructuring of the enterprise sector.  
In both transition countries and developed market countries, financial markets can be 
considered as key elements for the functioning of modern economies. Their existence can be 
traced back to three elements (Viñals, 1992): time, uncertainty and space. The time 
dimension arises from the desire of households’ and firms’ to transfer purchasing power from 
the present into the future or vice versa. The uncertainty dimension refers to the presence of 
risk which can impose serious impediments for economic activities and consequently for 
efficient resource allocation. However, as Arrow (1964) discussed, there exists a market 
equilibrium and an efficient allocation of resources if sufficient financial instruments are 
offered to cover the different states of natures or risk levels. Finally, the space dimension 
comprises the differing location of borrowers and lenders where the financial intermediary 
literally represents a marketplace for the meeting between demanders and suppliers of 
capital. 
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 The financial system has to fulfill three main functions, (Rybczynski, 1992) (1) collecting 
voluntarily generated savings and allocating them to economic activities with the highest 
expected return, (2) monitoring the use of money and disciplining the managers/owners in 
case the financial results gained are inadequate and (3) creating and managing a payment 
system, and developing a clearing and settlement system to economize on financial, human 
and real resources. Given a sound economic environment, namely an adequate institutional 
building, an elaborated legal, supervisory and regulatory framework and overall economic 
stability, the financial system will fulfill these three functions. In reality, however the 
functioning of financial markets in transition economies is limited by incomplete markets 
plagued by asymmetric information, immobility of production factors, heterogeneous products 
and factors and high transaction costs leading to organizational inefficiency.  
At the beginning of the financial system reform, discussions (Rybcynski, 1992, Girard, 1992, 
Nicoleascu, 1993, Guitan, 1993, Blommestein, 1993, Roe, 1992, Thorne, 1993, Mullineux, 
1996) focused on the legacy of the past, on the future role of the financial system as well as 
on the necessary and sequential steps to transform the system, like supportive laws, 
supervision, prudential regulation, organization, corporate governance, monetary and human 
resource management. The main problem encountered at the beginning of the reform 
process of the financial system were ‘bad-loans’ (Levine, Scott, 1993, Mullineux, 1996), 
ownership structure (Roe, 1992), bank supervision and prudential regulation, technical 
issues, macroeconomic factors, adequate capital resources and interest rates (Karailev, 
1993; Petkova, 1993). Smith and Walter (1993) considered the choice of linkage between 
financial institutions and privatized industrial sectors as the critical issue. According to them, 
effective monitoring and control of the industrial sector is a topic of continuing debate, 
involving the discussions about the choice between the Japanese ‘keiretsu’, the Anglo-
American capital market or the German universal banking as the model to describe the 
relationship between banks and industry.  
Hence overall sound economic and financial settings as well as a supportive legal 
environment are necessary but insufficient conditions for an efficiently working banking 
sector. To contribute to the development of the capital market, banks have to be able to 
assess a firm’s financial position, prospective situation and profitability as well as the 
riskiness of projects. For banks to be able to do this, reliable information about the 
enterprise’s operations is needed and there must be a readiness of the enterprise to deliver 
the information and the techniques and technologies to process the information and judge 
the firm’s creditworthiness (Calvo, 1993).  
Griffith-Jones (1995) discerns the asymmetric information and the lack of appropriate 
collateral as a major impediment for lending to small and medium sized businesses in 
particular in Eastern European countries. According to her, asymmetric information in 
combination with macroeconomic instability, inadequate bank regulation and imperfect 
competition leading to a higher risk of default resulting in lower expected profits enforces 
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 credit rationing. In the case of asymmetric information and high transaction costs, the 
financial institutions are unable to distinguish between high and low risk borrowers. To limit 
their risk they either charge a premium to cover expected losses or they avoid the riskier 
areas of economic activities by setting credit limits (Viñals, 1992) resulting in credit rationing 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Prevailing asymmetric information in the market leads to external 
financial constraints for firms and to limited possibilities of substituting new equity for debt 
(Viñals, 1992). In particular, in transition countries the underdeveloped economic 
environment for financial markets as well as incomplete markets impose several constraints 
on the development of efficient financial markets and on overall economic development. In 
turn, the low developed and only heavily bank-based (EBRD, 1998) financial markets confine 
the development of the market economy.  
To overcome these impediments to economic development the establishment of a sound 
financial environment as well as the creation and design of new financial products (Schrieder 
1997) is necessary. All new financial products which make markets more efficient and 
complete are defined as financial innovations (Van Horne, 1985). Financial innovations not 
only encompass new products but also a new organization or processes e.g. electronic 
transfers and changes in the financial framework such as trends towards securitization and 
off-balance sheet activities (Viñals, 1992). In this context, as a pre-requisite to functioning 
financial markets, Arrow’s (1964) model of security markets offers possibilities to share risks 
and to enhance the markets with more information (on prices, supply, demand and risk). 
In a theoretical paper on financing investment in Eastern Europe Holmstrom (1993) states 
the information gap between those who have more money than ideas and those who have 
more ideas than money, as the fundamental problem of financing. For matching money and 
ideas he mentions two vehicles, collateral securing the investor’s funds and intermediation 
bridging the information gap. However, the value of collateral is determined by its 
marketability, which in turn, depends on the symmetry of information about the future returns 
of such an asset and the maintenance of collateral. Since collateral plays such an important 
role in attracting funds, he recommends the development of collateral lending. This implies a 
reduction in information asymmetries which appears to be, at least partly, the result of 
prevailing uncertainties which comprise according to Holmstrom (1993) uncertainties through 
inflation, political and legal actions of the government.  
2.1.3 From a centrally planned to a market economy 
A stylized centrally planned economy encompasses three economic units, government 
including any kind of institutions, firms comprising all units producing commodities and 
households. The government employs a central plan determined to distribute commodities 
and money between firms and between firms and households. According to the central plan 
the firms employ labor and produce commodities that the households consume. The 
households receive income from the firms or the government that they can either save or 
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 spend on commodities produced by firms. The type of products and services, the quantity of 
goods commodities and input prices as well as wages are set by the government. Thus, a 
market clearing mechanism which determines the demand and supply of commodities as in a 
market economy does not exist.  
The ‘so called’ financial institutions collect capital from households and ‘surplus making’ firms 
through savings and transfers the money as instructed to the government or to ‘non-surplus 
making’ firms. The resource capital is not allocated according to highest expected returns but 
according to social and/or governmental interests. Consequently, the financial institutions’ 
sole function is to establish a capital and an implicit tax transfer system but they do not 
efficiently allocate capital, monitor the borrowers’ financial performance or exert influence on 
economic and/or managerial decisions. Financial control under classical socialism includes a 
totally passive credit and money system for enterprises as money demand determines 
money supply (Buch, 1996). The monetary system did not allow enterprises to bid for scarce 
resources (McKinnon, 1993) and inconsistencies between the financial needs of the 
production plan and financial flows are leveled out through the extension of additional credit 
(Buch, 1996). Through the price setting mechanism and the extraction of firm surpluses the 
government implicitly collects ‘taxes’ with little codification in formal tax law. In such a stylized 
centrally planned economy, no law addressing the issue of income tax is necessary if 
enterprises withhold household income (McKinnon, 1993) and increase instead their 
surpluses which in turn are skimmed off by the state. 
The transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy requires a thorough 
restructuring of the whole economy. It has been accepted and recognized that for the 
transformation of a command economy into a market economy the re-establishment of 
property rights, the liberalization of prices, the introduction of competition (Rybczynski, 1992), 
the elimination of subsidies, the liberalization of trade and the introduction of currency 
convertibility (Mullineux, 1996) are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the process of 
transformation. An essential requirement is institutional infrastructure (Mullineux, 1996) 
including the creation and/or reform of the legal system which comprises an efficient taxation 
system, corporate governance, regulation, supervision as well as bankruptcy (disclosure) 
and banking laws. In addition, an open, flexible, competitive and efficient financial system 
contributing to the efficient allocation of capital and the creation of a payments system to 
support these new commercial relationships is also necessary (Mullineux, 1996, Rybczynski, 
1992). 
However, once the liberalization process begins the central planning system is weakened by 
the loss of property rights, decision power, price setting rights and monopoly power. 
Additionally, the establishment of property rights and price liberalization deprives the 
government of its implicit tax income (McKinnon, 1993). The privatization of former state 
enterprises led to ‘loss making’ firms with a majority of shares still hold by the state or a state 
owned institution and to ‘surplus making’ firms hold in private ownership. With the 
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 privatization or liquidation of former state owned enterprises the existing labor market is 
unable to absorb the excess employees when the labor force is released. At the beginning of 
the transformation process when state revenues decline due to decreased implicit tax 
income and expenditures increase because of social transfers, the government’s only capital 
source to finance state enterprise losses and budget deficit are loans from the central state 
owned banks.  
Local governments pressure the banks to lend to enterprises they own or control, and to 
finance infrastructure investments in their localities (McKinnon, 1993). The lending to 
inefficient and/or ‘loss making’ firms does not necessarily improve the financial results of 
those companies, rather it can deteriorate the financial institutions asset structure and lead to 
a ‘bad-loan’ problem which is a common problem for banks in all transition countries. The 
existence of poorly or non-performing loans on the balance sheet inhibits the financial 
institution’s capacity to play a key role in economic development. Moreover, it may seem 
rational to banks to continue to approve loans of non-performing borrowers in order to keep 
the biggest debtors afloat and to disguise the extent of the ‘bad- loan’ problem and the 
evidence of their possible bankruptcy (Mullineux, 1996). As the liabilities of financial 
institutions consist, to a large extent, of deposits from households, the households, in 
essence, are paying the cost of restructuring. This induces economic agents to loose 
confidence in the financial market system. For this reason, the reform of the banking system 
has to occur carefully and should proceed the privatization of non-financial firms. This is 
because the main source of finance for privatized firms and newly created small and medium 
sized enterprises will be the banks (Mullineux, 1996).  
Along side the privatization and liberalization process, the restructuring of existing 
enterprises leads to a considerable shedding of labor. If the unemployment level is to be 
contained new sources of employment need to be established. In the OECD (Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries job creation occurred most rapidly in 
the small and medium sized enterprise (SME) sector in the 1980s (Mullineux, 1996). 
Therefore, a thriving small and medium sized agricultural and non-agricultural enterprise 
sector seems to be crucial for employment and thus for a successful transition from a 
centrally planned to market economy. Banks as financial intermediaries should provide 
capital for start-ups, joint ventures and restructuring in the SME sector. However, the 
combination of uncertainty (information, legal framework, prices, output) in transition 
economies and the relatively low risk threshold of banks as a result of limited information is 
expected to lead to credit rationing (Mullineux, 1996, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). As a result 
attention needs to be paid to the incentives used to induce banks to lend to the SME sector.  
2.1.4 Discussions on transformation and the financial sector in Romania 
In the discussion on growth and finance it was hypothesized and empirical evidence was 
presented that the performance of the financial system has a major influence on the 
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 performance of the overall economy. An efficient financial sector appears to directly induce 
investments and restructuring of enterprises and to contribute to economic growth by 
mobilizing and collecting domestic and foreign savings and by efficiently allocating these 
funds to investment opportunities. A sound financial sector, therefore, provides a mechanism 
for allocating risks and capital, spreading financial losses (EBRD, 1998) and transforming 
maturity of capital. Conversely, an unsound financial system imposes impediments on the 
development of a market economy and constraints economic growth. For this reason, the 
financial sector has been seen as of increasing significance for economic development in 
transition countries. 
The OECD Report on Romania (1998) describes the rural financial markets as poorly 
performing with a diminishing supply and demand for credit. The reasons for the insufficient 
availability of credit and investment capital in rural areas include the uncertain 
macroeconomic environment which favors the inter-bank lending and investment in treasury 
bills instead of promoting credit to the highly risky and far less attractive agricultural sector; 
failures to establish an appropriate institutional and legal framework for assets that can be 
used as collateral, the lack of pre-financing schemes for crops and the limited use of leasing; 
and the past practices of the government which provided subsidies to finance agricultural 
inputs of mainly loss making large agricultural enterprises and therewith inhibited financial 
institutions and farmers to rely on economic principles (OECD, 1998).  
Heidhues and Schrieder (1998) identified five factors limiting the development of the financial 
sector in Romania. These are: some inefficient former state enterprises, the government 
enforced subsidized lending to loss making state enterprises, the ‘bad-loan’ issue, the 
finance problems for small agricultural, backward and forward linked enterprises as well as 
the lack of economic diversity in rural areas. The suggested approach to overcome the 
constraints in rural financial markets in transition countries focuses on innovations at four 
levels: the macroeconomic level comprising the promotion of economic stability and 
confidence in a reliable and efficient financial sector through the enactment of trade and 
bankruptcy laws and the establishment of an independent central bank promoting monetary 
policy that is conductive to economic stability; the financial sector level entailing the 
establishment of a reliable, legally binding and regulatory framework for the financial sector 
and the implementation of laws and regulations which govern the capital structure, the risk 
management and the valuation of assets; the organizational structure including 
organizational financial innovations that support the restructuring of banks and reduce 
market entry barriers; and the product level referring to product innovations that satisfy the 
financial demand of the rural clientele (Schrieder, 1999). Contrary to Holstrom’s (1993) 
arguments to overcome information asymmetries by collateral lending, in the case of 
Romanian small scale farmers, the collateral requirements of financial institutions are still 
considered as an access constraint to credit for small agricultural enterprises. This is 
because the asset endowment of small scale farms or the asset “market value”, if any, is low 
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 and many farmers have not yet received all their land titles. However, the completion of land 
title distribution as well as a competitive land market is expected to ease the collateral 
problem in the credit market (Schrieder; 1997).  
2.1.5 Discussions on transformation and the agricultural sector in Romania 
The main actors in the development of rural areas and the rural financial sector are branches 
or agencies of financial institutions, rural households and small enterprises. In Romania, 
agriculture represents the predominate economic activity in rural areas with approximately 
60% (NIS, 1998) of the total employment in the private sector. Rural areas are classified as 
(1) predominantly rural areas were more than 50% of the population lives in rural 
communities, (2) significantly rural areas where 15-50% of the population lives in rural 
communities and (3) predominately urbanized areas where less than 15% of the population 
lives in rural communities (OECD, 1996). In Romania, about 45% of the population lived in 
rural areas (NIS, 1998). In this context, a community is classified as rural if the population 
density per square kilometer is less than 150 persons. The overall population density in 
Romania is presently 100 persons per square kilometer (World Bank, 1999).  
The agricultural sector representing a large part of the SME sector in rural areas, plays a key 
role in the development of rural regions. Agriculture is considered as important because it 
employs much of the labor force in the early stages of development and rising farm incomes 
are spent largely on products of the rural sector boosting local demand and generating 
further increases in employment (Mellor, 1995). Hence, agriculture produces spill-over 
effects on the backward and forward linked sectors through its income generation, which in 
turn, leads to an increase in demand for input factors and consumption goods in rural areas. 
The spin-off effects on local activities from the spending of increased farm incomes are 
called agricultural growth linkages and they are considered to be an important element in the 
creation of rural industry (Delgado, Hazell, 1998). Further, the agricultural sector absorbs 
redundant labor forces from rural and urban areas and provides an additional labor force to 
firms in periods of labor scarcity and economic development. 
In the beginning of the transformation process the agricultural sector was restructured and 
many small private farms, a few cooperatives and a few large scales farms have emerged. 
The former economic structure was built around large scale farms, and mainly due to the 
lack of markets individual farmers face huge problems in getting inputs and marketing their 
products (Schrieder, 1997). Further, the endowment of human and financial capital is limited. 
Moreover, there is a lack of experience in cultivation, management and marketing among the 
“newly created” private farms which are often managed by former employees of state 
enterprises and cooperatives (ACE-PHARE, Farm Survey, 1997). To overcome the main 
problems on the farm level, the market and financial infrastructure, farm management and 
know-how needs to be improved. A better access to markets increases the input supply and 
the marketing opportunities. As regards the financial constraints, a better access to term 
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 finance through intensive information on financial products, simple application procedures 
and appropriate credit conditions may improve asset accumulation and facilitate firm growth 
(Caprio et al, 1996).  
The banking sector, however, especially the large commercial banks are not interested in 
lending to agriculture, in particular not to the small scale private farm sector. Even the former 
agricultural bank is reluctant to lend to small scale farmers due to the uncertainty of returns 
(Banca Agricola, 1997), the high transaction costs related with small loan sizes, seasonal 
incomes and the low value of farm assets available as loan security (Bank Interview, 
1997/98). It is evident that credit expansion in the farm sector is hampered by farmers’ lack 
of knowledge on the availability and the conditions of credit, and by the shortage of well 
trained bank staff who have experience in evaluating farm business’ performance and in 
dealing with small farmers (FAO, 1998; GTZ, 1998). Therefore, most of the small private 
farms in Romania, established since the 1990 reforms, are excluded from formal lending 
(EU-PHARE Farm Survey, 1997). There is no doubt that if the private individual farm sector 
is to develop, there is a need to improve its access to credit and other financial services 
(Schrieder, 1997). Without rapid progress in this area, the start-up of new private enterprises 
will be delayed, the sustainability of existing ones will be endangered and agricultural market 
development policies and investments will be greatly hindered (Heidhues, 1995). Since the 
small enterprises of this sector have an important role to play for the development of the 
overall economy and of rural areas in particular, the economic and financial constraints are 
analyzed as regards to their access to financial services later in this study. 
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 2.2 Description and analysis of the financial sector in Romania 
As a result of the changes during the transformation process, the financial sector in Romania 
presents itself today as a financial market with agents offering and demanding financial 
services and a legal and regulatory framework controlling financial transactions. According to 
the responsibilities and legal statute/legislation, the financial sector in Romania is roughly 
divided in four segments (Figure 4-1). Following is a discussion of the monetary, insurance 
and capital markets. In particular, with respect to the hypothesis of this study, the functioning 
and performance of the banking sector as the principal agent of the monetary market in 
Romania is discussed.  
Figure 2 Financial sector 
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2.2.1 The monetary market 
The money market and the monetary market discussed in this study represents two distinct 
markets. The money market consists of the foreign exchange market and of a market for 
short term loans in which money brokers arrange for loans between the banks and the 
government in the UK (Business, 1990). In Romania, the monetary market includes all 
financial transactions from financial institutions with corporations and individuals for all types 
of credit and deposit transactions as well as operating the payment system. [The supplier of 
financial services are formal and informal financial institutions such as banks or savings 
organizations and the customers are individuals and corporations such as insurance, service, 
retail and manufacturing companies, local authorities and governments as well as all kinds of 
funds.  
The legal and institutional framework 
With banking laws being passed in Romania in 1991, the parliament created the legal basis 
of the monetary market. It consisted of the Law on Banking Activities (no.33/1991) and the 
Law concerning the Status of the National Bank of Romania (no. 34/1991). In drafting these 
16 
 laws, the lawmakers took into account the European Union banking directives and standards 
(Invest Romania, 1999). 
The National Bank Law defines the central bank’s tasks, rights, operations and organization. 
The central bank is headed by a Board of Directors which are appointed by the Romanian 
parliament. According to the law, it enjoys independence from the government. According to 
the law no 34, the Board of Directors takes policy decisions and measures in the field of 
monetary policy, foreign exchange and credit policy as well as in the area of payment 
transfers. The overall objective is price stability which is ensured by the instruments of the 
monetary, foreign exchange and credit policy. Further, the central bank has the sole authority 
to issue bank notes and coins, to establish rules and regulations for banking activities, to 
license and supervise all entities operating as banking companies, to request from all 
financial institutions documents and information on financial activities and to verify this 
information. It is also responsible for foreign exchange operations, foreign reserves, gold 
transactions, establishing data on external assets and exchange rates as well as supervising 
and regulating foreign exchange transactions. The central bank also acts as the fiscal agent 
for the government with respect to the issuance, sale and redemption of bonds and other 
government securities. Further, it can grant limited advances to the state to cover temporary 
deficits. 
The Banking Law no. 33/1991 declares the National Bank of Romania as the sole institute 
with the authority to issue regulations in the monetary policy, credit, foreign exchange and 
payment domain and to supervise the activities of all banking companies. The banking 
companies have to submit to the central bank their monthly financial statements. However, 
saving banks, mutual benefit societies, credit cooperatives and other credit societies as well 
as investment funds will be supervised by the supervisory personnel in their respective 
associations. Thus, they are not subjected to regulation and supervision by the central bank.  
Several regulations limit banking activities. For example, a financial institution is restricted to 
owning 20% of the capital of companies whose activities have no connection to any banking 
activity. Further, a single loan must not exceed 20% of the bank’s capital and reserves and 
insider lending is permitted under certain provisions issued by the National Bank of Romania. 
Any credit granted exceeding a minimum amount specified by the central Bank has to be 
reported to the central bank . 
According to the Law 33/1991 a banking company is defined as a juridical entity whose main 
business purpose is to collect funds from and to grant credit to both legal and natural 
persons and has full liability. This definition of banking companies excludes savings banks, 
mutual benefit societies, credit cooperatives and other credit societies which, according to 
this definition are not considered as banks. The banking companies may operate only with a 
license issued by the central bank. To receive a banking license a minimum paid-up capital 
of 50% for the social capital is required, and the authorized capital must be paid-up 
completely within two years. Additional regulations include conditions like a minimum capital 
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 requirement of 5 million Euro. The banking activities may include deposits, credits with and 
without guarantees or collateral, monetary asset operations, transfer and clearing operations, 
foreign exchange, precious metal transactions, securities operations, banking consulting 
services and guarantees as well as other activities that the law permits. To build a sound 
capital base, the banks will distribute 20% of the annual gross profit to the reserve fund until 
the fund reaches a specified level. Banking companies may establish a risk fund for non-
performing loans up to 0.5% of the total amount of outstanding credits granted. To protect 
the depositors, voluntary funds may be established to insure the money deposited in banking 
companies for the benefit of natural persons. These funds will be supervised by the central 
bank. However, corporations have no deposit insurance, and neither the deposit insurance 
nor the publication of the non-participation in the deposit insurance fund is mandatory for 
banks. 
The depth of the money market 
The efficiency of a formal financial market can be described by its financial deepening 
measured in terms of the monetarisation of the economy, the number of formal financial 
institutions and the quantity and quality of financial services (Heidhues, 1997). 
The indicator M2/GDP is a measure of the degree of monetarisation of an economy. The 
broad money reaching approximately 29% of GDP in 1996, 25% in 1997 and 27% in 1998 
(NBR, Quarterly Bulletin 4/98, CNS, 1998) points to a low level of financial deepening in 
Romania. Further, the number of formal financial institutions and branches are still small. In 
total, Romania has approximately 1,250 bank branches and agencies or one branch for 
about 18,000 citizens (The Banker, 1998). The quantity of financial services or the 
development level of the money market (Meier, 1995) is reflected by the amount deposited or 
lent with financial institutions compared to GDP. Romania can still be considered as a cash 
society, since bank deposits and lending are each equivalent to no more than 25%-30% of 
GDP (The Banker, 1998). The range of financial services is relatively wide but restricted to 
the banks’ headquarters in the city, to large companies and influential individuals.  
The monetary policy 
The National Bank of Romania is the only institution that is responsible for the monetary 
policy of the country. Hence, the main objective for the National Bank of Romania is price 
stability which it seeks to achieve by influencing the quantity of money in circulation and by 
fixing interest rates. The instruments used are the reserve requirements, the lombard credit 
and discount rate, the deposit taking operations, the open-market operations and the foreign 
exchange transactions of the central bank. Some monetary indicators and instruments are 
listed in Table 2. 
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 Table 2 Monetary indicators 
 Dec. 1995 Dec. 1996 Dec. 1997 
Consumer price index, change in % *1 27.8 56.9 151.4 
Broad money (M2), change in % *1 73.3 63.3 131.5 
Domestic Credit  85.4 84.7 50.8 
Reserve requirement ratio for lei deposits, in % n.a. 7.5 10.0 
Lombard interest rate in % 96.7 90.0 140.0 
Discount rate in % 34.1 35.0 40.0 
Deposit rate on lei reserves in % 9.1 12.0 15.0 
Average lending rate of commercial banks to non-
bank customers in % 
47.5 53.6 55.6 
Average deposit rate of commercial banks to non-
bank customers in % 
32.4 38.9 34.1 
Change of exchange rate, Lei to US$ *1 in % 45.9 56.5 98.8 
Government securities and T-Bills in billion Lei 0 0 3,271.0
Source: National Bank of Romania, Monthly Bulletin 8/1997, 2/1998, own calculations 
Note: *1  annual changes  
 
Monetary policy was eased in early and mid 1997, leading to a lowering of interest rates in 
the banking system and the resumption of the lending process. Although, the broad money 
growth rose toward the end of 1997 compared to the end of 1996, the increase in consumer 
prices outweighed the increase in broad money leading to a real decrease in money supply. 
In line with the increase in broad money, the commercial banks' interest rates, exchange 
rates and required reserve ratio increased at the end of 1997 while the lending and deposit 
rates of the central bank remained unchanged. The refinancing policy with the lombard credit 
and discount rate was used only occasionally and had less significance in forming monetary 
policy. Since the introduction of government bills and the emergence of open market 
operations through the central bank in 1997 the government securities operations have 
played a minor role in liquidity control while the deposit taking operations have served as the 
main instrument for the absorption of the banking system liquidity in 1997 (NBR, Quarterly 
Bulletin 3/1997).  
Against a background of large foreign capital inflows and the depreciation of the national 
currency, the central bank continued its foreign exchange purchases and foreign borrowings 
but at a lower level than in the previous years. This also affects the monetary base.  
The banking sector 
This part of the work describes and analyses the structure of the banking sector, the main 
financial institutions and their performance, the financial products and the loan application 
process for non-agricultural enterprises and farms. 
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 The structure of the banking sector 
The structure, size and network of the banking sector and financial institutions reflects their 
ability or capability to serve a certain segment of the population (e.g. rural, urban) or certain 
sectors or enterprises in the economy with financial services. Hence, these factors represent 
a kind of measure for the supply of financial products in rural areas.  
By the end of 1997 the Romanian banking system enjoyed a two-tier banking structure 
consisting of the National Bank of Romania, 33 Romanian commercial banks and 10 foreign 
commercial banks. The Romanian commercial banks were all joint stock companies, of 
which five were totally state owned, eight are state and private ownership while the 
remaining were totally privately owned with some foreign participation. The foreign 
commercial banks in Romania are all branches (not subsidiaries) of foreign European or 
American banks. Besides the official registered banks (Figure 3), credit cooperatives as part 
of consumption cooperatives and under the cooperative law no. 109/1996 are not recognized 
as banks but play a major role in savings mobilization and lending, especially in rural areas. 
The results of the farm survey in 1997 reflect this fact (Heidhues, 2000). Further, some newly 
founded Popular Banks, not registered officially as banks and hence not subject to banking 
laws contribute to savings mobilization. In addition to the formal or semi-formal financial 
institutions, some informal organizations like savings groups, Roatas, exist in rural areas but 
their actual outreach and expansion seems to be small since according to the farm survey, 
only a few farmers participate in these kind of groups (Heidhues, 2000). 
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Performance of the banking sector 
The 1997 central bank's balance sheet is summarized in Table 3. About 55% of its assets 
are invested in foreign currencies2 comprising mainly gold (18%), deposits with foreign banks 
(20%) and US treasury bills (10%). Another 26% of its assets are in domestic currency but in 
foreign institutions. Approximately 14% of its assets consist of government securities and 
interbank assets. In comparison the Deusche Bundesbank holds around 44% of its assets in 
                                                          
2 compared to 37% of the Deutsche Bundesbank, 01/1999 
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 interbank operations (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1999). On the liability side 29% of liabilities are 
held in foreign currencies and the remaining liabilities/equity are interbank liabilities (24%), 
loans and deposits from foreign institutions in domestic currency (22%), currency issue 
(20%) and equity (1%). The net foreign assets, amounting to about 25% of the 
assets/liabilities, represent a reserve against currency depreciation and thus a security 
against exchange rate risk. The net position of the interbank liabilities (17% of liabilities) 
indicates the binding of the banking system’s liquidity into national bank deposits as a major 
monetary instrument for the control of the quantity of money. In line with this, the 
engagement of the central bank in open market operations through treasury bill transactions 
is very limited. The net credit to the government reaches around 5% of all assets. 
Table 3 Balance sheet of the National Bank of Romania, end of 1997 
Assets Asset 
ratio in %  
*1 
Liabilities Liability 
ratio in %  
*1 
Total assets 100.0 Total liabilities and equity 100.0 
Assets in foreign currencies 54.7 Liabilities in foreign currencies 29.3 
Assets in domestic currency 
Credit to government 
of which treasury bills 
of which gov’t securities 
Interbank assets 
Deposits in foreign institution in lei 
Other assets 
of which settlements with IMF 
45.3 
6.7 
1.7 
5.0 
6.9 
15.7 
15.9 
10.3 
Liabilities domestic currency 
Public deposits 
of which state treasury account 
Currency issue 
Interbank liabilities  
Loans and deposits from foreign  
institutions in lei 
Other liabilties 
of which revaluation gains 
70.7 
1.4 
1.4 
19.8 
24.0 
 
22.4 
2.1 
1.3 
  Equity and reserves 1.1 
Source:  National Statistic Commission 1998, National Bank of Romania, 1998, own calculations 
Note: *1 Ratios refer to total assets or liabilities + equity 
 
The observations from the balance sheet of the National Bank of Romania in 1997, depicted 
in Table 3 are that it hardly invests in domestic securities. The focus of monetary policy is on 
deposit taking operations to absorb liquidity. The operation with government securities is a 
new market started in 1997 and there still seems to be a lack of confidence in the fiscal and 
financial discipline of the government (budget policy). 
The 1997 commercial banks' aggregated sheet encompasses the assets and liabilities of the 
formal financial institutions registered at the central bank. It shows a focus on domestic 
assets (86%), while the interbank assets and other non-defined assets comprise 17% and 
23% of all assets, respectively. Approximately 47% of the assets are invested in domestic 
credit comprising of government credit (11%), credit to the population (2%) and to business 
(14%). However, almost 50% of all credits to enterprises receive majority state owned 
companies. Almost 20% of all assets are credits to domestic persons but in foreign 
currencies. This points to a great amount of import financing. Nine percent of all assets 
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 represent overdue credits (almost 20% of domestic credit) and the cash holding is rather 
small. The deposits as well as loans from the central bank are included in the interbank 
operations. A large part of the liabilities consist of domestic deposits composed of deposits in 
foreign currency (17.6%) and in domestic currency (35%). The share of households deposits, 
almost 27% of all liabilities is relatively high, but in general is of short-term maturity.  
Table 4  Aggregated balance sheet of Romanian commercial banks, end of 1997 
Assets Asset 
ratio in 
%   *1 
Liabilities Liability 
ratio in 
%   *1 
Total assets 100.0 Total liabilities and equity 100.0 
Foreign assets  
of which in cash 
13.5 
0.4 
Foreign liabilities  
of which deposits 
9.2 
1.9 
Domestic assets 
Domestic credit 
Credit to gov’t 
Credit to non-gov’t 
Credit in lei 
Short term in lei 
Medium & long term in lei 
Credit to population in lei 
Credit to enterprises in lei 
Credit to majority state owned firms 
Overdue credit 
Credit in foreign currency 
National currency holding 
Interbank assets 
Other assets 
86.5 
46.8 
11.1 
35.7 
16.2 
12.8 
3.3 
1.6 
14.5 
6.6 
9.0 
19.6 
0.5 
16.7 
22.6 
Domestic Liabilities  
Domestic deposits 
Public deposits 
Non-bank deposits 
Deposits in lei 
Demand deposits 
Time, restricted, certificate deposits 
Household deposits 
Enterprise deposits 
 
 
Deposits in foreign currencies 
 
Interbank liabilities 
Other liabilities 
81.2 
54.9 
2.2 
52.7 
35.1 
20.5 
32.2 
26.8 
21.7 
 
 
17.6 
 
8.7 
17.5 
  Equity and reserves 9.7 
Source:  National Statistic Commission 1998, National Bank of Romania, 1998, own calculations 
Note: *1 Ratios refer to total assets and liabilities + equity 
 
The aggregate balance sheet of the commercial banks, depicted in Table 4, allows the 
following conclusions:  
- There is no excess liquidity in the formal banking sector. Rather, there seems to prevail a 
liquidity constraint manifested by the high share of overdue credits and interbank 
operations. 
- The banking sectors’ share of securities and participation is not indicated explicitly and 
seems to be relatively small as investment opportunities are rare. 
- The short term deposit structure gives evidence of a prevailing uncertainty in the banking 
sector with respect to future economic development. 
Among commercial banks the largest banks with respect to assets and equity are the state or 
joint state and private owned banks, Bancorex, Bank Comerciala Romana, Bank Agricola, 
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 Romanian Development Bank and the National Savings Bank. The core business of 
Bancorex is export and import financing. Similar to other state owned banks there was and 
still is no supply of loans to individuals. The Romanian commercial banks and the agricultural 
bank were formerly specialized banks serving firms but nowadays they have the permission 
to deal with all group of clients. In the commercial banks’ loan portfolio, the loans to state 
enterprises dominate while the share of individuals loans is close to zero. However, in 1997 
the parliament passed a draft law on the privatization of majority state owned banks. The 
purpose of this law is to increase efficiency of the commercial banks and to provide a better 
allocation of financial resources (Invest Romania, 1999). 
Since Banca Agricola (BA) was the former "housebank" of the agricultural sector, most of its 
assets (74%) are investments in loans to customers engaged in the agricultural sector or in 
associated businesses by the end of 1995. About 61% of the assets, or 82% of the loan 
portfolio are short term loans, while the remainder are advances. The second largest asset 
position are accrued interests, with 12% of all assets. According to the annual report of 
Banca Agricola in 1995, around 40% of its loan portfolio and thus, 25% of the assets, 
represented loans to companies or farmers outside the state sector. In addition, 40% of the 
loan portfolio (25% of all assets) are advances on loans to agricultural enterprises and farms 
unable to repay the amount due. Approximately 38% of the liabilities are funds from the 
central bank, 21% are amounts due to other banks and 29% are short term deposits or sight 
deposits due to customer. BA seems to have a leading position amongst the commercial 
banks since it has kept 30% of loans in the economy and together with the National Savings 
Bank it attracts around 80% of the public savings. Further, its branch and agency network is 
the second largest after those of the National Savings Bank (Annual Report 1995, Banca 
Agricola S.A. Romania).  
The Romanian Development Bank (RDB) supports mainly the manufacturing sector since the 
share of this sector on the loan portfolio amounts to around 20% of RDB’s assets. Besides 
the manufacturing, commercial and construction sector it lends around 8% of its assets to the 
agricultural sector, but only 3% to individuals.  
The leading bank with regard to employees and branches is the National Savings, Bank 
(Table 5) a former savings institute that was not allowed to lend money before the reform 
process. Its liabilities are 60% from deposits and availabilities of individuals while about 2.5% 
of its assets are loans to the population. The average savings balance per passbook was 
around 150,000 lei in 1996. The profit derives from interest revenues, bank deposits and 
Treasury Certificates.  
One of the largest private banks is Bankcoop, whose founders and shareholders are the 
consumer and credit cooperatives, individuals, other organizations and economic agents 
along with private, mixed and state owned capital. Approximately, 60% of the bank assets 
are loans and comprise of 12% in production companies, 17% trade companies, 4 % 
agricultural enterprises or individual farms and 6% individuals. In contrast, Banca Comerciala 
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 Ion Tiriac approved 0.2% of its assets for loans to individuals and 1% of its assets for loans 
to the agricultural sector.  
Table 5 Commercial banks end of 1996 
Name Number of 
branches or 
agencies 
Number of 
employees 
Assets in % 
to all 
Romanian 
commercial 
banks 
Equity in % 
to all 
Romanian 
commercial 
banks 
Bancorex 36 3579 23.3 10.3 
Banca Comerciala Romana 211 11342 15.7 15.5 
Banca Agricola 310 11593 14.9 8.2 
Romanian Development Bank 182 3755 6.8 11.7 
National Savings Bank (CEC) 2233 12687 5.8 7.1 
Bankcoop 240 5100 3.9 3.3 
Banca Comerciala Ion Tiriac 24 n.a. 2.9 4.4 
Source: The Banker, 06/1998, Annual Reports of Commercial Banks, 1996, National Statistic 
Commission 1998 
 
The consumer cooperatives with the Central Cooperative Union (CENTROCOOP) as the 
head organization have a long tradition in Romania. Today, they have representatives in all 
districts and in many communities. At the community level 2,500 primary consumer 
cooperatives and 840 primary credit cooperatives are active. At the district level (judet) they 
are affiliated to 41 Federal Consumer and Credit Coop unions, which, in turn, are affiliated to 
the joint apex body CENTROCOOP. The credit and consumption cooperatives on the 
community level are said to be independent, each having its general assembly and board of 
directors (Heidhues, 1995). Besides the consumption and credit cooperatives, the 
CENTROCOOP also has cooperative training centers, marketing and consulting 
cooperatives, a publication, statistic and data center. The credit cooperatives are widely 
represented in rural areas and operate on the basis of their members’ funds made up of 
members’ shares and savings deposits. For every loan made, one fifth has to be deposited 
with the credit cooperative’s social fund. The credit cooperatives extend loans and take 
deposits only from members which are natural persons, mainly farm households (Heidhues, 
1995). The deposit interest rates and ‘large’ loan rates are market rates while the rates for 
small loans are below the market interest rates. In 1999, for loans up to 3 million lei the rate 
was 30-50% p.a.. For large loans the credit cooperatives require a collateral of about 120% 
of the loan amount plus interest rates, and small loans are secured by two cosigners or 
guarantors. The assets of the cooperatives consist of credits to its members and of 
investments in small enterprises and bank deposits. The liabilities comprise members’ 
shares, savings, interbank liabilities and a so called savings fund (Bank survey, 1998). 
The lack of deposit insurance impedes the mobilization of savings. The intermediation 
between the credit cooperatives is limited. A credit cooperative with surplus funds is unable 
to transfer money to those which are in need of funds (Heidhues, 1995). For these reasons 
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 the credit cooperatives are capital constrained and their outreach (in loans size) is limited. 
The CENTROCOOP has considerable influence and control over the activities of the federal 
and primary credit cooperatives, which are not subject to the banking law and the supervision 
of the National Bank. 
Briefly, the characteristics of the Romanian banking sector can be summarized as: 
- The largest banks with respect to assets and equity are partly or fully state owned banks. 
- The main activities of the large partly or fully state owned banks focus on lending to 
corporations and not to individuals. The private farm sector is also neglected. 
- The National Savings Bank, due to its large branch network, is the only organization 
which is able to mobilize a large amount of savings from the households. It transfers the 
money from the households to the state, banks and enterprises, via securities, deposits 
and loans. 
- The largest private banks seem to recognize the private sector as a potential business 
partner since they have a higher share of outstanding loans to individuals than the state 
banks.  
- The credit cooperatives with their large network, although not recognized as a banking 
institute only offer services to individuals including farmers. The lending capacity of these 
services is rather limited. 
Financial products in rural areas 
The information on financial products offered in Romania outlined here come from a detailed 
interview of a private bank in Timis county and from several interviews with bank agencies 
and branches in the rural areas of Brasov and Dolj counties. The types and features of 
financial products offered to certain segments of customers reflect the supply of financial 
services - in this case the supply of services to the rural population.  
The main financial products offered are payment transfers, saving facilities and loans to 
individuals and legal entities. While the savings facilities are accessible for any type of 
person in possession of a minimum amount of money, several types of loans are limited to a 
certain type of customer. 
In the savings business, the banks differentiate interest rates and minimum required deposit 
amount between individuals and corporations. To encourage the formation of savings 
deposits the individuals’ interest rates are higher and the minimum deposit amount is lower 
than for corporations. In general, the financial institutions offer the following products: 
1) Checking account from which the owner is able to draw checks and deposit or withdraw 
cash. 
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 2) Savings deposit where the depositors receive a passbook with which they are eligible to 
deposit or withdraw any time a limited amount of money within a given period of time. 
The minimum deposit was around 200,000 lei in 1997. 
3) Term deposits are short and medium term certificates with a maturity of one to 18 months 
and a minimum deposit of 200-500,000 lei for individuals in 1997. The money deposited 
is available after the maturity of the contract.  
In the credit business, the banks distinguish not only between individuals and legal entities, 
but also between sectors, types of investment and working capital financing for corporations 
as well as between consumption and investment loans for individuals as illustrated in  
Table 6.  
For loans to private households, the financial institutions require in addition to the actual 
purchased and financed good other collateral such as a car or house and two or three 
guarantors or cosigners as security. However, since consumption loans are rather small and 
mainly used for the purchase of housing equipment, the actual purchase and the guarantors 
are considered as sufficient securities for the banks. But for the financing of a car, truck, or 
house a financial institution requires either the ownership certificate of the car or a mortgage 
as security. To be eligible for the loan application the potential individual borrower must 
provide proof of employment and have a regular sufficiently high income. Further they have 
to agree to a credit insurance contract which compensates, in case of a loan default, the 
bank’s loss after the forfeiture or execution in the collateral. In such cases the banks make 
use of the guarantee (cosigners) and the pledged items which were provided as securities 
and then use the credit insurance to cover the remaining debt. One of the banks interviewed 
had a special agreement with the retailer and household equipment shops in its city. Here, if 
a private customer intends to buy household equipment on credit basis, the shops became 
responsible for the screening of the client, the collecting of documents and for filling out of 
the required credit application forms. The banking institute’s sole task is to check the 
completeness of the documents, to decide whether to issue the loan and to administer the 
loan reimbursement. This procedure helps the bank to reduce the working time spent on a 
loan application and to access customers immediately at the shops. 
In contrast to these private consumption loans, the application procedure for corporations or 
legal entities is time consuming. They have to reveal their financial situation by submitting 
diverse reports, such as the annual report, monthly reports on revenues/expenses and 
income statements, business or operation plan, etc.. Further, they have to provide securities 
such as buildings, machinery, stocks and equipment even for short term loans. The financial 
institute has to examine and evaluate all the documents and to assess the financial situation 
of the enterprise. In case of a loan default, however, the banks are able to cease all assets of 
an enterprise, as well as the pledged assets.  
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 Treatment for the private farmer is again different. They are able to receive credit as 
individual even for the financing of agricultural inputs or machinery if they are able to show 
sufficient regular income and have one family member with outside employment willing to 
guarantee the loan. If the individual farmer fails to repay, the financial institutions have 
access only to the pledged assets and to the guarantors. In cases where the farmer or family 
member is unable to show a regular income or employment, the financial institution 
theoretically accepts a loan application as a legal entity. Here the financial institution requires 
the presentation of a wide range of additional documents or certificates such as owned and 
cultivated area, cultivation plan, annual profit/loss statement, monthly income statement from 
the mayor, input supply contracts, sales contract and proof of credit use. In the case of loan 
default all assets of the agricultural enterprise can be ceased.  
Table 6 Loan types *1 
 credit to 
persons individuals corporations 
credit type 
according  to 
sectors 
households 
 
agricultural enterprises manufacturing/production 
enterprises 
Commercial 
enterprises 
credit type 
according  to credit 
purpose 
consump-
tion credit 
in 
coopera-
tion with 
retailer, 
shops, 
e.g. loans 
for living 
facilities 
consump-
tion credit 
direct from 
bank, e.g. 
loan for 
TV, PC 
invest-
ment 
credit 
direct from 
bank, e.g. 
loan for 
housing, 
car, tractor
for input 
factors e.g. 
for fertilizer, 
seeds, 
herbicides  
for 
investment 
e.g. for 
tractor, 
plow, 
stable, barn, 
for input 
factors, e.g. 
raw 
materials 
for 
investment, 
e.g. for 
building, 
machinery 
 
maturity 1-12 
months 
1-12 
months 
1-5 years 1-12 
months 
1-5 years 1-12 
months 
1-5 years 1-12 
months 
securities 3 guaran-
tors,  
credit 
insurance 
2 guaran-
tors, 
equipment 
credit 
insurance 
2 guaran-
tors, 
mortgage 
machine, 
credit 
insurance 
mortgage, 
machines, 
stable 
mortgage, 
machines, 
buildings 
mortgage, 
machines, 
buildings 
mortgage, 
machines, 
buildings 
mortgage, 
equipment, 
traded 
goods 
required 
documents 
employ-
ment 
prove, 
wage 
statement 
employ-
ment 
prove, 
wage 
statement 
employ-
ment 
prove, 
wage 
statement 
annual 
report, 
monthly 
revenues 
and 
expenses 
annual 
report, 
monthly 
revenues 
and 
expenses 
annual 
report, 
monthly 
revenues 
and 
expenses 
annual 
report, 
monthly 
revenues 
and 
expenses 
annual 
report, 
monthly 
revenues 
and 
expenses 
Interest rates as of 
11/1997, variable  
in % *2 
59 60 60 60 60 50-55 50-55 55-60 
Source: Bank interviews 1997/98 
Note: *1 of one of the interviewed banks (Bankcoop)    *2 the consumer price index compared to the end of the 
previous year was 252,4 (1997) and 140.6 (1998), Quarterly Bulletin No 4/1998 of the NBR  
 
In Romania, generally evaluations experts or specialists are in charge of the evaluation of the 
pledged assets of individuals and corporations. Normally, there are three approaches that 
can be used to estimate the security values of pledged assets. This is either according to the 
market value, to the purchase or construction value, or to the income contribution value or 
discounted value of returns of say house rental. The purchase and market value for new 
bought housing equipment is almost equivalent to the value at resale markets. However, the 
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 value of used machinery and houses is rather difficult to evaluate since a market rarely 
exists, the quality of a used good is hard to estimate and the internal use or subjective utility 
of a car, machinery or building on a farm is higher than the value estimated for external use 
or sale. The expert estimates the market value for new products according to the purchase 
price and for used products according to the value of alternative uses (sale) of the asset. In 
general, the estimated values range around the lower bound of the existing market prices. 
The financial institutions accept about 40%-60% of the estimated value for machinery and 
equipment and around 60%-80%3 of the estimated value for buildings as loan security. 
Banks require loans to be covered by at least 100% plus interest rates for one year of the 
total amount (bank interview 1997). This practice led to loan coverages of at least 160% at 
the end of 1997. The interest rates charged for the loans are variable rates, indexed with the 
inflation rate. Under high inflation, the variable interest rates rise enormously and lead to a 
large increase in the nominal debt. 
Besides the regular loan types, the agricultural sector has had access to special financial 
support designed by the government to promote the agricultural sector. The main 
mechanism by which agriculture has been financed in Romania includes the following “loan 
products” (Davis, J. R., 1997): 
1) Preferential interest rates (PIR): the National Bank of Romania (NBR) provides a credit 
line with PIR below the market rates. These are financed through refinancing facilities 
and channeled through Banca Agricola (BA) with a margin of six percent for BA to input 
providers (called integrators in Romania). The objective was to provide credit at zero 
interest rates for private farmers covering approximately 50% of the value of crops that 
are contracted to the integrators. The credit is used to finance inputs (fertilizer, fuel, etc.) 
and the cost of the credit is covered by the integrators’ fee. 
2) Credit at subsidized interest rates: the commercial banks lend at market rates and offer 
an interest subsidy of 60-70% p.a. that is provided from the state budget to the final 
borrower. The funds are based on the deposit mobilization of the commercial banks. 
Besides the cost reduction for loans, this mechanism introduced some competition in the 
rural financial market as most of these funds were provided by Bankcoop and RDB rather 
than BA. However, this mechanism proved costly in administrative terms for the 
commercial banks because of the complex supervision, control, checking and wetting 
procedures required. 
3) Interest subsidies covered by NBRs profits: The NBR on-lent at market related interest 
rates to BA and state mandated storage agents. The BA margin was set at five percent 
and the final borrower costs were set at 15% p.a.. The difference was covered by 
variable interest rate subsidy paid out of NBR profits. The storage agents with access to 
this cheap credit benefited from these non-transparent subsidies. 
                                                          
3 bank interview 1997/1998 
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 4) Financing agriculture through state budget funds: these funds were provided to finance 
the autumn 1994 and spring 1995 agricultural campaign with state budget and 
commercial bank resources. The interest rates for the state funds was charged at the 
prevailing refinancing rate. 
5) Financing agriculture through preferential lending, variable and ad valorem interest rate 
subsidies: The funds come from NBR refinancing at preferential interest rates. BA as 
intermediaries of these funds was allowed to charge a five percent margin. An interest 
rate subsidy paid by the government covered around 60% p.a. of the interest rate 
charged to the borrower which paid the final cost of around 15% p.a.. 
6) Special preferential lending, interest rates subsidies and bad debt rescheduling: other 
mechanisms for providing agricultural finance included special preferential lending and 
interest rate subsidies, bad debt rescheduling for default borrowers and the use of private 
ownership funds to finance the restructuring of the state owned commercial companies in 
agriculture. This mechanism has had some worrying consequences. First, the 
rescheduling of the commercial banks’ overdue loans reduced their ability to recover bad 
debts or impose hard budget constraints and second, the clients with outstanding loans 
were allowed access to further finance suppressing the screening and monitoring 
function of the banks. 
All these special financing funds for the agricultural sector lead to the following results: 
- The quantity of loans to agriculture at market interest rates approached zero, as the 
banks as well as the agricultural clients preferred the subsidized loans where the real 
interest rates were negative and did not require a real positive return. The interviewed 
banks in 1997 noted they had only approved state funded or subsidized loans to the 
agricultural sector.  
- Since the state guaranteed the loans and since the interest rate was so low that even bad 
performing farms were able to repay the loan, the financial institutions were not forced to 
perform the screening and monitoring function properly. This resulted in an inefficient 
allocation of capital.  
- Farmers got used to subsidized interest rates and considered market rates as 
extraordinarily high, as these rates reflect inflation. The true risks and transaction costs 
associated with lending to agriculture were omitted.  
Loan application process 
In this section the procedure from the application to the redemption of the loan with its 
corresponding working hours is presented. The working hours spent for processing loans are 
used to measure part of the transaction costs as they are considered a potential impediment 
for the supply of loans in rural areas. As the focus of this study is on financial rural markets, 
in particular on agricultural financing, the differences between the loan application and 
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 approval process for different loan types is shown in Table 7. comprises loans to private 
consumers and to private farms (individuals) as well as input financing credit and investment 
credit for small and large scale enterprises (corporations) and for agricultural enterprise. 
Each step from loan application to redemption is divided in sub-steps and the estimated 
working4 time is indicated, reflecting part of the transaction cost related to lending. The 
figures represent averages, and may deviate from case to case.  
For consumption loans and short term input financing loans the financial institution has to 
screen but not to monitor applicants, while they are forced to both, screen and monitor the 
performance of corporations for investment financing. However, the screening and 
monitoring process for these loans relies largely on the thorough examination of annual 
reports. Since the financial institutions require from private farmers, whose sole income 
source is farming, and from agricultural enterprises various documents and reports confirmed 
by the mayor or notary, the verification, examination and evaluation of these documents and 
the business exceeds the working time of all other loan types. The data in Table 7 show that 
the consumption loan offered in cooperation with the retail sector is the least expensive in 
terms of labor hours, followed by the direct consumption loan. The risk or default levels of 
these loan types are similar. Although input financing of an individual farmer requires less 
working time than that of an agricultural enterprise, the interests of these rather small loan 
sizes may hardly compensate the transaction costs related to the size of an individual 
farmer’s loan.  
Comparing investment loans of the agricultural and production sector, the differences in 
working time are not striking. The default rates, however, are averages of all investment 
loans and do not account for the different risk and default levels of individuals, corporations 
and sectors. Since agricultural enterprises are, in general, state owned and are known to 
have severe financial difficulties, their default rate may exceed the average default rate. 
Further, the industrial enterprises are located around urban areas while the agricultural 
enterprises are dispersed in rural areas where the access to firms causes additional 
inconvenience for bankers. 
For this reason the financial institutions favor investment credits or lending to the production 
sector. Furthermore establishing contacts is relatively easy, transaction volumes are large 
and the probability of foreign capital being brought in is higher.  
 
                                                          
4 estimated by bank employees in Romania, bank interview 1997 
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Table 7 Procedure for different loan types 
 Bank activities  Con-
sump-
tion 
credit, 
direct 
Consump-
tion credit 
in cooper-
ation with 
retailer 
Input 
financing 
of private 
farmer 
(without 
employ-
ment) 
Input 
financing 
with 
agricul-
tural 
enter-
prise 
Invest-
ment 
credit for 
agricul-
tural –
enter-
prise 
Invest-
ment 
credit for 
manufac-
turing 
enter-
prise 
1. Information on:   
 loan conditions and required documents min 30  35 35 60 60 
2. Loan application:       
 checking of answers in the loan application  min 7  7 10 10 10 
 checking of the income statements, employment proves of 
the applicant and the guarantors 
min 1  1    
 in agriculture: checking of the cost planning for the 
cultivation period, approved by the mayor 
min   2  2  
 in agriculture: checking of the product sales contract min   2 2 2  
 setting up of the interest and redemption plan min 5  5 5 5 5 
 comparison between available monthly income and monthly 
repayment obligations 
min 10  10    
 checking of the monthly revenues and expenses 
calculations 
min    30 30 30 
 evaluation of the annual report, income statement min   30 30 30 30 
 evaluation of the feasibility study or the investment plan min     30 30 
 filling in of the guarantor forms min 2  2    
 Ausfüllen der Sicherheitenübertragungsformulare für 
Mobilien und des Meldungsformulars an das 
Notariat/Burgermeisteramt (Registrul de Gajuri) 
min 12  12 12 12 12 
 Ausfüllen der Sicherheitenübertragungsformulare für 
Immobilien und des Meldungsformulars an das 
Notariat/Burgermeisteramt (Sectia de Carte Funciara) 
min 12  12 12 12 12 
 contacting the external expert for the evaluation of the 
securities 
min 5  5 5 5 5 
 calculation of the acceptable security value (around 60% of 
the evaluated asset's value or the new purchase price) 
min 5 3 10 10 10 10 
 checking of all required forms from shops min  10     
 putting together all forms and documents for loan approval 
in the agency, branch or headquarter 
min 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 up to 50,000,000 Lei in agency (filiala) min 10 10 10    
 up to 100,000,000 in branch (sucusala) in the capital of the 
county (time for traveling includes around 30-60 min) 
min    50 60 60 
 over 100,000,000 lei in headquarter in Bucharest (time for 
traveling includes 1-2 days and 4 hours in the headquarter) 
min       
3. After loan approval       
 joint visit to the mayor or NOTAR due to the securities min 45 45 45 45 45 45 
 filling out of the loan contract, signature of the borrower and 
guarantors 
min 15 15 15 15 15 15 
 filling out of the title such that the bank as direct and 
immediate access to the security 
min 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 filling out of the insurance contract for the loan and eventual 
for the security 
min 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 checking the use of the loan min 1  2 2 10 10 
 transferring of the risk amount in the risk fond min 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 opening of a checking account and a loan account min 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 transferring the credit amount from the loan account to the 
checking account 
min 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 signing of the payment form by the credit officer min 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Interest and redemption payments (monthly 5 min.) min 60 60 60 60 60 60 
4. Loan default (40% default rates up to 60 days, 20% default rate up to 90 days, 2 % default rate more than 90 days)*1 
 default up to 60 days: phone call (10 min), letter (15 min), 
visit (60-120 min)  
min 36 24 48 48 48 48 
 default up to 90 days: letters and at least 2 visits min 24 24 48 48 48 48 
 default over 90 days: transfer of the case to a lawyer min 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
5. Regular monitoring of the enterprise success       
 evaluation of the annual reports and income statements  
and cultivation plans for agricultural enterprises  
min  40 30 
6. Total working time in minutes for a loan officer min 300.1 211.1 381.1 439.1 554.1 540.1 
Source: Bank interview 1997, Breitschopf 1997 
Note: *1 figures from one interviewed private bank   
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 Under the prevailing loan types, application process and risks, the following preferences dominate 
the behavior of the economic agents: 
1. From the perspective of the financial institutions with regard to collateral values, risks and in 
particular transaction (working) costs compared to the loan size, they prefer consumption loans 
at market rates and loans to the non-agricultural sector to loans to private farmers and 
agricultural enterprises. Regarding the farm sector, the financial institutions prefer state 
guaranteed or subsidized loans, where due to the low interest rates the default rate seems to 
be small. 
2. From the perspective of the private farmer with regard to interest rates, required securities and 
transaction costs to the provision of the required documents, the farmer usually prefers 
subsidized or guaranteed loans to loans under market conditions. 
The banking sector and the loan business: A summary 
Albeit the development of the financial market through the adoption of laws, through the 
establishment of new branches or institutions and through the application of a strict monetary 
policy, the financial intermediation is still limited to urban areas and to large enterprises. Some 
characteristics of the financial sector reflect the observed limited financial intermediation in the 
private agricultural sector, regarding the loan business: 
- The banking sector with its established and still predominant state banks, its structure, network 
and recent business strategies focus on the enterprise sector and not on households or the 
private farm sector. But these established financial institutions have recognized the necessity 
of mobilizing savings from households to build up their capital (liability) base and thus their 
lending capacity. Only the credit cooperatives as semi-formal institutions address explicitly 
households and individual farms, but their lending capacity is restricted due to a lack of capital 
and capital transfer between credit cooperatives.  
- The commercial banks offer loan types designed for the consumption purposes of individuals 
and for financing corporation investments or input factors. They have not developed a special 
kind of credit for the private farm sector. The government provides financial support for the total 
agricultural sector in the form of subsidized or granted loans hindering the development of the 
credit business in this sector.  
- The credit application procedure for farmers from the first information on loan conditions to the 
final repayment of the principal shows considerable transaction costs for both sides. This 
results from the high informational needs, but are still insufficient to reflect the actual financial 
performance of the farm business.  
With these characteristics of the monetary market and the banking sector, leasing appears to be 
one solution to solve intermediation problems. However, since the banks require an equity 
contribution of at least 40% per loan and an equity ratio (equity to assets) of around 20% in the 
balance sheet of an enterprise is generally considered sufficient, also leasing companies 
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 experience severe equity or capital constraints in their leasing business (leasing company 
interview, 1997). 
2.2.2 The capital market 
The capital market is a market in which long term capital5 is raised by corporations (industry and 
commercial enterprises), the government and local authorities. The money comes from private 
investors, pensions funds, investment funds, insurance companies and banks and is usually 
arranged by merchants or issuing banks (Business, 1990). The commodity and stock markets are 
part of the capital market as they provide the market with futures, bonds, shares and loan stocks.  
The National Security Commission (NSC) is the main organization controlling and regulating the 
Romanian capital market. It is an autonomous authority consisting of five members which are 
elected and appointed by the parliament. It submits annual reports to the parliament. The NSC’s 
tasks are the administration, enforcement, survey and control of compliance (security and stock 
exchange law no. 52/1994), the functioning of the security market, the protection of investors 
against unfair and fraudulent practices, information on securities issued and the establishment of a 
framework for the activities of security intermediaries such as security agents (broker and dealer).  
Figure 4 The structure of the capital and exchange market in Romania 
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5 long term capital with a maturity between five an ten years Bursa 
Agricola
 The law no.52/1994 defines the main capital market concepts and securities, and regulates the 
establishment, statutes, organization and tasks of the National Security Commission. Further, it 
defines and regulates the procedure of a public offer and the intermediation of securities. The 
central issue of the law is the organization, supervision and administration of the stock exchange. It 
includes the definition, regulation and authorization of the operations and transactions, the 
investor's protection, external auditing, investment advisers, security settlement and the collective 
depository systems as well as the liabilities, sanctions and provision issues of the stock exchange. 
The Romanian capital market's structure is illustrated in Figure 4. The NSC as the main controlling 
and regulating entity has competencies in all fields of the capital market. The actors in the capital 
market are the investors, such as commercial enterprises, investment funds, individuals, foreign 
companies and the state. They are mainly represented and intermediated by security agents. 
Banks are not allowed to engage directly in the security business, but they can set up separate 
security trading companies. The products traded in the capital market are predominantly shares of 
private or privatized companies and some bonds. No market for derivatives exists.  
The Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) was set up in 1995 as a public institution and is the primary 
market6 for shares and bonds. The BSE is self financed by funds from commissions and managed 
by its members which are security companies. It can adopt rules and regulations regarding the 
registration of members, the listing standards, trading mechanism, and the clearing and registry 
activities of its clearing, settlement and registry departments. The stock exchange has two listings 
distinguished in base category and first category requirements, which the listed company has to 
comply with. The daily volume of transactions at BSE reached approximately 17.6 billion lei on 
10/22/1997 with 4160 transactions (trades per day) and around 3.7 million shares traded. The total 
number of companies listed is 67, of which 12 belong to the first category (ZINA, 1997).  
The RASDAQ is a company with limited liability. Its purpose is the operation and maintenance of 
the automated trading system. It supports trading by shares distributed to Romanian citizens 
through the Mass Privatization Program (MPP)7 and the trade of securities from issuances of the 
primary market (NSC, 1997; Unicapital, 1997). In September 1997, about 60,000 transactions, or 
90,000,000 shares and over 600 billion lei were traded at RASDAQ (RASDAQ, 1997). With 659 
firms registered, the daily transaction volume amounted to 3006 transactions on 10/22/1997 with 1 
to 115 transactions per firm per day and a modal value of one transaction per firm and day. The 
total amount of shares sold on 10/22/1997 reached 4,330,164 shares or13.5 billion lei (ZINA, 
1997). 
The Romanian Registry is an independent organization responsible for the maintenance of 
accurate sharholders' records. It was set up and is owned by eight Romanian commercial banks. 
                                                          
6 A primary market is the place where the securities are issued and where companies raise funds from investors 
(Unicapital, 1997) 
7 Under the MPP the Romanians received coupons with which they could bid for stakes up to 60% on nearly 4000 
companies (30% of all privatizable companies) or could invest in one of the five regionally based investment funds 
(Private Ownership Fund). Separately, the State Ownership Fund as the main privatization body representing initially 
70% of registered share capital, is selling off the remaining stakes in companies (Financial Times, 1996). 
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 The intent is to provide informational services to the issuer community and to confirm the 
ownership of securities.  
As a public utility, organized in the form of a stock company and owned by 164 Romanian financial 
organizations, the National Company for Clearing, Settlement, and Depository for Securities 
provides a centralized custody of securities, trade records and trade settlements. It represents a 
facility for the book entry transfer of security ownership between participants of the Depository. It 
promotes a clearing, settlement and depository system for securities to ensure speedy, fair and 
safe securities transactions while maintaining the operating expenses at a very low level (ANSVM, 
1997). 
The commodity market for commercial and agricultural goods is linked to the Romanian capital 
market through the futures and forwards business. The Romanian Commodities Exchange (RCE), 
founded in 1992, is a joint stock company with 96 shareholders (banks, producers, foreign trade 
companies, etc.) and without any legal regulations for the commodity exchange until August 1997 
when the parliament decided to regulate the commodity exchange through a Futures Commission. 
This commission is an independent authority, constituted as a legal entity and subject to the control 
of the parliament. The RCE consists of three markets, the first market is for fungible commodities 
according to international standards, the second market is for a great variety of agricultural and 
food products, chemicals etc., and the third market offers trades with services and goods of all 
kind. The trade occurs with spot or forward contracts. A goal is the launching of future contracts 
and the establishment of a clearing house (BRM, 1997) The only commodity market for agricultural 
products is the Bursa Agricola which is a private company, located in Arad. It mediates the trade of 
agricultural products as well as counsels activities in the same field (Bursa Agricola S.A., 1999)  
The Romanian capital market is in its development stage. Despite the legal and institutional 
framework, the trade level or volume is rather small, shown by the number and size of transactions 
at the Bucharest Stock Exchange and the RASDAQ. The supply of shares offered for sale is higher 
than the actual demand (quantity purchased). Thus, the capital market's role as fund raiser for 
start-ups and investment and as capital and risk allocator is relatively insignificant in Romania.  
2.2.3 The insurance market 
The Ministry of Finance is the subordinated body in charge of controlling and monitoring the 
insurance-reinsurance activities of companies. The government, in turn, defines the responsibility 
and mission of the Ministry of Finance with regards to insurance. 
The law no. 47/1991 defines insurance activity, regulates the set-up, and organization and 
operation of commercial insurance activities. It stipulates that the establishment of foreign 
insurance companies is only allowed in association with Romanian [corporations. Further, the 
foreign company should have operated without any default (e.g. severe financial problems) for at 
least ten years in the insurance business. The companies acting in the insurance business might 
be set-up as joint stock or as limited liability companies. The activity of an insurance company 
includes the acceptance of a premium paid by the insured or reinsured entity to cover a certain risk 
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 and compensates in case of loss (occurrence of risk). The insurance companies may cover one or 
more insurance categories such as life, personal, vehicle, transport, aviation, fire and assets, civil, 
credit and guarantee, financial losses and agricultural insurance. The accounts, funds and financial 
statements of the life insurance, however, must be separated from the other types of insurance 
accounts. 
At the end of 1997, there were 55 active insurance companies registered at the ministry. Of those 
companies three were public enterprises and 23 were private Romanian companies. The 
remaining 29 companies were private joint venture companies with foreign participation. The main 
activities of this insurance sector, according to the premium amount received, comprise of 
insurance against compulsory third party and motor insurance (each with 24% of all premium paid), 
followed by fire and assets insurance with a 13% premium share, life and third party liability and 
transport insurance each with 6% share. Life insurance had at the end of 1997 around 578000 
policies, of which 99% were endowment policies. Thus, about 6 % of all employed people had a life 
insurance policy. The total premiums of approximately 34.6 billion lei, gives an average 
endowment life insurance premium of approximately 60,000 lei per policy (NCS, 1998).  
The assets of life insurance companies are composed to 11% of land and buildings and up to 87% 
of bank deposits. Similarly, the deposits and cash at banks held by the non-life insurance 
companies amounts to 55% of all their assets. Further assets include receivables up to 12.5% of 
all assets, government securities of about 8%, and land and building investments of about 7% of all 
non-life insurance companies’ assets. Only 2% of the assets are invested in shares and 
participations in companies (NCS, 1998). 
The insurance sector has two main features. Firstly, the persons benefiting from the rather small 
life endowment insurance is limited to 6% of the active population. This fact points to a low 
significance of capital accumulation by life insurance companies. Secondly, the insurance 
companies’ asset structure shows missing investment opportunities or very precautionary 
investment behavior, since most of their assets are investments in bank deposits and bank cash.  
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 2.3 Description of the agricultural sector in Romania 
2.3.1 The agricultural production 
The agricultural sector is a key sector for Romania’s development and economy, accounting for 
about 18.8% of GDP, 37% of employment (EBRD, 1998) and 3% of exports in 1997 (NCS, 1998). 
It is heavily affected by the economic transformation. During the transition process the agricultural 
sector has undergone extensive changes including (i) the adoption of redundant labor forces 
mainly coming from the industrial sector, (ii) the distribution of cultivable land to private owners and 
(ii) the lack of capital resulting from the slow reallocation of capital through financial institutions 
from state enterprises to the private farm sector. The largest change was the redistribution of land 
tenure to former owners and community members moving large scale farms to small family or 
individual farms with a reported average farm size of around 2.2 hectares (Toderiu, 1997) in 1995. 
With the beginning of the privatization process the labor force shifted from cooperatives and state 
enterprises to the private agricultural sector (Breitschopf, 1999; Schrieder, 1999). This shift 
contributed to an increase in agricultural production indices by 5.6% between 1990 and 1997 while 
employees increased in the agricultural sector by 8.7% in the same period (NCS, 1998). 
Furthermore the high percentage of people employed in the agricultural sector (37% in 1997) 
compared to the low contribution of agriculture to GDP (18.8%) reflects a low productivity level of 
this sector.  
In Romania, the vigorously pursued privatization in agriculture led to four farm types coexisting at 
present: large scale state farms heavily dependent on subsidies from the government; farm 
associations with legal status, often successors organizations of former production cooperatives; 
farm associations without legal personality, representing a new organizational form since 1990; 
small private farms also created after the 1990 reform (Schrieder, 1999) 
The private agricultural sector8 engages approximately 37% of the active population and 60% of all 
people employed by private enterprises in 1997 (NCS, 1998). Not surprisingly, in the agricultural 
sector the share of the labor force working on private farms, compared to state farms, was 
approximately 95% in 1997. Between 1992 and 1997, total agricultural production from the private 
sector rose 9% to 89%, of which 63% comprised of crop, fruit and vegetable production (NCS, 
1998). However, comparing agricultural output from the private sector to the size of the labor force 
on private farms, the private sector9 seems to be less efficient than the state or mixed farm sector.  
In 1997, about 70% of the agricultural area and approximately 81% of the arable land was in 
private ownership and hence under private cultivation. About 63% of the total agricultural area is 
cropping land, 23% pastures and 10% hayfields; the remaining area includes vineyards, nurseries 
and orchards (NCS, 1998). The main crops with respect to cultivated area are cereal grains with 
corn as leading crop, followed by wheat and rye, oil seeds particularly sunflowers and potatoes. 
                                                          
8 according to the NCS statistic the private sector includes household farms, individual farms, private companies and 
partnerships. 
9 including household farms, individual farms, partnerships and legal companies but not cooperatives 
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 The average yield per ha over the entire sector is 30 dt for wheat and rye, 42 dt for corn, 11 dt for 
sunflower and 125 dt for potatoes. However, the average yield from the private sector is 28 dt/ha 
for wheat and rye, and 41 dt/ha for corn, which is slightly lower than the total average and 
illustrating a lower productivity level of the private sector (NCS, 1998). Furthermore, although the 
private farm sector cultivates around 78% of the wheat and rye area, its share of production is only 
74% of total wheat and rye output.  
The number of livestock in 1997 owned by the private sector ranged between 90% and 100% of all 
cattle, sheep, goats and horses while the share of pigs and poultry ranges between 58% and 69% 
(NCS, 1998). Animal production measured in live weight is higher percentage wise for pork (66%) 
and poultry (74%) than its share of actual livestock numbers in the private sector (NCS, 1998). This 
indicates a greater concentration in the private farm sector of pig feeding, while the public and 
mixed sector seems to be more breeding oriented. In contrast, the percent of cattle is higher than 
its share of beef in the private sector. Overall, the private farm sector contributes around 74% of all 
animal production for consumption, but has on average 84% of all livestock.  
National statistics figures show there is an average of 57 ha arable area per physical tractor (67 ha 
for the private sector) indicating a rather high level of mechanization. The private sector has 
approximately 70% of all tractors, ploughs, cultivators and seeders, and 50% of all harvest 
combines. These numbers suggest on average a relatively equal distribution of agricultural 
machinery and equipment throughout the agricultural sector, but does not reflect the availability, 
age and quality, access of private farms to machinery services and the actual functioning of the 
equipment in the private farm sector. The average input of chemical fertilizer in the private farm 
sector is approximately 70% of the total chemical fertilizer input during a cultivation period while the 
share of the area cultivated by the private sector is 80% of the arable land. The average 
application rate of chemical fertilizer is 37 kg per ha for the private farm sector and an average of 
43 kg per ha for the entire agricultural sector. This suggests that fertilizer could be a production 
constraint in the private farm sector (National Statistics, 1997). Since the transformation process 
began in 1990 the consumer price index has risen from 100% to 42872% by December 1997. In 
1995 and 1996 the consumer price index moved between 132% (1994=100%) and 138% 
(1995=100%) in comparison to the corresponding previous year and in 1997 to 254.8% 
(1996=100%). The largest price increase occurred in the service sector, while the smallest was in 
the food goods sector (see Table 8).  
The industrial production price index in 1997 showed an increase of 300% over the previous year, 
while the agro-food prices in the peasant market augmented around 210% on average clearly 
show the lowest increase. The small increase of the agricultural product prices combined with 
highly augmented energy, water and machinery prices entails a relative price decrease for some 
agricultural products and has put the agricultural sector under financial pressure. Besides the 
relative price decrease for several agricultural products like wheat, potatoes, fresh milk, the varying 
seasonal prices of many agricultural products causes price uncertainty and may lead to price 
speculation. Further, the regional price differences for agro-food of up to 100% (NCS, 1998) partly 
reflects a lack of market transparency, missing transportation facilities and a bad infrastructure. 
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 Table 8 Selected price indices, Dec. 1996 = 100, otherwise 
indicated 
Item Index 12/1997 
Food goods (consumer price) 245.6 
Services (consumer price) 303.9 
Non-food goods (consumer price) 242.6 
Chemicals 214.0 
Fuels 300.4 
Electric energy, gas, central heating 309.2 
Water, sewage 298.1 
Industrial production, total 300.2 
Food and beverages 282.3 
Machinery and equipment 290.8 
Means of transport 247.7 
Chemistry 293.8 
Agro-food-products sold at peasant markets *1 210.4*2 
Wheat 215.6 
Potatoes 146.3 
Pork meat 279.7 
Fresh milk 199.8 
Source: National Commission for Statistics, 1998 
Note: *1  index for all agro-food products is based on average annual prices 
and not on prices of Dec. 1997, *2  average of wheat, potatoes, pork 
and milk price indices  
 
2.3.2 Agriculture from a regional perspective 
The agricultural sector in Timis and Dolj counties have relatively fertile soils and a large part of its 
active population is engaged in farming. The agricultural sector in Brasov county, on the other 
hand, is less important, due to the amount of industry and service businesses in the area. The 
average monthly salary for agriculture is highest in Brasov, as the low income farms are 
abandoned in favor of industrial or service sector employment, or the farm income is supplemented 
by tourism revenue. In all three regions, the main cash crops are cereals, especially in the private 
farm sector (Table 9). Despite the fertile soils in Dolj and Timis the average yields lie below the 
national average. As Brasov is mountainous with forest, pastures and meadows (over 50%) 
extensive livestock farming, in particular, cattle and sheep dominates. In Timis many farms have 
started intensive pig raising, feeding and breeding. For agricultural equipment, tractors, harvesters 
and plows, Brasov and Timis seem to be above the national average. However, information on the 
age of the agricultural equipment or the type of private enterprises owning tractors etc. is not 
available at the regional level. 
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 Table 9  Selected data from the three regions in 1997 
 Brasov Dolj Timis Romania 
Employment in agriculture (%) 16.6 48.4 34.7 36.8 
Share of agricultural production in each county (%) 1.8 3.7 4.5 100 
Average nominal monthly salary for agriculture (Lei) 550,000 451,000 475,000 469,000
Cultivated agricultural area (thousand ha),  
- private sector area (%) 
- total cereal grain area (%) 
- private sector cereal grain area (%) 
108.4 
82.2 
47.6*1 
84.2 
475.5 
82.7 
76.4 
87.1 
498.7 
71.8 
74.6 
73.2 
9059.8 
81.6 
69.7 
83.5 
Average yields per ha for *2:   - wheat and rye (dt) 
- corn (dt) 
- potatoes (dt) 
28   (27) 
28   (28) 
142   (138)
28   (27) 
39   (39) 
97   (98) 
29   (27) 
41   (38) 
125   (125) 
30  (28) 
42  (42) 
125  (125) 
Livestock per 100 ha of ag. land *2:  - cattle 
- pigs  
- sheep, goats 
26.1 (27) 
117.8 (71) 
87.9 (99) 
14.0 (16) 
31.4 (37) 
55.3 (67) 
11.2 (11) 
203.6 (49) 
56.8 (67) 
22.7 (25) 
76.0 (61) 
67.1 (76) 
Machinery, equipment per 100 ha of private sector 
- tractor 
- plow 
- cereal harvester 
 
3.6 
2.3 
0.4 
 
1.3 
1.0 
0.3 
 
2.0 
1.5 
0.3 
 
1.5 
1.1 
0.2 
Source: National Commission for Statistics, 1998 
Note: *1 over 50% of the cultivated area are fodder crops and perennials,  *2  figures in parenthesis indicate the 
average yield or stocking rate of the private farm sector 
 
2.3.3 Structure of the villages interviewed 
The selected villages in the three regions have in average 89% (Brasov), 73% (Dolj) and 82% 
(Timis) of their community land privatized. Although the private land holding is highest in Brasov, 
the agricultural land in private ownership accounts for only 72% of the land, while in Dolj and Timis 
72% and 89% of the agricultural land is privately owned. The agricultural ownership structures in 
one village in Brasov was not destroyed by the former communist regime. For this reason, 100% of 
the individual land holdings are private. In Brasov, about 52% of the active population is engaged 
in agricultural activities, in Dolj about 71% and in Timis around 50% (community survey, 1997). 
The private farmers interviewed in the three regions own on average 5.7 ha cultivable land per 
farm but have extended their cultivated area through renting on average an additional 2.7 ha of 
land. The main crop is wheat (568 ha) followed by corn (471 ha), sunflower (127 ha), barley and 
potatoes. The average area cultivated for wheat is 3.1 ha/farm and 2.9 ha/farm for corn. The 
average yield per ha is 14.5 dt, 34.4 dt and 66.7 dt for sunflower, wheat and corn, respectively. The 
large number of mixed animal and cropping farms shows that livestock plays an important role as a 
non-seasonal income source, as a supplier of fertilizer and as a means to save in kind for family 
farms. Poultry and feeder pigs are raised on 90% of private farms, while 60% have milk cows, 40% 
have sows and 42% have sheep. Breeding farms have on average 2.8 milk cows, 2.2 sows and 66 
breeding ewes.  
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 Table 10   Selected data from the individual farm survey, 1997 
 Brasov Dolj Timis Total 
survey *2 
Cultivated agricultural area (‘000 ha) 
                                             - grain cerealarea (%) 
684 
32 
248 
75 
914 
82 
1846 
62 
Average yields per ha for:    - wheat  (dt) 
- corn  (dt) 
- potatoes  (dt) 
- sunflower  (dt) 
29.9 
30.1 
153.6 
0 
36.6 
63.5 
0 
17.4 
35.8 
86.1 
0 
10.5 
34.4 
66.7 
153.6 
14.5 
Livestock per 100 ha of agricultural land *1:  
- cattle 
- pigs 
- sheep, goats 
 
101 
199 
1744 
 
32 
238 
209 
 
27 
234 
126 
 
49 
225 
597 
Machinery, equipment per 100 ha of private sector 
- tractor 
- plow 
- harvester 
- planters 
 
11.4 
4.2 
0.4 
1.1 
 
3.7 
2.9 
0.4 
4.1 
 
5.5 
4.8 
1.3 
4.1 
 
6.9 
4.4 
1.0 
3.3 
Source:  farm survey 1997, own calculations 
Note: *1   over 50% of the cultivated area are fodder crops and perennials,  *2 average of all villages surveyed. 
 
Buildings, stables and barns were on average constructed before 1945 and equipped with old or 
few technical devices. In some cases private farmers had enlarged or repaired their buildings with 
materials mainly coming from old and abandoned buildings. 
The machinery and the technical equipment for crop cultivation is rather rudimentary. On average 
the interviewed farmers own 0.5 tractors, 0.07 harvesters, 0.3 plows and 0.2 sowing machines per 
farm. The harvesters on average are 20 years old and the tractors, in general, are over 8 years. 
However, compared to the national level the agricultural machinery and equipment in these 
counties lies significantly above the average (see Table 10 and Table 9).  
In the county of Dolj, each interviewed village had access to a peasant market which was either 
organized periodically or permanent. Further, the services of former input suppliers as well as the 
marketing structures established for former large state farms were still functioning and available for 
the farmers in these three villages (community survey, 1997) because the successors or 
remainders of the large agricultural units are still operating in these places. In the other two 
counties there were no markets, farm input suppliers or product marketing companies such as 
Romcereal or Agromec operating close enough to the interviewed villages to offer services. 
About 50% of the farm household income was supplemented by non-farm employment averaging 
11 million Lei per farm household per year (farm survey, 1997). According to the farmers 
interviewed, the main problems for private farms are (i) low producer prices compared to input 
prices, (ii) liquidity constraints and (iii) old and unreliable machinery, equipment and buildings. The 
farmers do consider, though, that the possibility of directly marketing their products is a huge 
advantage for the private farm. Their main area of development on private farms is to increase the 
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 quality and quantity of farm products through direct sale to the public and to invest in modern farm 
technologies (machinery, building, technical appliances). 
2.3.4 The path to economic development 
Two observations are central to the analysis of the agricultural sector in Romania: 
1. In general, the agricultural sector displays, despite its large share of the population engaged in 
farming, a small contribution to GDP reflecting a low labor productivity level compared to other 
sectors. In particular, the private farm sector has relatively low productivity with respect to 
output per labor.  
2. Average yields per ha in the private sector are lower than the average yields of the total 
agricultural sector.  
The first observation reflects the reallocation of labor forces in a transformation process. The 
private farm sector necessarily absorbs part of the redundant labor forces from the former state 
sector. This is because the ownership of a small piece of land allows no registration as 
unemployed and therefore excludes the land owners from unemployment support. Only the 
cultivation of land provides food security for people with no other income. Therefore, the temporary 
function of the private agricultural sector is a buffer for unemployment and an assurance of food for 
private farmers. Having achieved food security, private farmers begin to consider the farm as a 
source or means for income generation. Increasing farm income, though, entails risk taking and 
implies that a restructuring of the private farm sector is necessary. This includes the restructuring 
of land, inputs, and produce markets as well as the development of a non-farm sector to absorb 
any underemployed or redundant labor force within the agricultural sector.  
The second observation is closely tied to the first observation. The primary objective of private 
farmers is to ensure their food and housing needs are guaranteed. This leads to the refusal by 
farmers to undertake any actions or activities such as capital intensive production that involves 
financial risks. The risk aversion entails the continuation of a capital extensive, labor intensive farm 
development path. Low yields correspond to the low assets endowment level of individual farms 
and the lack of supplementary, non-agricultural income sources means that the private farmers 
continue to operate on a low input-output level. 
If the farm livelihood is fully assured and satisfied, the farmers may direct their actions to increase 
farm income through small investments and small risk taking. The shift from security dominated to 
profit maximizing behavior requires not only changes of the farmer’s wealth and attitude against 
risk, but also changes in the macroeconomic environment, the structure of the private farm sector 
and the infrastructure linked to agriculture. The latter two are pre-requisites for improving the asset 
endowment of farms. Therefore, development in the private agricultural sector is supposed to be 
based on development of the infrastructure in a wider sense. This is: 
1. Increasing land purchases and sales, renting or leasing to increase the available cultivable area 
per farm and thus the benefit from economies of scale.  
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 The average farm size is 2 to 3 ha. Although the law allows renting and selling of land, there 
exists no real agricultural land sales or rent market. This results from farmers unwillingness to 
invest in land, or to sell their land for a low price. Some verbal agreements on land renting 
exists, but these are short term informal contracts. Some farmers refuse to give up their land 
due to security aspects and others refuse to rent or buy land because of the low expected 
incremental profit per unit of land rented. 
2. Improved access of input supply markets for small scale farming, and organization of markets 
for farm products and equipment.  
The input supply and produce markets are still dominated by the former state owned 
monopolies which existed to deal with large scale farms. Small input or produce markets rarely 
exist and individual farmers face problems in getting inputs, marketing their products (farm 
survey, 1997). Moreover, they face price uncertainty. Information on prices, quantities and 
qualities demanded or offered are equally important for a transparent market economy. 
Therefore, the establishment of a communication and information network that supports farmers 
in their decision making process, may reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, and increase 
farm income. 
3. A broad and adapted array of financial services to improve farm liquidity and thus the purchase 
of farm equipment and input factors.  
The financial capability or capacity to buy agricultural equipment and input factors is a key factor 
in farm development. Small individual land holdings only have a limited liquidity. In addition, 
small land holdings have serious problems for credit approval, as the demanded loan amount 
for input factors is rather small compared to the transaction costs of the financial institution 
servicing the loan. In other cases, the demanded loan amount for agricultural equipment may be 
too high compared to farm size and income. Furthermore, agricultural income is seasonal and 
volatile, agricultural land is not used for collateral as no effective land market exists and finally 
the acceptance of agricultural equipment and buildings as collateral is almost zero since their 
resale value in cases of default is uncertain (bank interview, 1997). Therefore, most small 
private farms in Romania, established since the 1990 reforms, are excluded from formal lending 
(ACE-Phare, 1998). There is no doubt that if the private individual farm sector is to develop, 
there is a need to improve its access to credit and other financial services (Schrieder, 1997). 
Without rapid progress in this area, the establishment of new private enterprises will be delayed, 
the sustainability of existing ones will be endangered and agricultural market development 
policies and investments will be greatly hindered (Heidhues, 1995). 
4. Reliable information and communication network to disseminate information on prices, quantity 
and quality of products and assets.  
To reduce at least to some degree the uncertainty surrounding prices, quality and quantities of 
agricultural products, input factors and farm assets, the establishment of an information network 
is considered necessary. By reducing uncertainty leads to a decrease in transaction costs and 
reduces the reluctance among individual farmers to take risks.  
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 5. Creation of employment opportunities. 
The development of the non-agricultural sector offers employment alternatives to farming and 
provides a guaranteed income source for the farm family. This additional income may enlarge 
the wealth of the farm household, and increase the willingness or readiness to make 
investments that involve taking risks. In addition, it decreases the redundant labor force in the 
agricultural sector increasing income per unit of man power on the farm. If agriculture is to yield 
a respectable standard of living, the number of engaged laborers per hectare must be reduced 
and this will only be possible if new employment opportunities can be created outside 
agriculture (Meier, 1995). 
Indeed, the development of the agricultural sector is linked to the development of markets and the 
development of the non-agricultural sector and vice versa (Figure 5). The extraction of labor from 
the farm sector will induce small farms to fold as the income earned in the non-agricultural sector is 
higher. This will lead to increases in farm profit as available land increases and the supply of inputs 
becomes reliable and sufficient. To purchase inputs the farms need sufficient liquidity, which 
depends on the availability of financial services and on the access to sufficient non-volatile income 
sources. In turn, credit will be approved by financial institutions if farm income and the value of the 
asset pledged as collateral is considered as sufficient to cover the loan plus interest. However, the 
estimated value of the pledged farm asset reflects only the real asset value if there exists a 
transparent market for agricultural input factors and equipment. This market will exist if the demand 
by the agricultural sector is high for used farm assets. That is, if there is sufficient liquidity and the 
capital to buy the ‘collateral’ is available. The farmer only buys additional farm assets if he obtains 
extra profit by using this asset. The farm will only make a profit if the farm size is sufficiently large, 
inputs are available and redundant labor leaves the sector. The extraneous labor will only leave the 
agricultural sector if there are job opportunities in the non-agricultural sector. This sector, in turn, 
will develop if the agricultural sector demands consumption goods, services and input factors from 
backward and forward linked enterprises, which means that the increased income in the 
agricultural sector has multiplicative effects on a region when the income is respent on local goods 
and services (Delgado, Hazell, 1998). But the agricultural sector only will demand these goods and 
services if its income is sufficiently high, etc.. This is, agricultural growth has a major impact in 
generating demand for output from the labor intensive rural sector (Mellor, 1995). Part of these 
linkages are represented in Figure 5. 
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 Figure 5 Development circle 
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 3 Data and methodology 
The first part of this chapter describes the data used for the analysis while the second part explains 
the econometric procedures and the model applied in this study.  
3.1 Data  
A short outline of the origin, the data sampling process, the data selection and a small statistic 
analysis is given in the following. 
3.1.1 Origin of the data 
The research project ACE-PHARE-1995-Project by the European Union ‘Rural Financial Markets 
for the Small Private Farm Sector’ in Romania focused on the analysis of the private farm sector 
and its relationship to financial markets. As part of this project a survey was carried out in 1997 
covering a sample of 220 private individual farms and farm associations in 9 villages of Romania. 
Further, an elaborated community questionnaire taken at the end of 1997 provides information on 
the natural conditions, the population and infrastructure at the community level. The villages 
surveyed are located in three zones that are distinct in their natural, economic and social 
conditions and characteristics.  
In addition to the quantitative data selection in the agricultural sector, quantitative and qualitative 
data of the financial intermediaries were also collected. In semi-standardized interviews with six 
representatives of financial institutions in the banks’ central and three representatives of leasing, 
the current business strategies with respect to private farmers, and the issues related to collateral 
evaluation and seizure, plus the business (income) analysis and risk management were discussed. 
Besides the interviews in the banks’ central office, branches in the surveyed villages were visited 
and asked about their products and main activities, clients, strategies and experiences with the 
farming sector. Furthermore, several days were spent at a financial institution in one of the regions 
surveyed to analyze in detail the credit business from the loan application, project and asset 
evaluation and approval through to the installment of the loan. Differences in the procedure 
between loans to farms and non-farms or between consumption loans or investment loans were 
observed, analyzed and quantified in bank employee labor hours. They served as a measure for 
transaction costs needed to gather and analyze the required information.  
3.1.2 Sampling process of the farm data 
The sampling procedure was a three stage process. First, there was a stratified selection from 
counties, then a random selection of the villages within each county and a random selection of the 
farms within each village. Using the rank method the stratified selection of the counties took place 
on the basis of agricultural area, percentage of arable land out of the agricultural area and socio-
economic indicators like farm size, population per km² and mechanization level. The following three 
counties were identified: 
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 (1) Dolj located in the south-west along the river Donau. This county is 80-200 m above sea level 
and has a flat landscape, fertile soils but a dry climate. The average precipitation is 533 mm 
per year, with an average temperature of 11°C. Besides state farms there are also farms 
operating as family associations. The private farms and associations were, in general, founded 
in 1990 or later. The agricultural sector engages around 70% of the active population. Only 
73% (72%) of the total land (agricultural land) is in private ownership. Former large industrial 
state enterprises are still operating either as private companies or state owned companies.  
(2) Brasov located in the center of Romania has a mountainous landscape with plains ranging 
from 400 to 1200 m above sea level. The average precipitation is 765 mm per year and the 
average temperature is 8.1°C. It is a tourist region benefiting from a landscape marked by a 
small private farm sector focusing on extensive livestock production. Many farms were founded 
before 1990. However, only about 52% of the active population is engaged in the agricultural 
sector. Eighty nine percent of the total land belongs to private persons. The private farm sector 
owns 72% of the agricultural land.  
(3) Timis is a flat region in the west of Romania bordering Hungary with an altitude between 100 
and 125 m above sea level, with an average precipitation of 533 mm per year and an average 
annual temperature of 9.2°C. It has fertile soils cultivated by private farms and associations. 
Some of the farms were founded before 1990. Approximately 82% of the total land is in private 
ownership, and 89% of the agricultural land belongs to private farms. About 50% of the active 
population is engaged in the agricultural sector. 
Within each of these counties three villages were randomly selected, and in each village about 20-
25 farms were interviewed. The villages surveyed for Dolj were Motatei, Isalnita, Segarcea; for 
Brasov, Viola, Feldioara, Moeciu; and for Timis, Dumbravita, Varias, Masloc. In each of the 
villages, the formal financial institutions and the credit cooperatives run one to four branches or 
agencies. Besides the formal financial intermediaries, input supply companies, retailers, employers 
and land owners as well as credit groups provide a kind of credit service. Roads, communication, 
public transport, water and electricity supply has been constructed, but these services may not be 
very reliable. Besides the basic infrastructure every village has an agricultural service, a postal 
office, one or more public schools, bakeries, grocers and butchers and a general market. Except 
for two villages an office of the cooperative for agricultural product sales and technical service for 
agriculture is established in every village. The population size ranges from 2,500 (Dumbravita) to 
around 8,500 (Segarcea) people. In Moeciu only about 15% of the active population works in the 
agricultural sector, but in Voila this proportion rises to 87%. In the other counties the agricultural 
sector engages approximately 50% of all employed people (Community survey, 1997).  
The farm interviews comprise 3 modules: the agricultural production module, the financial module 
and the farm household module. Detailed and reliable data were collected from a total of 220 
farms. The community questionnaire comprises natural, financial, demographic and infrastructure 
components. The semi- standardized bank interviews and leasing company interviews focus on the 
credit approval procedure, the asset evaluation, the security requirement, equity share, the 
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 business strategies regarding the agricultural sector, the credit risks and the structure of the actual 
loan portfolio.  
3.1.3 Data selection and analysis 
The data from the farm survey were sorted, cleaned and analyzed. The final farm data set for the 
econometric analysis comprises of 181 observations from individual farms. For the purpose of this 
study, the capital expenditure as well as the farm output in monetary units was calculated based on 
the data from the production module. Further information on family labor, cultivated land, farmers’ 
education, and farm establishment were gained from other modules within the questionnaire. 
Some missing values like prices, yields or inputs were either replaced by local, regional or national 
averages or the observation was skipped.  
The calculated farm output (Y) represents all cultivated, bred or fed products from the farm that 
were either sold, consumed or stored and is evaluated at market prices. Further it includes all 
revenues from a farmer for agricultural services such as plowing or harvesting services. The capital 
expenditure (K) contains all variable and fixed capital needed for production also included the 
service providers for e.g. harvesting. Only buildings and arable land (A) were exempted. The first 
was excluded due to low investment levels for buildings and due to missing values like age, size, 
market prices and construction cost. The latter is included separately as an exploratory variable in 
the production function because of its specific meaning in agricultural production. The exclusion of 
buildings probably would not have a strong effect on the capital expenditure value because 
agricultural buildings on individual farms were rather simple and in some cases have been built 
and renovated with old materials by the farmers themselves. All family members (L) occupied in full 
or part time work on the farm are taken into account10. Due to the high inflation rate in Romania all 
prices were standardized to December 1997. The consumer price index served as a measure for 
inflation. It was published by the National Bank of Romania, Monthly Bulletin 8/1997 and 2/1998. 
The final data set comprises 181 observations of individual private farms between 1 to 25 ha of 
arable land. A few observations with unexplainable, high or low values or ratios with regard to farm 
type, labor input and land size were excluded from the data set. The data gained from the bank 
and leasing company interviews as well as from the community survey serve as descriptive data 
which partly supplement the model with some necessary information on the credit business. 
Furthermore, the data help to illustrate the economic environment of the agricultural sector in these 
regions, to describe the financial activities of the banks and to outline the structures and 
constraints under which the financial intermediaries operate.  
 
                                                          
10 the input of a few seasonal or non-family laborers indicated as service providers for e.g. harvesting has no significant 
impact on the regression results. 
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 3.2 Methodology 
The first part of this chapter outlines the principal models used to quantify the capital demand and 
supply. The second and third part supplement the findings of the model with a qualitative analysis 
of the capital demand and supply that is based on the issues of asymmetric information and risk 
aversion of farm households.  
3.2.1 Rural financial markets: a quantitative analysis 
The theoretical concept and the model with its assumptions is represented in the following. First, 
the model relies on the basic production function, from which the profit and demand function is 
derived. The functions are analyzed under conditions where the agricultural revenues first are not 
and than are subject to price and production uncertainties, and under consideration of own capital 
sources and utility aspects. Second, a basic partial profit function of a representative financial 
institution is outlined. Finally, follows a comparison of the capital demand and supply. 
The theoretical concept 
This discussion on rural financial markets focuses on the demand for loans and supply of loans for 
individual farmers. It attempts to quantify the influence of the factors agricultural outcome, 
uncertainty, collateral requirements and costs on the amount of capital demanded by individual 
farmers and on the capital offered by financial institutions. 
The model in this study is based on the neoclassical theory of production, where the production 
function is supposed to display diminishing returns to capital and decreasing returns to scale. 
Several other functional forms were taken into account but their regression results displayed no 
advantages against the Cobb-Douglas technology (Annex 7.4). Since the model focuses on the 
micro-level of a family farm and bank, further factors like infrastructure, management abilities, 
innovations and know-how which are equally important for rural development were excluded in the 
quantitative analysis.  
In the initial first step some descriptive statistical data and the distribution of net farm income in 
relation to capital expenditure are illustrated as shown in chapter 4.1. When a financial institution 
arbitrarily selects a borrower from the sample of the interviewed farmers, the distribution of the net 
income gives the probability of selecting a farm with a high, low or average debt service capacity. 
Thus it provides a measure for the probability of selecting a “good or bad” borrower from the set of 
individual farmers interviewed. 
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Next, a regression of the output - measured in monetary units - on capital, labor and land input to 
obtain the monetary production function is completed. Based on this regression function, the 
capital demand is derived through the maximization of farm profit under cost constraints. By 
introducing utility aspects of the farm household and by varying several possibly constraining 
factors of the capital demand function the impact of these factors on the demand of capital can be 
estimated. The introduction of a partial profit function for a representative financial institution 
permits the derivation of a capital supply set. It takes into account the risk and transaction costs. 
The assumption of the classical market equilibrium between demand and supply through a market 
clearing interest rate is maintained. But, since in reality the market is not perfect, some market 
imperfections such as differing information on collateral values or probability perceptions are 
included in the demand and supply function. The discussed model is a static model, with cross 
sectional data and considers one production period (year). The single steps of the model are 
illustrated in Figure 6. 
Statistical tests 
A correlation between the variables land inputs (A) and capital inputs (K) is likely to exist. In an 
extreme case where the correlation coefficient is equal to unity, the parameters become 
indeterminate. One might suggest that the standard errors, the partial correlation coefficients and 
the total R² may all be used for testing for multicollinearity. Therefore, a revised version of Frisch's 
Confluence Analysis (Annex 7.5) or ’bunch-Map-Analysis’ is used (Koutsoyiannis, 1977): This 
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 procedure regresses the dependent variable on each of the explanatory variables separately. 
Choosing a simple regression appears to give the most plausible results. Inserting further 
explanatory variables and finally examining their effect on the standard error and on the R ² 
enables the classification of these variables as useful, superfluous or detrimental (Koutsoyiannis, 
1977). The test shows that the influence of A on the regression results of Y on K is still positive and 
the residual variance, the absolute error sum as well as the R² still improve with the inclusion of A 
and L. In addition, the partial correlation coefficient between K and A is 0.68 (n=181). For this 
reason multicollinearity is not considered a severe problem. The results of this analysis as well as 
the correlation coefficients of the parameters are listed in Annex 7.5.  
In many econometric applications the assumption of a constant variance (homoscedasticity) for the 
random variable is not always expected to hold. The error term (u) is an expression of the influence 
of errors in the measurement, of erratic variations and the influence of omitted variables on the 
dependent variable - briefly, it includes everything that is not explained by the exogenous 
variables. Many of the variables that are omitted from the function tend to move in the same 
direction as the other explanatory variables causing an increase in the variation of the observations 
from the regression line (Koutsoyiannis, 1977). For example, in the estimation of a Cobb-Douglas 
production function for farm output the error term absorbs factors such as entrepreneurship, 
technological differences between farms, and different organizational skills. These factors do not 
vary considerably in small firms but are expected to vary widely for large firms (Koutsoyiannis, 
1977).  
In summary, there are reasons to believe that the homoscedasticity assumption is often violated in 
practice. It is suggested to examine what the consequences of heteroscedasticity are on the 
estimated OLS-parameters and their standard errors (Koutsoyiannis, 1977). In general, if the 
variances of the error term are not equal, the variance of the estimated OLS-coefficients can not be 
used to construct confidence intervals. The OLS estimates are also unbiased but inefficient and the 
prediction of the dependent variable based on these OLS estimates will have a high variance 
(Koutsoyiannis, 1977).  
The maximum likelihood method is predominantly used for non-linear functions. These functions 
better explain the real world. (Kennedy, 1992). It is impossible to establish the finite sample 
properties for maximum likelihood. In particular, the properties of the best linear unbiased 
estimations do not carry over from the linear model (Judge et al, 1982). However, it is possible to 
consider asymptotic properties, namely asymptotic consistency, unbiasedness, efficiency and the 
normality of the estimated parameters (Koutsoyiannis, 1977). The assumption for this method is 
that the dependent variable is distributed normally, the error terms are independent of each other 
and any sample is representative of the underlying population. If the assumption of homoscedastic 
disturbance is not fulfilled, the coefficient will be statistically unbiased, the prediction of the 
dependent variable will have a high variance and the prediction would be inefficient (Koutsoyiannis, 
1977). 
To identify heteroscedasticity the Spearman-Rank-Test is applied. The plotting of the absolute 
error term (u) against K shows no clear relationship and hence heteroscedasticity is not considered 
51 
 as a severe problem. However, a possible high variance of the coefficient of the dependent 
variable should be kept in mind. The test results and the distribution of the error terms are listed in 
Annex 7.6.  
The functional form 
The impact of capital expenditure, labor input and land on agricultural production is quantified 
using a production function. In this study, the dependent variable represents the farm output (Y) of 
all farm activities expressed in monetary terms. The explanatory variables are capital expenditures 
(K), the cultivated area (A) and the family labor input (L). These four variables are continuous and 
are used to specify the functional form of the production function. For further subdivisions of the 
sample, the education level (E) taking into account the managerial/organizational abilities of a 
farmer, the year the farm was established (F) which accounts for farmer experience and the 
production focus (D) on livestock or crop as proxy for specialization are surveyed. According to 
these variables, the interviewed farmers are classified in sub-samples and the coefficients of each 
sub-sample for capital expenditure, land and labor input are calculated to show some possible 
differences of their production technology. Shazam (Version 8) and MS Excel 95/97 are used for 
the econometric and statistical analysis.  
The general form of the production function is: 
(1) Y = f (K;A;L;u)  with u as the disturbance term. 
where: Y: yield in monetary units (million Lei) 
  K: capital expenditures/employment of capital (million Lei/yr.) 
 A: agricultural land input (ha/yr.) 
 L:  family labor input ( manpower/yr.) 
  
Referred to Frank (1990), Paris (1992), Mas-Colell (199), the functional form of agricultural 
production shows the following characteristics: (1) decreasing marginal returns after a certain 
point, (2) a partly linear relationship, (3) diminishing marginal rates of substitution between the 
production factors, and (4) an output plateau or asymptotic constant output level after a certain 
input level. 
In Annex 7.4 nine specified functional forms and their regression results are listed. In terms of the 
overall significance (t-value, R², residual variance, absolute errors) eight out of the nine specified 
functions show a relatively good fit. The simple handling of the Cobb-Douglas production function 
and the good fit supported the choice of this technology for this model11. The basic functional form 
is given by: 
(2) Y = f (K,A,L)  = c Kβ Aα Lγ  
where c: intercept 
  β: parameter for capital expenditure K 
α: parameter for land input A 
γ: parameter for labor input L  
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 Using this production function it is possible to show the maximal amount of output that can be 
produced using alternative combinations of the input factors K, A and L (Varian, 1992). In addition, 
the sample is divided in sub-samples according to the features education level (E), farm 
establishment (F) and specialization (D). Regressions on each of the sub-samples deliver different 
regression coefficients. However, their interpretation lies beyond the purpose of the model.  
The elasticity of input measured by the expression [m f(K,A,L) >=< c (mK)β (mA)α (mL)γ], the 
marginal product of capital expenditure obtained through the derivative of [δY / δK] and the 
marginal rate of technical substitution [RTS (L for K) = - δK / δL|Y=Y0 = δY/δL / δY/δK] provide 
some basic information on the production technology. 
Profit and demand functions under certainty 
The profit and demand functions of an individual farm12 with certain outcomes and no risks is 
described first. With the Cobb-Douglas production function Y=f(K,A,L) and the corresponding linear 
cost function C(i,r,w) the direct profit function Π of an individual farm can be written as: 
(3) Π  = Y(K,A,L) P – C(i,r,w)         
  = c Kβ Aα Lγ – (Ki + Ar + Lw), 
 
where: i: 1+interest rate/100,  
  r: opportunity cost for land use (million Lei/ year), 
  w: wage or opportunity cost for labor (million Lei/ manpower/year) 
P: price of output, normalized to one since Y is indicated in monetary units 
 
Assuming profit maximizing behavior for the farm taking the first order conditions with respect to K 
and solving for K gives a capital demand function of (Varian, 1992): 
(4) K(i) = ( i / (βcAαLγ)) 1/( . 1)- β
To be consistent with profit maximization the capital demand function must be homogeneous of 
degree zero in i which is equivalent to K(ti) = K(i). Similarly, the labor demand and land demand 
functions are:  
(5) L(w) = ( w / (γcKβAα)) . 1)- 1/(γ
(6) A(r) = ( r / (αcKβLγ)) 1/( . 1)- α
The derivative of the capital demand function K(i) with respect to (i) , indicates how the factor 
demand responds changes. It gives the slope of the demand function, which is negative (Varian, 
1992): 
(7) δK/δi  = 1/(β-1) ( i ) β 1)- /(β   / (βcAαLγ)) 1/( 1)- β  <   0  13 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
11 The regression results of a translog function supports the choice of the Cobb-Douglas technology. The values of the 
coefficients were close to zero (Annex 7.4). 
12 the farm is first considered as firm and later as a combination of firm and household, 
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 Replacing capital expenditure (K) in the profit function by equation (4) and considering A and L as 
arguments only14, gives a restricted indirect profit function (Π) which can be written as a function of 
the factor price: 
(8) Π(i)  = (i / (βcAαLγ P)1/(  i (1-β) / β  1)- β
This profit function meets the overall properties of the indirect profit function which are (i) non-
increasing in input prices and non-decreasing in output prices, (ii) homogeneous in prices (iii) 
convex and (iv) continuous in prices (Varian, 1992).  
Capital demand with collateral requirements and uncertainty 
Capital expenditure from own or external sources 
In the real world, an economic agent, for example a farmer, makes production decisions under 
many uncertainties. Uncertainty and risk mean that some variables in the objective function are 
random variables. Incorporating risk in the production function means incorporating random 
variables in the decision problems faced by farm managers. This can be done by incorporating the 
probability distribution of the random variables (Antle,1983). The incorporation of stochastic values 
reduces the probability distribution to a few outcomes. In this work the complexity and diversity of 
the real world is reduced to two possible outcomes of the action ‘taking a loan’. It is assumed that a 
farmer receives either an output (Y) with probability q which reflects the possible monetary farm 
output of the year the farmers were interviewed. This output depends on the size of (K, A and L) 
and is supposed to cover the production costs. Or he receives an alternative output (Y*) with 
probability (1-q). It is assumed that in this case the farmer is only able to repay the capital 
expenditures (K) but not the interests. Therefore, the alternative farm output (Y*) is equal to capital 
expenditures (K) and in case the farmer takes a loan, he faces a loss of assets given as collateral 
of the size Kη with probability (1-q). The pledged assets or collateral are expressed as the share 
(η) of the loan amount (l) which is set in this model equal to K15.  
Transaction costs in rural areas comprise mainly of non-interest charges by lenders, travel 
expenses, and time and money spent promoting and following up the application (Von Pischke, 
1991). In the model, only a small share of the transaction costs of borrowing in rural areas are 
included in the profit function. They are represented through the fees (f) which are a share of the 
loan amount (K). This is because the required fees for loan insurance and collateral registration in 
Romania depend on the loan amount and on the collateral value, and because no detailed 
information exists on the extent of the borrowers’ further actual transaction costs. The designed 
profit function Π comprises the possible outputs and a cost function depending on the source of 
capital use: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
13 where 1/(β-1) ≤ 0 since 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 
14 the analysis focuses on the optimal capital expenditures K. There is also a high underemployment in rural areas and 
the market for agricultural land is not yet developed. Hence the opportunity costs for land and labor are very low. 
15 The coverage of collateral is 100% of the principal plus the interest rate p.a.. 
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 1) all capital expenditure (K) as own capital (Ko ) with the deposit interest rate as the capital 
opportunity costs under uncertainty, or  
2) all capital expenditure (K) as external capital (Kf ) borrowed from a bank with the interest rate 
under uncertainty. 
 
(9) Π = q Y(K,A,L) + (1-q)K – C(i,j,r,w,q) 16 
where for K = Ko = q (c Koβ Aα Lγ) + (1-q)Ko – (Koi + Ar + Lw)   
and for K = Kf = q (c Kfβ Aα Lγ) + (1-q)Kf - q Kfj – (1-q)Kfη – Kff – (Ar + Lw) 
 
where K : capital expenditure, either   1) own capital K = Ko or   2) external capital K = Kf, 
i : real average deposit interest rate/100 + 1 
j: real average loan interest rate/100 + 1, 
q: probability of the outcome Y (success), 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, 
1-q : probability of the outcome K (in case of a loan contract, failure to repay the borrowed capital 
amount K or the interests), 
f : fees for loan insurance, application and approval as a share of the loan amount K, where 
there is no loan: f = 0, 
η : share of K to be repaid in form of pledged assets to the bank, η > 1 in case of a loan, where 
there is no loan: η = 0. 
 
Using again the first order conditions and solving for either K = Ko with j, f and η equal to zero or for 
K = Kf with i equal to zero, the capital demand function under uncertainty is: 
(10) Ko = [ (i -(1-q)) / (q βcAαLγ) ] 1/( 1)- β     for K = Ko 
(11) Kf = [ (qj+(1-q)η–(1-q) +f) / (q βcAαLγ) ] 1/(    for K = K1)- β f 
The capital demand under uncertainty is smaller than the capital demand under certainty (K 
uncertainty < K certainty) since per definition i ≥ 117.  
To assess the impact of capital cost, the required loan coverage ratio (η) and of the probability (q) 
on capital demand, the partial derivatives of the capital demand function are taken: 
(12) δKf/δj = (Φε-1  ε q) / (qθ)ε  < 0, 
(13) δKf/δq = (Φε-1  ε ξ) / [q(qθ)ε] > 0, 
(14) δKf/δη  = [Φε-1  ε (1-q)] / (qθ)ε  < 0 
where Φ = (q j + (1-q) η - (1-q) + f)  >=< 0 
θ = βcAαLγ   > 0, 
ξ = [q(1 – η + j)- (Φ)]   < 0, since η ≥ 1 
  ε = 1/(β-1)   < 0 for β < 1  
 
                                                          
16 P is normalized to one 
17 setting Kcertainty > Kuncertainty and solving the inequality gives i < (i-(1-q))/q and since (q-1) is negative, the result is i>1 
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 The sign of the derivatives which gives the direction of the slope of the capital demand function 
depends on Φ. By setting Φ greater than or equal to zero (Φ ≥ 0) the pre-condition for the assumed 
values of the derivatives becomes:  
(15)  i + jq + (1-q)η - (1-q) + f  ≥  0  
In this context, two cases are identified according to the source of capital expenditure: 
1) Capital expenditure under uncertainty from the farmers’ own or internal sources (own capital), 
where (i-1) equals the opportunity costs of own capital, η and f equals zero (η,f=0). Thus, 
equation (15) reduces to 
(1–q) ≤ i          
This shows that as long as the probability of default changes accordingly with the interest rate 
such that the equality is true, the capital demand remains unchanged. Subsequently,  
δK/δi < 0  only if   (1–q) < i. 
This result confirms the assumption that, as with certain outputs, a decreasing interest rate 
leads to increasing capital demand and vice versa. This is true for real positive interest rates. 
2) Capital expenditure under uncertainty from external sources (loan), where (j-1) equals the real 
loan interest rate, the collateral requirement (Kη) is η ≥ 1 and the fees (f) are 0 < f < 1. The 
equation (15) now becomes  
q ≥ (1-η-f) / (1-η+j)  
For η ≥ 1, the expression on the right hand side of the above equation is negative for all j ≥ (η-
1). Since the probability q is already, by definition, larger than the negative expression on the 
right side of the above equation, Φ is larger than zero (Φ > 0). Hence, the demand function is 
negatively sloped with respect to j and η (δK/δj < 0 and δK/δη < 0), and positively as regards 
the derivative δK/δq. Under theoretically large real negative interest rates with j < (η-1), the 
expression on the right hand side of the equation becomes positive and can be larger than q. 
Then the capital demand increases with increasing j and η while it decreases with increasing q. 
 
Capital demand with collateral requirements, uncertainty and a combination of external and own 
capital expenditure 
In many cases, the capital expenditure of an individual farm or a firm consists of a combination of 
own and external capital. To take this combination into account capital expenditure in the model 
becomes  
(16) K = Ko + Kf, 
where Ko: own capital expenditure, 
Kf: external capital expenditure. 
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 Consequently, the profit function Π becomes  
(17) Π =  q  [ (c(Ko+Kf)β Aα Lγ ) -  (Ko i + Kf j + Kf f + A r + L w) ]  
  + (1-q) [ (aKo + bKf)  -  (Ko i + Kf η + Kf f + A r + L w) ]   
where j: real loan interest rate/100 +1 
  a: share of own capital returned, a ≤ 1 
 b: share of external capital returned, b ≤ 1 
 
Again, assuming profit maximizing behavior for the farm, applying the first order conditions 
(δΠ/δKo, δΠ/δKf) and solving for Ko and Kf the demand for external capital KfD is:   
(18) KfD = [(qj + η(1-q) + f – b(1-q)) / qθ]ε - Ko,  
and for own capital KoD: 
(19) KoD = [(i – a(1-q))/ qθ ] ε - Kf     
where θ = βcAαLγ      
 
It is anticipated, that the derivatives with respect to j, n and q are  
(20) δKf/δj =  (Ψ ε-1 ε q) / (qθ)ε  < 0 
(21) δKf/δq =  (Ψ ε-1 ε µ) / [q(qθ)ε]  > 0 
(22) δKf/δη =  [Ψ ε-1 ε (1-q)] / (qθ)ε   < 0 
where Ψ = (qj + η(1-q) + f – b(1-q)) 
  ε = 1/(β-1) < 0  for β < 1 
µ = (q(j-η+b) – θ) < 0 
θ = βcAαLγ > 0 
 
Since it is assumed that η ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ b ≤ 1, the expression for Ψ is greater than zero (Ψ > 0)18 and 
the slope of the demand function has the anticipated signs. 
Capital demand and utility 
In the last few years micro-finance studies have encompassed the economic and social aspects 
that accrue to potential borrowers. This shift in emphasis on a more holistic view of the clients has 
caused a redirection of attention also to the clients’ household (Cohen, 1998). Analogous, 
agricultural micro-enterprises or agricultural households represent two units of microeconomic 
analyses, the household and the firm (Meier, 1995). While in a firm the shareholders, as principals, 
aim to maximize shareholder value and thereby profit, the farm household’s objective is different 
from pure profit maximization. The farm provides consumption goods and employment for 
household members. This procurement of labor, income and food, assured through a certain 
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 endowment level of farm assets (wealth), gives a certain utility to household members. Thus, farm 
activities focus on maximizing farm household utility which depends on farm profit. When the 
household is a price taker in all markets and for all commodities produced and consumed, the 
optimal farm household production can be determined independent of consumption and leisure 
choices. Then, given the maximum income level derived from profit maximization, consumption 
and labor supply decisions can be made. Given this sequential decision making process the 
appropriate analytical framework is a recursive model with profit and utility maximizing components 
(Meier, 1995). 
In this work, the farm household’s utility (U(W)) is reduced to wealth (W)19 as the sum of an initial 
asset endowment (Ws ) and return (hij ) which signifies a gain (hi1 ) with probability q for j = 1 or a 
loss (hi0 ) with probability (1-q) for j = 0 20. The potential gain or loss is a function of some actions. 
Assumptions of the model include concavity of the utility function, a low asset endowment level of 
farm households in Romania and a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility. Given these 
assumptions, the expected utility of wealth expressed in equation (23) is smaller than the utility of 
the expected gain or loss (wealth). 
(23) U(W) =   q U(Ws+hi1) + (1-q) U(Ws+hi0) < U(Ws+qhi1) + U(Ws+(1-q)hi0)   21.  
where (hi1) = [ Y - (Koi + Kfj + Kff + Ar + Lw) ]    ≙  Π  22 
  (hi0) = [ (aKo + bKf) - (Koi + Kfη + Kff + Ar + Lw) ] ≙  Π   
 b ≤ 1 
  q: probability of success or gain  
Y = c(Ko+Kf)β Aα Lγ 
 W: wealth, W=Ws+hI  where Ws= initial asset endowment and hi = potential outcomes 
 
To take into account the sequential decision making process of a farm household (Meier, 1995) a 
capital demand for production (equation (24)) is derived from maximizing the expected profit 
function (max. exp.Π = q h1 + (1-q) h0  ,   δexp.Π/δK  =  0).  
(24) Kexp. Π  = [(qj+f+Ar+Lw-(1-q)(b-η)) / (qcβAαLδ)]1/(1-β) 
 
Taking the first order conditions (equation (25)) for the expected utility function (U(W) = q u(W1) + 
(1-q) u(W0)), where the production function (Y) is considered independent of capital (K) gives the 
capital demand function (KfD ) with respect to utility (equation (26)). The expected capital demand, 
based on expected profit maximization (equation (24)), is then substituted into the production 
function (Y) of the capital demand function (KfD). The resulting capital demand (KfD ) in equation 
(26) is a sequential result of the maximization of expected profit and expected utility. It reflects a 
recursive model, since the production function (Y) in the demand function (KfD ) is a function of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
18 For Ψ > 0 the condition is q > (b-f-η) / (j-b-η). Since per definition 0 ≤ b ≤ 1, η ≥ 1, the right hand side of this expression 
becomes negative and the capital demand shows the anticipated slope but only if j > b+η. Otherwise as in cases of 
highly negative real interest rates, the slopes of the demand curve reverses.  
19 W reflects the consumption capacity 
20 j and i do not represent interest rates as in the chapters before. 
21 Assuming a concave utility function of the form u = ln(W+hΠ) 
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 capital (K) which in turn is replaced by the capital demand (Kexp. Π ) (equation (24)) obtained 
through maximizing expected profit. 
(25) δU/δKf  = q δU/δ(h1Π) δ(h1Π)/δKf  +  (1-q) δU/δ(h0Π) δ(h0Π)/δKf  = 0  
(26) KfD   =  (1-q) (W-Ar-Lw+Y) / (j+f) – q (W-Ar-Lw)/(b-η-f)  
where  Y = cKβAαLδ  = c [(qj+f+Ar+Lw-(1-q)(b-η))/(qβAαLδ)] (β/(1-β)) AαLδ 
 
The resulting capital demand function (equation (26)) shows the impact of interest rates, of the 
initial wealth level and the possible loss on capital demand. Since the utility function is a concave 
function with respect to Ws and hij  and the profit functions or actions hij themselves are linear, the 
farmers display a risk averse behavior. Suppose it is true that the input of e.g. borrowed capital 
increases the risk of net returns, then the consequences of risk depend on the extent of risk 
aversion among farmers (Binswanger, 1979). 
Supply of capital 
In this work the essential elements of a partial profit function from the lending side of a financial 
institution comprise capital costs, probability of repayment, interest rates charged, fees, value of 
collateral obtained and transaction costs. Transaction costs are expressed as labor costs in this 
study. The input factors for the ‘product loan’ such as material and building costs are omitted since 
they have no relevance to the problem in question and are minor costs compared to the personal 
and capital costs of the Romanian banks23. The costs associated with the risk of non-repayment of 
the loan or interest is incorporated through the probability p. In this model the partial profit function 
is a linear function in terms of capital (K), with two possible revenue streams. The first is the 
revenue from fees and principle-interest payment (Kfj + F) that occurs with probability p and the 
second (ηKf + F) is the revenue from fees and collateral seizure or sale  which occur with a 
probability (1-p). The opportunity costs of capital (Kfi) and the transaction costs (Hv) from labor 
input represents the main cost factors in the model. In general, transaction costs in rural areas are 
high compared to urban areas because of problems with collateral provision; low, uncertain and 
irregular income flows; and the relatively small size of transactions (FAO, 1998; GTZ, 1998). The 
special problems in rural areas require a high level of information on the actual financial 
performance of the farm. In this model, it is assumed that there is no cost for collateral 
enforcement and seizure or resale so that the collateral value (ηK) equals the final ‘income’ for a 
financial institution in case of a loan default. This occurs, because any estimation about possible 
collateral seizure costs may vary enormously and are not available. The described profit of the 
supplier πs for any financial institution takes the form: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
22 Since the utility function is concave the profit function  h1Π is assumed to be linear in K and thus, for the utility 
maximization independent of K    , here: j and i do not represent interest rates as before. 
23 According to the bank interview in 1997, the total monthly costs (100%) are split into 84%  interest, 8.7% risk 
provisions, 5% personal costs, 1.7% material costs, and 0.4% other costs.  
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 (27) πs = p (Kf j + F) + (1-p) (ηKf + F) – (Kfi + Hv)  
where p: probability of receiving the principal-interests payment Kfj, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, 
  1-p: probability of receiving the income through the collateral value ηKf , 
  F: fixed amount of fees (revenue) before the loan installment, 
  H: labor hours, 
  v: average wage per labor hour of a credit officer, 
  i: 1 + real interest rate for deposits/100 
  j: 1 + real interest rate for loans/100 
 
In order to receive a profit (π) of at least zero, the linear profit function is set greater than or equal 
to zero (π ≥ 0) and is solved for Kf . 
(28)  π = p (Kfj + F) + (1-p)(ηKf + F) - (Kfi + Hv) ≥ 0 
(29) S
))-i(-)-j(p(
)F-Hv(KSf =ηη>=<  
where: S = (Hv - F) / m 
m = [p(j-η) + (i-η)]   
 
The resulting expression represents a capital supply set which indicates the minimum or maximum 
possible loan size offered under given conditions. The supply depends on the fees (F), working 
hours (H), probability of repayment (p), capital opportunity costs (i-1), capital revenues (j) and 
collateral value (η), and it includes all loan sizes yielding at least a zero profit for the financial 
institution. Since the equation is an inequality, the sign of the inequality reverses if the expression 
of the denominator (p(j-η) - (i-η)) is negative. Therefore, two cases for π ≥ 0 are identified. 
(a) in the case of KfS ≥ S  the denominator must be greater than zero:    
  p(j-η) - (i-η) > 0. 
Solving for p, the condition is         
  p ≥ (i-η)/(j-η)  for j > η  and    
  p ≤ (i-η)/(j-η)  for j < η. 
(b) in the case of KfS ≤ S, the denominator must be less than zero:   
  p(j-η) - (i-η) < 0. 
Solving for p, the condition is        
  p ≤ (i-η)/(j-η)  for j > η  and    
  p ≥ (i-η)/(j-η)  for j < η. 
 
These results show that capital supply or the offered minimum/maximum loan size for π ≥ 0 
depends on the ratio of interest rates to (p) and collateral value (η) to capital opportunity costs (i) 
and capital revenues (j). 
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 The partial derivatives of the capital supply show, how the minimum or maximum loan size 
changes when either the capital cost (i), capital revenues (j), the transaction costs (H), or the 
probability p changes while all other variables remain unchanged. 
 δKf/δH =  v / m  > 0  
 δKf/δi = - (Hv-F) / m²  < 0 
 δKf/δj = (Hv-F)p / m²  > 0 
 δKf/δp = (Hv-F)(j-η) / m² > 0 
 δKf/δη = (Hv-F)(1-p) / m² > 0 
 
where m = (p(j-η) - (i-η))  > 0 
 
Under the assumption of positive real interest rates and moderate security requirements, that is if F 
< Hv, j > η and (j -η)p > (i -η), the sign of the derivatives are what is expected. In cases of negative 
real interest rates the signs of the derivatives with respect to j (since it becomes j < η) may reverse. 
A negative sign on the derivative means a decrease of the potential offered capital amount per 
loan contract. 
Whether an increase of probability (p) occurs along with an increase in labor hours (H) causes a 
positive change in capital supply depends on the partial derivatives of the capital supply equation 
with respect to H and p. The increase in H reflects higher transaction costs resulting from the 
stringent screening process of the individual farm business by financial institutions. The increased 
screening effort is thought to reduce risk, increasing the probability of repayment. 
Supply and demand of capital 
Under the assumptions of (i) a competitive, transparent market where all characteristics of traded 
items are observable, and (ii) the existence of a convex set of production and preferences and 
publicly known prices, then a competitive market equilibrium yielding a pareto-optimal24 outcome 
exists (Nicholson, 1995). To maximize the utility or profit of economic agents the market 
equilibrium (Walrasian equilibrium) requires that there is a equilibrium price for each good 
demanded and offered. Assuming a competitive market equilibrium and the pareto-optimality 
condition, the market interest rate should clear the rural financial markets in Romania, such that 
capital demand equals capital supply:  
(30) KfS ≈  KfD  
To find the market clearing interest rate all other variables except for the interest rate are held 
constant. The capital supply (KfS ) represents a set of possible loan sizes offered per loan contract. 
Equation (31) shows the necessary conditions to obtain a profit greater than or equal to zero for 
financial institutions. 
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 (31) (Hv - F) / (p(j-η) - (i-η) ≈ [(qj + η(1-q) + f - b(1-q)) / qθ]ε - Ko    
However, some of the welfare theorem assumptions25 do not hold in Romania and the market 
equilibrium is not pareto-optimal. Many types of market failures including externalities, public 
goods, market power and asymmetric information prior or subsequent to contract signing (Mas-
Colell, 1995) may occur. The rural financial markets in Romanian predominantly suffer from 
asymmetric information and uncertainty in outcomes.  
From the perspective of the financial institutions, the asymmetric information pertaining to actual 
farm financial performance and the actual value of farm assets before contract signing is an 
impediment for a competitive market equilibrium to exist in rural areas. Therefore, the evaluation of 
a pledged asset may differ between the borrower and lender. Thus, the capital demander’s 
collateral value of η (η = ηB) does not necessarily correspond to the capital supplier’s value of η (η 
= ηF). In addition, the information on a farm’s financial performance is asymmetric causing high 
transaction costs for the financial intermediary to obtain the true information and reduce the risk of 
default.  
Besides market failure through asymmetric information, farm households acting as utility 
maximizers and the uncertainty surrounding yields and prices affects the credit market. For the 
borrower, uncertainty about his actual outcome (yield and prices) in combination with risk aversion 
may prevent him attaining profit maximization. For that reason, the right hand side of equation (31), 
the capital demand of an individual farm household, may be based on the assumption of expected 
utility maximization and not pure profit maximization. 
Including the differences in asset evaluation, the utility of wealth (asset endowment) and the high 
transaction costs of the lender for improved screening efforts in equation (31) gives the market 
clearing price. This price, if it exists, differs from the one under pure profit maximization. 
(32) (Hv-F)  /  [p(j-η) - (i-ηB)] ≈ (1-q)(W+Y-Ar-Lw)/(j+f)  -  q(W-Ar-Lw)/(b-ηF-f)  
where:  Y = cKβAαLγ 
 
To illustrate the differences between capital demand and supply from the diverging assets 
evaluation caused through asymmetric information, the collateral requirement η takes the value ηB 
= Kj for financial institutions and ηF = Kj/(1-x)= v (see chapter 4.2) for the borrower’s actual asset 
value of the pledged assets. The probability of repayment p for the financial institutions and the 
probability q for farm output Y are included to represent uncertainty and risk. Further, it is shown, 
that high transaction costs caused by increased screening efforts to reduce uncertainty for financial 
institutions heavily affects the supply. Finally, some degree of risk aversion is integrated through 
utility maximization aspects. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
24 An economic outcome is said to be pareto-optimal if it is impossible to make some individuals better off without making 
some other individual worse off (Mas-Colell, 1995). 
25 Welfare theorem I states that any competitive equilibrium is pareto-optimal, the welfare theorem II says, that any 
pareto-optimal outcome is a competitive equilibrium if appropriate lump-sum transfers of wealth are arranged (Mas-
Colell, 1995). 
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 3.2.2 Rural financial markets and asymmetric information: a qualitative approach 
This part of the work relies on a qualitative analysis of the problems resulting from uncertainty in 
quality and prices of assets. It is argued that the lack of information on the value of farm assets 
leads to adverse selection through financial institutions. The discussion on adverse selection in the 
rural financial markets in Romania refers mainly to Akerlof’s lemon market (1979).  
Asymmetric information represents one type of market failure. It might occur before or after the 
contract signing or agreement. According to Mas-Colell (1995), the asymmetric information before 
contracting relies either on insufficient signaling or screening and results in adverse selection. 
Asymmetric information after a formal agreement is often referred to the principal-agent-problem 
and includes the moral hazard (hidden action) and the hidden information problem (see Figure 7). 
In this study on rural financial markets, asymmetric information is considered the main factor 
leading to no loan agreements. This is partly due to insufficient screening from the side of the 
financial institutions, a weak signaling from the side of potential borrowers and due to adverse 
selection. 
 
Figure 7 Asymmetric information 
   Asymmetric information 
 
 before contracting   subsequent to the contract signing 
screening 
signaling     principle-agent-problem 
adverse selection 
 
hidden action  hidden information 
(moral hazard) 
 
Source: Mas-Colell, 1995 
 
The quality of a particular farm asset is not observable to financial institutions and, moreover, there 
is relatively little information on the market prices or resale values of used farm assets. Because of 
this missing or very small secondary market, it is assumed that there prevails uncertainty on the 
quality of the asset as well as on its alternative use which is normally signaled through it’s resale 
value. As with the car sellers in the case of the lemon markets (Akerlof, 1979), the farmers are 
considered as the so called ‘sellers’ since they provide assets as collateral in exchange for a 
certain loan amount. The financial institutions in turn, are considered to be the ‘buyers’, since they 
‘sell loans’ and require assets as securities for the approval or installment.  
63 
 The farmers (n) valuate their asset with a value (vn). This value takes into account (i) the farmers’ 
knowledge of the true quality of the asset, (ii) the real utility or return of this asset and (iii) any 
subjective considerations and evaluations regarding the particular farm asset.  
The financial institutions or, like for some Romanian banks, the external evaluation experts are 
unable to observe the true quality of each single asset. Furthermore, no or a rather small 
secondary market for farm assets exist. Hence, the financial institutions set the value of any farm 
asset (vf)26 equal to the expected value (v) of a small pool of similar assets27 without having much 
information on the market prices and the economic yield of such assets. Because of the 
uncertainty of the real value of farm assets and the prudential and cautious estimation of the value 
of these assets, the expected value (v = E(vf) ≠ E(vn)) of these assets is assumed to be 
downwardly biased, reflecting the underestimation of farm asset values.  
Only those farmers or potential borrowers whose individually estimated asset value (vn ) is smaller 
than the expected value (v) are going to be willing to use their assets as collateral28. Subsequently, 
all farmers whose asset value ( vn ) is higher than v (vn > v) drop out and only those with values of 
vn equal or lower than v (vn ≤ v) remain interested in the loan business. That is, the pre-condition 
for a potential borrower to accept a loan contract is: 
(33) vn ≤ v        29 
Being aware of adverse selection, the financial institutions may reconsider their expected value (v). 
The reconsidered or ‘new’ expected value of say v/2 is based on the pool of remaining interested 
farmers and thus, on the pool of the remaining farm assets with value vn ≤ v. But as before, only 
those farmers with asset values vn ≤ v/2 remain interested in a loan contract. The final stage of this 
adverse selection process is an expected value close to zero (v = 0). Subsequently, not a single 
agreement on a loan contract between a farmer and a financial institution will be signed.  
However, the farmers are not actually selling their asset, rather, use it as collateral which can be 
seized if the loan defaults. However, they face uncertainty about his ability to repay the loan 
depending on their annual income. To assess the possible income through an investment the 
farmer calculates the expected cost of a loan, which is the sum of the loss of an asset (vn ) 
weighted by the probability (1-q) of defaulting plus the loan interests ((j-1)K) payable weighted by 
the probability (q) of successfully repaying the loan, and compares these expected costs with the 
expected gain of q Y(K). Thus, a farmers’ perception of his asset value includes the probability of 
loss. Therefore, the condition for accepting the collateral requirements changes to: 
                                                          
26 for f = 1 to any number 
27 set of assets vf with f from 1 to any number 
28 the farmers do not directly compare their asset value vn with the bank’s estimation of the asset value v, but with the 
potential loan size they may get for the assets. And the bank just allows a loan size covered by the value v.  
29 it is assumed that vn ~ loan size demanded and v ~ loan size supplied. And since loan size demanded and supplied 
are supposed to be equal, vn ~ v. 
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 (34) (1 – q) vn ≤ v. 
where 1-q: probability of default, 
 v: estimated average asset value from the perspective of the financial institutions, 
 vn: perceived asset value by farmer n, 
 j: here: nominal loan interest rate/100 plus one 
 
It is common practice at financial institutions to accept only a certain percentage of the expected 
assessed asset value (v) as the security value (B). This security value (B)  is smaller of the factor 
(x) than the expected asset value (v) and is expressed here as v x = B. Furthermore, for a loan of 
the size (K) the financial institutions require at least a security of the size jK (principal plus 
interests). Hence, the pre-condition for the financial institution to supply a loan are : 
(35) v x = B = K j  
where K: loan amount,  
 
Rearranging equation (35), v can be expressed as 
(36) v  = Kj/ x or    
(37) K = v x / j 
where x: factor between 1 and 0, expresses a share of the asset value accepted as security 
 
Since the potential borrower is ignorant about the expected value (v) evaluated by a financial 
institution, the borrower focuses on the exchange value he gets for the asset accepted as 
collateral, namely the loan size (K). The pre-condition to be willing to accept the loan contract with 
the collateral requirements30 becomes for him: 
(38) (1 – q) vn ≤ K. 
Replacing K in equation (38) by the expression in equation (39), the final expression for an 
agreement between a potential borrower and lender to occur is : 
 
(39) (1 – q) vn ≤ v x / j    
Under adverse selection the potential borrowers who remain interested in a loan contract are 
farmers with individually assessed values (vn) less than or equal to the loan size K offered 
(indicated by equation (39)). This is, the ‘bad’ borrowers e.g. farmers with low actual quality assets 
or only those with probabilities of default close to zero may pursue the contract offered. The 
difference between the asset evaluation due to the prevailing uncertainty with respect to quality 
and market values of assets as well as the uncertainty about default rates induces adverse 
selection.  
                                                          
30 at time zero, that is at the time of the contract agreement 
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 3.2.3 The agricultural micro-enterprise, risk and risk aversion: a qualitative analysis 
This section on the agricultural sector tries to elucidate the economic behavior of individual farmers 
from the standpoint of neoclassical theory of utility maximization under uncertainty. It is a 
qualitative analysis supplementing the results of the quantitative analysis on rural financial 
markets. 
Under classical consumption theory, the consumer’s utility function u(c) comprises consumption (c) 
as utility. The budget to ‘buy consumption’ is constrained by available wealth (W), which in turn 
constrains utility. Utility maximization underlies the following objective function: 
(40) max.  u(c) = ln c  31      
 s.t.   W  ≥ cp 
where: c: consumption 
p: price of consumption goods 
 W: wealth 
 
It is assumed that the initial asset endowment or wealth level (Ws ) of an economic agent provides 
certain utility, since it allows him to satisfy some of his needs such as consumption either directly 
with the purchasing power given by wealth or indirectly by using part of its wealth in a production 
process32. That is, u(Ws) ≡ u(c). Normalizing p to one and replacing c by W equation (40) becomes 
(41) u(c) = u(W) = ln W   33. 
The wealth level is not considered as given or independent of the action of an agent. Rather, the 
wealth level is affected by the expected outcomes (hi ) of an action leading to a decline in initial 
wealth (Ws+hi0) or to an increase in wealth (Ws+hi1). 
Any economic agent is supposed to make efforts to increase his wealth (W), and thus, his utility. 
The farmer is assumed to have clear preferences for some asset bundles and activities. These 
asset bundles and activities promise a certain wealth level (W) that guarantees a certain level of 
living standard . To order their preferences they satisfy certain standard properties such as 
completeness, reflection, transitivity, continuity, monotonicity, local nonsatiation and convexity. The 
convexity assumption is a generalization of the neoclassical assumption of ‘diminishing marginal 
rates of substitution’. There exists a continuous utility function representing the preferences if the 
above assumptions are satisfied (Varian, 1992). 
The farmer makes his action choices under uncertainty. This means taking a particular action to 
reach a desired wealth level (W), e.g. investment through external capital may lead to a loss or 
gain of some assets (Ws+hij) with an unknown or known probability. The choices which the farmer 
faces take the form of lotteries where the farmer receives an outcome such as a prize (Ws+hi1) with 
probability q or a prize (Ws+hi0) with probability (1-q). The prizes may be money, assets or goods. 
                                                          
31 The utility function is assumed to be concave 
32 or even by directly fulfilling his longing for prestige 
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 Most situations involving behavior under risk can be put into this lottery framework (Varian, 1992). 
In this study the farmers have the choice between a bundle of assets and actions (Ws+hij) for j = 0 
or 1, giving different levels of utility. However, the final utility of the outcome (hij ) of an action at a 
certain wealth level (Ws ) depends on the probability (q). 
(42) Expected Utility  =   U (W) =  q∑
=
n
1i
i u(Ws+hi1) + (1-qi) u(Ws+hi0).  34 
where W: resulting wealth level consisting of the asset endowment and outcome, W=Ws+hij  
  Ws: initial wealth level  
hi1: outcome of an action hi with a gain of assets, j=1 
  hi0: outcome of an action hi with a loss of assets, j=0 
  U: expected utility [maybe use E(u) for expected utility] 
  u: utility 
  qi: probability of the outcome gain (hi1) of an action i, with 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.  
 
The utility in equation (42) is based on the von Neumann-Morgenstern technique which defines 
utility as the expected utility U(W) of a gamble (Nicholson,1995). The expected utility property says 
that the utility of a lottery is the expectation of the utility gained from its prizes. Thus, the utility is 
additively separable over the outcomes and linear in the probabilities. Since the utility function is 
concave, the farmer prefers the utility of the expected prizes over the expected utility of the prizes: 
(43) u (qi (Ws+hi1) + (1-qi)(Ws+hi0)) > qi u(Ws+hi1) + (1-qi) u(Ws+hi0). 
This behavior is called risk aversion. Several measures of risk aversion rely on the ratio of the first 
and second derivative of the expected utility function. The more concave the expected utility 
function, the more risk averse the farmers (Mas-Colell, 1995). 
In the case of Romanian farmers, the asset endowment level of farms with one to four hectares is 
very modest. This endowment level provides a level of utility towards the lower bound of the utility 
function. Due to the concavity of the utility function, the additional utility from one more unit of 
assets is decreasing and the slope of the utility function becomes flatter with increasing wealth. In 
line with the decreasing slope (second derivative) the risk aversion decreases with increasing 
wealth. Not surprisingly, private farmers with low utility levels display a rather high degree of risk 
aversion against any kind of investment endangering their available assets or wealth.  
When a consumer wishes to maximize his preferences, he chooses an optimal bundle of goods 
under a given budget constraint in order to receive the maximal utility value. The basic hypothesis 
of consumption theory is transferred to farmers’ wealth and choice of action bundle. Here, a 
rational farmer will always choose the most preferred action and base his choice on a given initial 
level of wealth (Ws+hij). These decisions are made from a given set of actions and asset bundles to 
achieve a certain wealth level (W) under the restriction that the expected gain from the action is 
equal to or greater than zero, or that the resulting wealth level W will not fall below the minimum 
wealth level W0. That is: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
33 ‚ln‘ represents the natural logarithms 
34 the signs i and j do not represent interest rates as used before in this chapter 
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 (44) max.    U(W)  
s.t. (q∑
=
n
1i
∑
=
n
1i
i hi1 + (1-qi) h )   ≥ 0   or  
  (qi (Ws+hi1)+ (1-qi) (Ws+hi0) ≥ W0 
i0
where W0: minimum level of required wealth to satisfy essential needs 
 
Combinations of outcomes (hij ) with corresponding probabilities q which provide the same level of 
utility and among which the farmers are indifferent form indifference curves (Nicholson, 1995). A 
high potential loss of wealth with a low probability 1-q and a low potential loss with a high 
probability 1-q may yield the same utility. This infers that the optimal bundle of assets and actions 
depends on the probability ratio. 
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 4 Rural financial markets 
The results of the analysis represented in this chapter are divided in six subsections: the 
descriptive results of the sample; the production function received from the multiple regression; the 
profit function derived from the production function under different conditions; the demand function 
taking into account several constraints; the supply of capital by financial institutions and finally a 
comparison of capital supply and demand.   
4.1 Descriptive statistical results 
The sample finally used for the analysis comprises 181 observations of individual farms. The 
descriptive statistical findings are listed in Table 11. It shows the maximum and minimum value, 
the mean and standard deviation of the variables output (Y), capital (K), land (A) and labor (L) input 
as well as the values of the year of farm foundation (F), the educational level (E) of the farm 
manager and the net income to capital expenditure (X) in one production period. All variables show 
a relatively high variance, which reflects the great variety and diversity of the individual farm sector 
in Romania.  
Table 11 Statistical figures of the observed variables 
 Revenues Y 
in million lei 
Capital K 
in million 
lei 
Land A in 
ha 
Labor L in 
man power 
per year 
Foundation F, 
year of 
foundation 
Education 
E, levels *1 
income to 
capital 
expenditure X 
*² 
Number 181 181 181 181 76 73 181 
Minimum value 4.8 2.5 1 1 1950 1 -2.88 
Maximum value 190.8 166.2 25 7.5 1997 8 2.36 
Mean 60.9 35.3 6.3 3.1  4.4 0.1 
Stand. deviation 40.5 27.4 5.2 1.1  1.7 0.8 
Source: Own calculations 
Note: *1 The educational level from 1-8 comprises no school, elementary, secondary, high school, agricultural 
and technical school, undergraduate and graduate. *2 capital expenditure includes family labor 
remuneration of about 450,000 lei per month, corresponding about to one third of wages in agriculture. 
 
To understand better the functioning of rural financial markets not only macroeconomic, structural, 
and sectoral features of the financial system needs to be considered, but also microeconomic 
information e.g. the participants economic performance are important. In this context, the debt 
service capacity of individual farms is of interest. The distribution of the net income in relation to 
the capital expenditure in consideration of family labor remuneration represents a proxy for the 
potential debt service. The proxy roughly shows what interest rates an individual farm is able to 
pay on its capital expenditure. The frequency distribution of the proxy is depicted in Figure 8. When 
a financial institution arbitrarily selects a farmer out of the sample of interviewed farmers, the 
distribution gives the probability of selecting a farm with a good or low debt service capacity. 
Therefore, it can be used also as a proxy for the risk of credit default (1-p). The variable (X) 
displays a normal distribution with mean 0.1 and standard deviation 0.8. The frequency 
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 distributions of the explanatory and dependent variables are listed in Annex 7.1. Their distributions 
are normal, with a skew to the left. 
Figure 8 Frequency distribution of the net income in relation 
to capital expenditure 
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Source: Own calculations, sample n = 181 
Note: The net income to capital expenditure (X) is indicated as decimals, e.g.: X% / 100% 
 
4.2 The production function 
The multiple regression analysis includes regressions with several functional forms like the Cobb-
Douglas technology, the Mitcherlich-Baule function, the trans-logarithmic, quadratic and linear 
relationship between the output (Y) and the input factors (K), (A), and (L) (see Annex 7.4). The 
regression results of most of the functional forms are significant. However, the Cobb-Douglas 
technology depicted in Table 12, promised to be the most suited and convenient functional form for 
the model developed in this work and the regression results of the trans-logarithmic function 
underpins this choice. 
Table 12 Regression results of the Cobb-Douglas production technology 
 parameter t-value mean 
Constant 5.91 6.21**  
K 0.52 11.22** 35.3 
A 0.25 5.80** 6.3 
L 0.07 1.56* 3.1 
    
Residual sum -79.1   
Residual variance 405.2   
R² 0.75   
Source: Own calculations 
Note: The sample comprises 181 observations, the significance level for ** is α = 0.01and for * α = 0.1 
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 The regression results for the Cobb-Douglas technology display a high significance as regards the 
variance of the residual, the R² and the t-values and allows a relatively uncomplicated technical 
handling35. Accordingly, the Cobb-Douglas production function is given by equation (45). The t-
values and residuals of this technology are shown in Table 12. 
(45) Y = c K β A α L γ    =  5.91 K 0.52 A 0.25 L 0.07 
Since the addition of the parameters β, α and γ yields a value smaller than one (0.52+0.25+0.07 = 
0.777), the production function displays decreasing returns to scale, as expected. The elasticity of 
output indicated by the parameters β, α and γ reflects the increase of the output (Y) caused by one 
per cent change of the input factors (K), (A) and (L). Hence, the contribution of capital (K, 
comprising all production inputs) to output (Y) is 0.52 per cent, of land (A) 0.25 per cent and of 
family labor (L) 0.07 per cent. The production function for an average individual farm36 is depicted 
in Figure 9, with output (Y) in million lei on the y-axis and capital expenditure (K) in million lei along 
the x-axis. 
Figure 9 Production function of an average individual farm  
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Source:   Own calculation 
 
Plugging the average values of the input variables (K), (A) and (L) in the corresponding derivative 
gives small marginal products for capital and land input (Table 13). The second derivative of the 
production function with respect to capital expenditure (K) is negative, and hence the marginal 
product of capital is diminishing with increasing capital expenditure. Based on the average values 
of the input factors37, the marginal products indicate that an additional capital expenditure of one 
million lei increases the output (in this case the revenues) by 0.95 million lei, an additional hectare 
of cultivable land increases the output by 2.6 million lei and one additional family labor leads to an 
increase in revenues of 1.5 million lei per year. A remuneration for labor input of about 450,000 lei 
per month amounts to a wage of 5.4 million lei38 per year. When the value for land input is 
augmented and those for the other input factors remain unchanged, the marginal product for 
                                                          
35 The regression results of coefficients of the trans-log. function support the choice of the Cobb-Douglas technology. 
36 Three family labor forces and 6 hectares of cultivable land 
37 Average capital, labor and land input see Table 13. 
38 5.4 million lei per annum corresponds to a monthly wage of 50 EUR 
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 capital expenditure increases and the marginal product for land declines as depicted in the four last 
columns of Table 13. Furthermore, an increase of capital expenditure in line with an increase of 
land input still yields a marginal product of capital expenditure smaller than one. Evidently, these 
results suggest that at this stage in the development of the small-scale private farm sector in 
Romania land input is a very crucial factor for agricultural production.  
Table 13 Marginal products 
Input factors Para-
meters β, 
α, γ  
Average 
values for 
input factors 
marginal 
product 
δY/δ... * 
values for 
input 
factors 
marginal 
product 
δY/δ. 
values for 
input 
factors 
marginal 
product 
δY/δ. 
K 0.52 35.3 0.953 35.0 1.071 35.0 1.185 
A 0.25 6.3 2.566 10.0 1.802 15.0 1.329 
L 0.07 3.1 1.460 3.0 1.682 3.0 1.862 
constant c 5.91       
Source: Own calculations 
Note: * For capital expenditure the marginal product is: δY/δK = 0,52 * 5.91 * 35.3 –0.48  * 6.3 0.25 * 3.1 0.07 =  0.95 
 
At the same average input level, the marginal rate of technical substitution (RTS) reveals a rather 
low substitution of labor or cultivable land through capital as depicted in Table 14. An additional 
capital expenditure of one million lei substitutes 0.65 units of man power or 0.37 hectares of 
cultivable land. In contrast, one additional hectare of cultivable land would replace 1.8 units of man 
power per year or 2.7 million lei per year while keeping the output (Y) constant.  
Table 14 Marginal rate of technical substitution (RTS) 
K replaces RTS A replaces  RTS L replaces  RTS 
L -0.65 L -1.76 K -1.53 
A -0.37 K -2.69 A -0.57 
Source: Own calculations 
 
To briefly illustrate whether the level of education, specialization or experience in farming have an 
influence on the parameters and hence on production, the sample is divided into sub-samples. The 
criteria for the sub-samples for education comprises: low or high educational level, for 
specialization: livestock, crop or mixed farming, and for experience in farming: old and new farms. 
The regression results for the Cobb-Douglas technology of each sub-sample are listed in Annex 
7.2. The parameters for capital expenditure and land input are significant in all sub-samples. The 
coefficient of the input factor K is comparatively high for private farms with a manager of low 
education39, with unspecialized production and with a short farm history (new farms). The constant 
appears to be high for samples with high education, with specialization in crop production and with 
farms founded before 1990. Obviously, education, specialization and experience are positively 
related to a higher initial production level. Farms with specialization in crop production show a high 
average capital expenditure and a high initial production level, while their parameter for capital 
expenditure (K) is low. Although the coefficient of (K) for the sample with a low educational 
                                                          
39 education levels range from 1 to 8, the low education level comprises 1 to 3 (no school, elementary and secondary 
school) 
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 background is larger than for higher education, their average capital expenditure is of the same 
size. This may indicate a more productive use of capital for the group of less educated farmers. 
The sub-sample of ‘new farms’ shows a higher parameter value for (K) and a higher average 
capital expenditure (K) than its corresponding sub-sample. Overall, the differences in the 
parameter values between the sub-samples are not striking. To estimate the impact of education, 
specialization and experience on farm production precisely further analyses have to be undertaken 
which are, however, beyond the objective to this study.  
4.3 The farm profit and demand function  
This chapter discusses the demand for own or external capital under certainty conditions (with no 
price or production risks), without taking into account any further costs for capital except the 
interest rates as opportunity costs of capital. To outline the effects of economic instability like high 
inflation, the models also takes into account varying real interest rates. 
While the production function reveals some features on the technical side, the capital demand 
function and the farm profit function refer also to the financial side of farm production. Plugging the 
values from the regression analysis and the average deposit interest rate for own capital or the 
average loan interest rate40 for external capital in the demand functions developed in Chapter 3.2, 
the capital demand function becomes the following shape: 
(46) K (i) =  [ (1-0.47) / (0.52*5.91*A0.25 L0.07) ]1/(0.52-1)   
=   [0.53 / (3.07* A0.25 L0.07)] –2.08 
Similarly, the demand functions for agricultural land and man power are: 
(47) A (r) = [r / (1.48 K 0.52 L 0.07)] –1.33 
(48) L (w) = [w / ( 0.41K 0.52 A 0.25)] – 1.08 
where: r: opportunity cost for land 
 w:  opportunity cost for labor 
 
Plugging the values of (K), (A) and (L) as indicated in the first row and column of Table 15 below in 
the corresponding equations above, assuming for (r) one million lei per year as opportunity costs 
for land use, and for (w) 5.4 million lei per year as necessary family labor wage income41, the 
demand for labor, land and capital is obtained and listed in Table 15. The results in Table 15 show 
that the impact of one more unit of labor on the demand for agricultural land or capital is rather 
small, while the impact of one more unit of land (or capital) increases the demand for capital (or 
land) significantly. As a result of the temporarily negative real interest rates in Romania, the 
calculated demand for capital in general is rather high, since any capital use causes no costs but 
                                                          
40 Real interest rates (-38% for loans, -47% for deposits) are based on the Fisher effect; the actual nominal interest rates 
were 34% for deposits and 55% for loans; the inflation rate in Romania was 151% in December 1997 (NBR, 1998). 
41 The opportunity costs for land are based on the low rent income of agricultural land and the family wage corresponds 
to a monthly income of 50 EUR, which is about two-thirds of the average wage for employees in agriculture in December 
1997 (NCS, 1998). 
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 benefit. However, the huge difference in the opportunity cost of own or external capital, based on 
deposit or loan interest rates, produces a large difference in demand for own or external capital. As 
anticipated, the capital demand function has a negative slope in respect of the capital opportunity 
cost, since the derivative of the demand function is negative.  
Table 15 Demand for input factors 
Capital demand in million lei for external capital with a negative real loan 
interest rate at Dec. 1997 
 
Input of A in ha Input of man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 3 
1 25.38 28.08 29.79 31.06 32.95 
5 58.68 64.92 68.87 71.83 76.20 
10 84.19 93.15 98.82 103.05 109.33 
Agricultural land demand in hectares  
Input of L in man 
power per year 
Input of K in million lei 
 10 20 35 50 100 
1 8.31 13.43 19.80 25.35 40.99 
2 8.86 14.33 21.12 27.04 43.73 
3 9.20 14.88 21.93 28.09 45.42 
Labor demand in man power per year  
Input of A in ha Input of K in million lei 
 10 20 35 50 100 
1 0.22 0.33 0.46 0.56 0.82 
5 0.35 0.52 0.71 0.86 1.27 
10 0.42 0.62 0.85 1.04 1.54 
Source: Own calculations 
Note: The opportunity costs for capital were assumed to correspond to the real deposit interest rate, 
which was about –47% p.a. in December 1997 and to the real loan interest rate of about –38% 
in Dec. 199742 (NBR, 1998). 
 
Table 16 Demand for capital under positive real interest rates 
Capital demand in million lei for own capital with a positive real deposit interest 
rate  
Input of A in ha Input of man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 3 
1 8.47 9.37 9.94 10.37 11.00 
5 19.58 21.66 22.98 23.97 25.43 
10 28.09 31.08 32.97 34.39 36.48 
Capital demand in million lei for external capital with a positive real loan 
interest rate 
Input of A in ha Input of man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 3 
1 7.69 8.50 9.02 9.41 9.98 
5 17.77 19.66 20.86 21.75 23.08 
10 25.50 28.21 29.93 31.21 33.11 
Source: Own calculations, 1999 
Note: The opportunity costs for capital were assumed to correspond to a real deposit interest rate of 
about 5% p.a. and to a real loan interest rate of about 10% p.a. 
 
                                                          
42 Calculated according to the Fisher effect ( Shapiro, 1996), with a nominal deposit rate of 34% and an inflation rate of 
151 %, both for Dec. 1997 (NBR, 1998). 
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 Positive real interest rates show a rather different result with regard to the capital demand as 
depicted in Table 16. The capital demand and the gap between the demand for own and external 
capital expenditure is significantly reduced compared to the demand under negative rates. 
However, this demand is considered without uncertainty in output and prices, and without further 
costs for external capital such as loan application costs, insurance and credit security costs. 
Farm profit is calculated according to the profit function developed in Chapter 3.2 and represents 
the maximal possible profit under a given input set of land and labor. The capital expenditure is 
chosen optimally so that the profit is maximized. The labor input in Romania’s small scale farm 
sector varies largely depending on the availability of jobs43 for family members. To eliminate the 
effect of this variation on the farm profit, labor remuneration is assumed to be zero in the profit 
calculations. Further, the impact of land prices -unknown prices since there hardly exists a market- 
on profit is excluded too. The farm profit displayed in Annex 7.7 is calculated under different input 
levels of land and family labor, as indicated in the first column and third row of the table.  
The average monthly net wage in the Romanian agricultural sector for December 1997 was around 
0.65 million lei (NBR, 1998), which adds up to about 7.8 million lei per year per worker. Under the 
temporarily prevailing high inflation an adequate remuneration of labor and land input in the private 
agricultural sector seems to be possible. However, besides wages, the profit (see Annex 7.7) also 
has to cover re-investments. 
A comparison of the farm profit under positive and negative real rates draws a rough picture of the 
effect of temporarily high inflation on farm income (see Annex 7.7). The real interest rates and thus 
the capital costs are assumed to correspond to 5 % for own capital and of 10% for external capital. 
As soon as the real interest rates become positive, the profit of an average farm (six hectares of 
agricultural land and three family workers) declines by more than 22 million lei. With increasing 
labor input the remuneration of labor and land use omitted in these calculations becomes difficult. 
Figure 10 illustrates graphically two different profit situations of an average individual farm with 
varying capital expenditure under certainty and under zero transaction costs for external capital 
funds, (1) under negative real interest rates (thick line) and (2) under positive real rates (thin line). 
As before, the opportunity costs for land and labor input are set to zero. It becomes clear that even 
under positive real rates an average farm makes a profit that allows it partly to remunerate the land 
and labor input. Further, the optimal capital expenditure for an average farm seems to range 
around 20 million lei under positive real interest rates. 
However, it should again be emphasized that these profit calculations underlie certain outcomes 
and with the exception of the interest rates no further costs for external capital are taken into 
account. The influence of uncertainty and external capital costs such as tough collateral 
requirements, risk and fees on capital demand is discussed in the next chapter. 
                                                          
43 non-agricultural jobs 
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 Figure 10 Profit of an average individual farm under negative and positive 
real interest rates. 
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4.4 Capital demand, uncertainty and collateral requirement 
4.4.1 Capital demand for own or external capital 
Under uncertain production and market conditions, the farmers are not sure about their farm 
income and thus about their capability to repay a loan and the interest. Moreover, financial 
institutions only approve a loan application if they are able to seize sufficient and real assets as 
collateral. Consequently, the capital demand function is affected by the uncertainty in farm returns 
and by collateral requirements and becomes, for own capital demand Ko in Romania: 
(49) Ko = [ (i-(1-q)) / (q*βcAαLγ) ] 1/(β-1).        
  = [ (0.53+(1-q)) / (q 0.52*5.91A0.25L0.07) ] 1/(0.52-1).   
And for external capital Kf demand: 
(50) Kf = [ (q j+(1-q)η–(1-q)+f) / (q βcAαLγ) ] 1/(β-1)..       
  = [ (q 0.62+(1-q)1.6–(1-q)+0.05) / (q 0.52*5.91A0.25L0.07) ] 1/(0.52-1). 
where  1-q: probability of default, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 
j:  loan interest rate/100 + 1 
i: deposit interest rate/100 + 1 
 
As before, the capital opportunity costs are assumed to correspond to the real interest rates in 
Romania. The collateral requirements (η) amount to at least 160% of the loan amount44 (η=1.6). 
The fees (f) for insurance, registrations and loan approval are considered as a share of the loan 
                                                          
44 The collateral has to cover the principal and the interest for one year. Under a nominal loan interest rate of 60% p.a. 
the collateral value has to cover 160% of the loan amount. 
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 amount of up to 5% 45. The capital cost for own capital corresponds to the deposit interest rate, for 
external capital to the loan interest rate. The uncertainty of repayment is incorporated through the 
probability of default (1-q).  
Table 17 Capital demand under negative real interest rates with tough collateral 
requirements and uncertainty of return 
Demand for own capital in million lei  
q = 0.95 i = 0.53* 
Input of A 
in ha 
Input of L in man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
1 38.87 43.00 45.62 47.58 49.15 50.47 51.62
5 89.87 99.43 105.49 110.01 113.65 116.71 119.36
10 128.95 142.67 151.36 157.84 163.06 167.46 171.26
Demand for external capital in million lei 
 q = 0.90 j = 0.62** f = 0.05 η = 1.6 
Input of A 
in ha 
Input of L in man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
1 17.44 19.30 20.47 21.35 22.06 22.65 23.17
5 40.33 44.63 47.34 49.37 51.01 52.38 53.57
10 57.87 64.03 67.93 70.84 73.18 75.15 76.86
q = 0.95 j = 0.62** f = 0.05 η = 1.6 
Input of A 
in ha 
Input of L in man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
1 19.46 21.53 22.84 23.82 24.61 25.27 25.85
5 45.00 49.79 52.82 55.09 56.91 58.44 59.77
10 64.57 71.44 75.79 79.04 81.65 83.85 85.76
Source:  Own calculations  
Note: * 1 + average real deposit rate/100 at commercial banks at Dec. 1997, calculated using the Fisher effect  
** 1 + average real loan interest rate/100 at commercial banks at Dec. 1997, calculated using the Fisher effect. 
 
Two different default rates (1-q) 5% and 10% are assumed.46 The resulting demand levels of the 
model for own and external capital in million lei per production period (year) is indicated in Table 
17. It shows the capital demand in dependence of farm size which is expressed by varying land 
and labor inputs. The increase in the default rate (1-q), the collateral requirement (η), the loan fees 
(f) or the interest rate leads to a reduction in capital demand, given the precondition that q > (1-η-
f)/(1-η+j) 47, which is met by definition for (q).  
To quantify the impact of loan approval fees and collateral requirements on capital demand, the 
fees are reduced to one per cent and the loan coverage declines to 100% of the loan principal48. 
The resulting capital demand displayed in Table 18 shows that the reduction of fees and collateral 
                                                          
45 Risk premia of 3%, insurance for collateral of 0.75% for mobiles and 0,4% for immobiles, and 1,25% for credit 
insurance of the bank and a fixed amount of around 50.000 lei for asset valuation and diverse registrations. Source: 
Bank interview 1997 
46 The default rates are based on estimations and experiences of the interviewed financial institutions with small farm 
loans and their default rates. 
47 See chapter on Methodology, capital demand under uncertainty, δk/δ..<0 only if q > (1-η-f)/(1-η+j) 
48 Fees f of 1% of the loan amount and the loan coverage η of 100% corresponds more closely to the common practice 
of financial institutions. 
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 requirement leads to an increase in capital demand of almost one third under otherwise similar 
conditions (q = 0.95). 
Table 18 Capital demand under uncertainty and negative real interest rates with relaxed 
loan requirements 
Demand for external capital in million lei 
q = 0.95 j = 0.62 f = 0.01 η = 1.0 
Input of A 
in ha 
Input of L in man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 
1 24.45 27.06 28.70 29.93 30.92 31.76 32.48 
5 56.55 62.56 66.37 69.22 71.51 73.43 75.10 
10 81.13 89.76 95.23 99.31 102.60 105.36 107.75 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
The impact of interest rates on capital demand is shown in Table 19, where the opportunity costs 
applied for own or external capital are increased and correspond to clearly positive real rates. The 
derivatives with respect to (i) or (j) are negative and indicate a declining capital demand with 
increasing interest rates. Under these conditions, not surprisingly the demand for own capital under 
certain outcomes is higher than the demand for own capital under uncertain outcomes. The 
increase of interest rates has largely reduced capital demand at different farm size levels.  
Table 19 Capital demand under uncertainty and positive real interest rates with tough 
collateral requirements 
Demand for own capital in million lei  
q = 0.95 i = 1.05 
Input of A 
in ha 
Input of L in man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
1 8.42 9.32 9.89 10.31 10.65 10.94 11.19
5 19.48 21.55 22.86 23.84 24.63 25.29 25.87
10 27.95 30.92 32.80 34.21 35.34 36.29 37.12
20 40.10 44.36 47.07 49.08 50.71 52.07 53.26
Demand for external capital in million lei 
q = 0.90 j = 1.10 f = 0.05 η = 1.6 
Input of A 
in ha 
Input of L in man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
1 6.17 6.83 7.24 7.55 7.80 8.01 8.20
5 14.27 15.79 16.75 17.47 18.04 18.53 18.95
10 20.47 22.65 24.03 25.06 25.89 26.59 27.19
20 29.37 32.50 34.48 35.96 37.15 38.15 39.01
q = 0.95 j = 1.10 f = 0.05 η = 1.6 
Input of A 
in ha 
Input of L in man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
1 6.59 7.29 7.74 8.07 8.33 8.56 8.75
5 15.24 16.86 17.89 18.65 19.27 19.79 20.24
10 21.87 24.19 25.67 26.77 27.65 28.40 29.04
20 31.37 34.71 36.82 38.40 39.67 40.74 41.67
Source: Own calculation 
Note: The opportunity costs of capital are assumed to be real 5% p.a. for own capital and real 10% p.a. for external 
capital use. 
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 The impact of fees and collateral requirements on capital demand is quantified in Table 20. It 
shows that the relaxation of fees and collateral requirements leads to a slight increase in external 
capital demand. However, the impact of collateral and fees on the capital amount demanded is 
moderate. 
Table 20 Capital demand under uncertainty and positive real interest rates with relaxed 
collateral requirements 
Demand for capital in million lei under uncertainty and collateral requirements 
Demand for external capital in million lei 
q = 0.95 j = 1.10 f = 0.01 η = 1.0 
Input of A 
in ha 
Input of L in man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
1 7.53 8.34 8.84 9.22 9.53 9.78 10.01
5 17.42 19.28 20.45 21.33 22.03 22.63 23.14
10 25.00 27.66 29.34 30.60 31.61 32.46 33.20
20 35.87 39.68 42.10 43.90 45.35 46.58 47.63
Source: Own calculations 
 
To illustrate the profit situation of an average farm under negative and positive real interest rates 
two corresponding profit curves are depicted in Figure 11. They take into account the uncertainty 
conditions and transaction costs49 for external capital use. The thick line represents the profit 
situation under negative real loan interest rates, the thin line under positive real loan interest rates. 
The cost for labor and land are set equal to zero in order to facilitate a comparison with the profit 
curves under certainty and zero transaction costs in Figure 10. As expected, the profit curve under 
uncertainty and with transaction costs shifts downwards compared to the profit situation under 
certainty, but the shape of the profit curve remains rather unchanged.  
Figure 11 Profit of an average farm under uncertainty and with transaction 
costs for external capital  
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Source: Own calculation 
                                                          
49 Here, transaction costs are set equal to fees and collateral requirements. The latter are seen as potential transaction 
costs. 
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 4.4.2 Capital demand in combination with external and own capital 
However, in reality an individual farmer’s capital expenditure are financed through own and 
external capital sources. Thus, the capital expenditure (K) becomes K = Ko + Kf , as developed in 
Chapter 3.2. The demand for external capital KfD  is defined as the difference between the optimal 
external capital input and the optimal available50 own capital input under given interest rates and is 
expressed in equation (51). This definition of the capital demand function leads to a jump in the 
marginal demand curve with respect to K at the point where the input of capital (K) derives from 
external sources.  
(51) KfD = [(qj + η(1-q) + f – b(1-q)) / qθ]ε - Ko.  
Clearly the demand for external capital depends very much on the availability of own capital and 
also on the difference between the opportunity cost of own and external capital. According to the 
survey, the average loan size ranges around nine million lei51 at constant prices (Annex 7.3). The 
actual average ratio of external capital (loan) to total capital expenditure for private farms is about 
0.25. Therefore, it is assumed that an individual farmer is able to input around one-quarter of his 
capital expenditures from external capital sources. The final demand levels for external capital 
under input of own capital, uncertainty, fees and collateral requirements is shown in Table 21 with 
varying land size and available family labor inputs. The figures indicate the external demand as the 
difference between the weighed (0.75) optimal own capital input and the optimal external capital 
input. A so-called negative capital demand arises due to the large difference between the 
opportunity cost for own and external capital as it was prevailing in Romania. Also, the relative 
restriction of optimal own capital input to 75%, and the unlimited absolute own capital input of the 
model permits a negative external capital demand. 
Table 21 Demand for external capital under uncertainty and negative real rates with tough 
collateral requirements and own capital Ko 
External capital demand in mn lei 
q = 0.95  j = 0.62 i = 0.53 f = 0.05 η = 1.6  a, b  = 1 Ko share = 0.75 
Input of A 
in ha 
Input of L in man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
1 -9.69 -10.72 -11.37 -11.86 -12.25 -12.58 -12.87
5 -22.40 -24.78 -26.29 -27.42 -28.33 -29.09 -29.75
10 -32.14 -35.56 -37.73 -39.34 -40.64 -41.74 -42.69
Source: Own calculations 
 
However, this calculated potential capital demand does not correspond to reality. The actual use of 
external capital, for example through subsidized loans from banks or other sources, is higher –
positive- than the demand calculated in Table 21. The main reasons for the observed external 
capital use through loans are that the interest rates for loans to small-scale agricultural enterprises 
are on average 49 per cent points below (subsidized) the official, registered market loan rate 
(Annex 7.3), and thus the actual nominal loan interest rates are lower than the official nominal 
                                                          
50 If the available capital input is lower than the optimal own capital input, then the available capital determines the 
external capital input, otherwise the optimal own capital input has to be taken into account. 
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 market deposit rates. Consequently, any rationally-acting economic agent tries to obtain as much 
external capital as possible, to at least invest in a bank deposit account. The capital demand under 
subsidized interest rates in the model, displayed in Table 22, confirms this behavior of farmers for 
large amounts of cheap external capital.  
Table 22 Demand for external capital under uncertainty, tough collateral requirements and 
subsidized (negative real) loan interest rates and with own capital Ko 
Demand for external capital in million lei  
q = 0.95  j = 0.42 i = 0.53 f = 0.05 η = 1.6  a, b  = 1 Ko share = 0.75 
Input of A 
in ha 
Input of L in man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
1 9.89 10.94 11.60 12.10 12.50 12.84 13.13
5 22.86 25.29 26.83 27.98 28.91 29.69 30.36
10 32.80 36.29 38.50 40.15 41.48 42.59 43.56
20 47.06 52.06 55.24 57.60 59.51 61.11 62.50
Source: Own calculations 
Note: The interest rate subsidy was on average 49 percentage points (farm survey 1997) below the official published 
average loan rate of 55%, end-December 1997, (NBR, 1998). The final subsidized nominal lending rate was 
55%-49% = 6%, corresponding to a real lending rate of –58%. Thus, j = 1-0.58 = 0.42. 
 
The impact of positive real interest rates with tough and relaxed fees and collateral requirements is 
shown in Table 23 and Table 24, respectively. Although the demand for external capital is still 
rather low, it becomes positive when the margin between the loan and deposit interest rate 
decreases. Further, the relaxation of fees and collateral contribute to a slight increase in demand. 
Thus, the loosening of collateral requirements and the reduction of fees increases the capital 
demand for an average farm52 to about four million lei, but the size of the loan demanded is small53 
compared to other business loans, which range on average around 11 million lei.54 
 
Table 23 External capital demand under positive real rates with tough collateral 
requirements under uncertainty and own capital Ko 
Demand for external capital in million lei  
q = 0.95  j = 1.1 i = 1.05 f = 0.05 η = 1.6  a and b  = 1 Ko share = 0.75 
Input of A 
in ha 
Input of L in man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
1 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.36
5 0.63 0.70 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.84
10 0.91 1.00 1.06 1.11 1.15 1.18 1.20
20 1.30 1.44 1.53 1.59 1.64 1.69 1.73
Source: Own calculations 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
51 Constant prices based on December 1997, farm survey 1997, 
52 Average farm: 6 hectares of agricultural land, 3 family workers. 
53 4 million lei corresponds to about 440 EUR in Dec. 1997. 
54 Survey of non-agricultural enterprises, 1997/98, in Brasov and Dolj. 
81 
 Table 24 External capital demand under positive real interest rates and relaxed loan 
requirements on external capital demand under uncertainty with own capital Ko  
Demand for external capital in million  
q = 0.95  j = 1.1 i = 1.05 f = 0.01 η = 1.0  a, b  = 1 Ko share = 0.75 
Input of A 
in ha 
Input of L in man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
1 1.22 1.35 1.43 1.49 1.54 1.58 1.62
5 2.81 3.11 3.30 3.44 3.56 3.65 3.74
10 4.04 4.47 4.74 4.94 5.11 5.24 5.36
20 5.79 6.41 6.80 7.09 7.32 7.52 7.69
Source: Own calculations 
 
4.4.3 Capital demand under risk aversion 
The farm household as an entity is composed of an agricultural enterprise and a household. It is 
therefore assumed that the farm household as a decision-making unit focuses on utility-maximizing 
rather than on pure profit maximization and that the utility function displays a concave shape. 
Consequently, the household members display risk aversion as regards the possible gains or 
losses from business activities. The more concave the utility function, the greater the decline in 
demand for external capital.  
Since the shape of the utility function applied is supposed to be concave, a logarithmic function for 
utility U = ln(W+Π) is used. The special characteristics of logarithmic functions are that they are 
strictly monotone, increasing for all logarithmic values (W+Π) larger than zero and non-existing for 
all values smaller than zero, negative for all values 0<(W+Π)<1, and that all logarithmic functions 
have one common point, which is zero for (W+Π)=1 (Schule 2000). These characteristics affect the 
capital demand function in that the demand is zero for all values (W+Π) ≤ 1. The figures used to 
calculate the capital demand are high in numerical terms but not in values (1 million lei ~ 110 
EUR). In this functional form a change in utility or capital demand is large for very small values of 
(W+Π). The objective is to demonstrate that with a low wealth level and a possible loss of assets 
the demand for capital is rather low, but increases with increasing wealth, further characteristics of 
the selected functional form are of secondary relevance. Most important is that the model shows 
that the risk aversion decreases with increasing wealth. For this reason, the relative increase in 
wealth compared to capital demand should be considered, and not absolute wealth. The demand 
function is based on the maximization of the expected utility function depicted by equation (52) for 
production where the input of own capital is equal to zero (Ko=0). 
(52)  U = q U(W+h1) + (1-q) U(W-h0)    55    
 
where h1  = [ Y - (Kfj + Kff + Ar + Lw) ] = Π1    56 
  h0  = [ bKf - (Kfη + Kff + Ar + Lw) ] = Π0  
 b  ≤ 1 
  Y  = cKfβ Aα Lγ 
                                                          
55 Assuming a concave utility function of the form u = ln(W+hΠ). 
56 Since the utility function is concave, the profit function h1Π is assumed to be linear in (K) and thus independent of (K) 
for utility maximization.  
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As a first step, the potential gains or losses dependent on a certain amount of capital expenditure 
are calculated according to the equations above. The potential profit and loss is based on an 
average individual farm with six hectares of cultivable land and three family workers. The negative 
real interest rates applied conform to the actual situation in Romania. The fees, collateral 
requirements and remuneration of the other input factors are explained in the notes. 
The two curves in Figure 12 represent the two possible outcomes: a loss and a profit, each 
depicted with a probability of occurrence equaling to one (q=1, (1-q)=1). Along the vertical line the 
gain or loss is illustrated in relation to the capital expenditure represented by the horizontal line. A 
decrease in (q) shifts the profit line downwards and a decrease in (1-q) shifts the loss line upwards. 
An intersection of the loss or profit lines indicates at which probability and capital input level the 
potential profit compensates the potential loss. In contrast to the actual situation in Romania, the 
potential loss and profit situation under positive real rates is depicted in Figure 12. The loss line is 
flatter than under negative rates  (see Annex 7.8) and the profit line exposes a global maximum 
followed by a profit decrease, ending in a loss situation under high capital input due to the positive 
real interest rates. In this case a decline in the probability of success (q, set equal to one), shifts 
the profit line downwards, leaving a rather small scope for gains. 
Figure 12 Profit or loss situation under positive real rates and relaxed collateral 
requirements  
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Source: Own calculations  
Note: Collateral coverage of only 100%, η=1, real loan interest rate of 10%, f=0.05, b=1,  
w=5.4 mn lei, r=1 mn lei, profit = h1, loss = h2. 
 
Based on the capital demand function developed in Chapter 3.2, the demand for external capital 
with Ko = 0 is given by the expression: 
(53) KfD = (1-q)(W-Ar-Lr+Y) / (j+f)  –  q(W-Ar-Lw) / (b-η-f) 
where  Y = c [(qj+f+Ar+Lw-(1-q)(b-η))/(qβAαLδ)] (β/(1-β)) AαLδ 
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 The demand for capital under varying wealth levels, collateral requirements and interest rates is 
Ilisted in Table 25. The wealth level of 25 and 50 million lei is chosen to demonstrate the impact of 
wealth level on capital demand. Actual information on the wealth of individual farms was not 
available. 57 Furthermore, the actual shape of the utility function is unknown, but it is commonly 
assumed that the utility function is concave. The concavity is represented by a logarithmic 
functional form in the model. The capital costs referred to in this table include the loan interest rate, 
fees and the potential collateral loss. 
Table 25 Capital demand in relation to capital costs under risk aversion 
and different wealth levels 
Capital demand in million lei  
 W=50 million 
lei, η=1.9 
W=25 million 
lei, η=1.9 
W=50 million 
lei, η = 3 
 
W= 25 million 
lei, η= 3 
j Capital K 
0.5 78.53 8.07 63.61 6.57
0.6 70.72 7.26 55.80 5.76
0.7 65.00 6.66 50.08 5.16
0.8 60.62 6.21 45.70 4.70
0.9 57.16 5.85 42.25 4.35
1 54.37 5.56 39.45 4.05
1.1 52.06 5.32 37.14 3.81
1.2 50.11 5.11 35.20 3.61
1.3 48.46 4.94 33.54 3.44
1.4 47.04 4.79 32.12 3.29
1.5 45.79 4.66 30.88 3.16
Source: Own calculation 
 
The probability of default (1-q), the collateral requirements (η), the administration fees (f), the 
family wage level (w) and the opportunity cost (r) for agricultural land take the values: (1-q)=0.05, 
η=1.6 or 3, f=0.05, w=5.4 million lei per year and r= 1 million lei. 
The data in Table 25 above reveal several features of the farmers’ behavior as regards the 
demand for external capital: (i) the demand for capital declines with a lower asset endowment level 
(W), and a decrease in wealth of one unit yields an even larger reduction in capital demand. (ii) 
The demand for capital declines with increasing capital costs. (iii) An increase in the collateral 
requirements for external capital leads to a significant reduction in capital demand. The derivatives 
of the capital demand curve with respect to loan requirements, asset endowment and capital costs 
confirm these findings. Taken together, the relation of initial wealth to possible loss is a very crucial 
factor influencing external capital demand in the model. 
 
                                                          
57 The average capital input of an individual farm is 35 million lei. The evaluation of available farm assets is considered 
impossible due to lack of information on their values, prices or qualities. The chosen wealth level takes into account the 
specific characteristics of the logarithmic utility function and aims at demonstrating the effect of different wealth levels on 
capital demand.  
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 4.5 Supply of capital 
The supply of capital offered per loan transaction through financial institutions can be differentiated 
from the expected profit function. The credit supply in this study is derived from the partial profit 
function developed in Chapter 3.2. The number of labor hours spent for a loan contract between an 
individual farmer and a bank depends on the legal status of the borrower. As described in Chapter 
2, financial institutions consider a ‘farm’ as a natural person if there is one member of the farm 
household in permanent employment who stands for the loan (as borrower). Otherwise the 
individual farm is considered as a legal entity, and this implies considerable paperwork and thus 
requires more working time which increases the transaction costs. For this reason the working 
hours (H) per loan contract correspond to the average working time spent for legal and natural 
persons depicted in Chapter 2, Table 2-6. The working cost (v) per hour is based on the income of 
a loan officer plus the additional costs to the employer.58 The fees (F) due for the opening of an 
account ranged at around 10-20 thousand lei at the end of December 1997.  
Table 26 Profit situation of financial institutions, per loan contract 
Partial profit in million lei under negative real interest rates  
Loan size in 
million lei 
Probability of repayment p  
 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1 0.57 0.47 0.38 0.28 0.18 0.08
5 2.89 2.40 1.91 1.42 0.93 0.44
10 5.79 4.81 3.83 2.85 1.87 0.89
Partial profit in million lei under positive real interest rates  
Loan size in 
million lei 
Probability of repayment p 
 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
5 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.24
10 -0.01 0.09 0.19 0.29 0.39 0.49
Source: Own calculations 
Note: The probability of repayment ranges around 49% in the farm sample (n=181). This is based on the assumption 
that the principal and the interest are repaid if the net income in relation to capital expenditure is around 0.1 (see 
Annex 7.1). The values of the applied variables or parameters are for i=0.53 or 0.05, j = 0.62 or 0.1, H = 7, v = 
0.02, F = 0.02. 
 
The profit situation under varying loan sizes (KfS) and probabilities of repayment (p) is depicted first 
under interest rates and high collateral requirements as they prevailed in Romania at the end of 
December 1997, and then under high interest rates (positive real rates) with moderate collateral 
requirements. The probability of repayment (p) represents the chance of the financial institutions to 
select an individual farmer whose net income to capital expenditure is sufficiently high to repay the 
principal and the interest. The frequency distribution of the ratios shown at the beginning of chapter 
4 (see also Annex 7.1.) serves as a measure for the probability (p) of selecting a non-defaulting 
borrower.  
                                                          
58 The gross wage of a loan officer is about 2.5 million lei as of end December 1997 (Bank interview, 1997). The 
additional costs to the employer amount to about 32% of the gross wage. Further, about 800 working hours per month 
are calculated. v = 2.5 * 1.32/800=0.004 million lei per hour. 
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 The comparison between the profit under negative real and positive real rates reveals, first, that 
under negative real rates the profit increases with increasing default since the return from the 
resale of collateral, considered in this model without collateral resale costs, is higher than the real 
loan interest rates. This is because the collateral value (η=1.6) of 160% of the loan amount59 is a 
real value while the loan interest rates are nominal rates and partly negative in real terms. Under 
positive real rates, the profit becomes positive with a probability of default (1-p) slightly lower than 
50%. This is due to the omission of the costs associated with collateral resale. Second, the profit of 
financial institutions originates from the margin between the loan interest rate and the deposit 
interest rate. In periods of high inflation, this margin is fairly high, while in periods of low inflation 
this margin decreases and hence the profit declines too.  
The capital supply in equation (54) (see chapter 3.2) represents a set of possible loan sizes with a 
boundary indicating the minimum or maximum loan size a financial institution has to offer to gain a 
profit of at least zero lei.  
(54) S
))-i(-)-j(p((
)F-Hv(KSf =ηη>=<    for a profit equal to at least zero 
where p: probability of receiving the principal-interest payment Kfj, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, 
  F: fixed amount of fees (revenue) before the loan installment, 
 H: labor hours, 
  v: average wage per labor hour of a credit officer, 
  η: collateral requirement 
 i: real interest rate for deposits/100  + 1 
S:  (Hv - F) / m 
m:  [p(j-η) + (i-η)]   
 
The minimum loan size or capital supply per loan contract depends on the ratio of the interest rates 
and collateral values. Under negative real rates and tough collateral requirements, the capital 
revenue for a financial institution is smaller than the return from the collateral requirement (η)60, 
this is j<η as indicated by case II and III in Figure 13. Then, according to Figure 13, the probability 
of repayment should be higher than the interest rate ratio, which is 1.09 for K ≤ S, or lower than the 
interest ratio for K ≥ S. But, since (p) cannot by definition be greater than one, the probability must 
be lower than the interest ratio and thus the capital supply is equal to or larger than (S) as 
indicated by case II of Figure 13. Hence, in case II the capital supply reflects the minimum loan 
size necessary to cover the expenses. Increasing (p) to one, the minimum loan size per contract 
increases. 
In situations with low inflation, the capital revenues are supposed to be larger than the collateral 
requirements (case I and IV in Figure 13) and subsequently, the probability of repayment appears 
to be greater than the ratio of the interest rates, which in case I is 0.5. From this probability point 
upwards, the capital supply is equal or larger than (S) for π≥0, as pointed out in Figure 13. Hence, 
the supply set reflects a minimum loan amount. For all values of (p) lower than 0.5 (case IV), the 
loan size lies below (S) as depicted in Figure 15 and represents a maximum loan size.   
                                                          
59 100% for the principal and about 60% for the interest rate of one year. 
60 This underlies the assumption, that the collateral can be seized and sold without further costs. 
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 The following ‘case tree’ summarizes the different situations/cases discussed above: 
Figure 13 Case tree 
    Π ≥ 0 
 
      K ≥ S       K ≤ S 
        for m ≥ 0       for m ≤ 0 
 
p ≥ (i-η)/(j-η)  p ≤ (i-η)/(j-η)  p ≥ (i-η)/(j-η)  p ≤ (i-η)/(j-η) 
for j > η   for j < η   for j < η   for j > η 
p ≥ 0.5   p ≤ 1.09      p ≤ 0.5 
 case I   case II   case III  case IV 
 
The capital supply in relation to probability (p) is depicted in Figure 14 and Figure 15 for case II and 
case I and IV from Figure 13 above. The other variables such as i, j, η, F, H and v remain constant. 
The depicted supply functions represent the outer line of a convex set, along which the profit is 
equal to zero. 
Figure 14 reflects the Romanian conditions, where (j-η) is smaller than (i-η). The greater (p) 
becomes, the smaller the denominator (m) and thus the steeper the line in Figure 14, representing 
an increasing minimum loan size for a profit of at least zero. At p(j-η) equaling (i-η), which occurs 
at p = 1, the capital supply set has reached its limit and no capital supply beyond that line yields 
any profit. 
Figure 15 contains two convex sets; the first set (case IV) ranges from p = 0 to p = 0.499999 
revealing a capital supply per loan contract smaller than the indicated line, and the second set 
(case I) ranges from p = 0.500001 to p = 1, showing a possible capital supply larger or equal to the 
line drawn. Hence, the capital supply is ‘negative’ up to (p) lower than 0.5 (p<0.5) and positive for p 
> 0.5 under positive real interest rates. Since the line in Figure 15 represents the boundary (for Π = 
0) of the capital supply set, any capital supply or loan size within this set leads to a profit larger 
than or equal to zero.  
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 Figure 14 Capital supply set61 of a financial institution, under high 
inflation in relation to p (case II) 
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Source: Own calculations 
Note: The variables j, i and η take the values j=0.62, i = 0.53 and η=1.6; capital supply is 
indicated in million lei 
 
Figure 15 Capital supply set of a financial institution under low inflation 
in relation to p (case I and IV) 
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Source: Own calculations  
Note: Capital supply in million lei per loan contract; the variables j, i, and η take the values 
j=1.1, i = 1.05, η=1 
 
The screening effort is expressed in working hours (H) per loan agreement. To quantify the impact 
of this effort, the minimum capital supply for (Π = 0) is indicated in Table 27 under different working 
hours spent per loan contract and under different probabilities (p) of repayment, beginning with 
p=0.501. The minimum loan size per contract has to increase in line with the increase in working 
                                                          
61 Here, capital supply refers to a set consisting of a bundle of possible offered loan sizes for a profit larger than or equal 
to zero 
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 hours (H). However, under positive rates in real terms the minimum required loan sizes decrease 
in line with the increase in (p), even with a high input of working hours.  
Table 27 Minimum capital supply per loan contract under varying (screening efforts) 
working hours H and probabilities p 
Supply of capital under negative real rates in million lei 
 Probability of repayment p  
H in hours 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
8 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.13
10 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.22
12 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.31
Supply of capital under positive real rates in million lei 
 Probability of repayment p  
H in hours 0.501 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
8 120.00 1.20 0.60 0.40 0.30 0.24
10 200.00 2.00 1.00 0.67 0.50 0.40
12 280.00 2.80 1.40 0.93 0.70 0.56
Source: Own calculations 
 
An employee of a financial institution needs in average of seven working hours (H) to check the 
documents required, to approve the loan application and to monitor repayment. However, he is 
unable to assess the financial performance of the individual farm, since no detailed information on 
either the production process or on investment is requested. To reveal the actual financial situation 
of an individual farm, additional screening efforts are necessary which may be similar to the efforts 
made in the context of the questionnaire for the farm survey in 1997. With the help of the 
information obtained from the farm survey, the actual situation of a farm can be depicted and 
analyzed. Such additional information-gathering reduces the risk and thus increases the probability 
of loan repayment. On the other hand, however, it also increases working time and thus the 
transaction costs per loan contract. The distribution of net income to capital expenditure (Annex 
7.1) shows a loan default of approximately 50% of all farmers interviewed. An extended screening 
with an additional 4-5 hours of labor input, which is equivalent to the hours spent on an individual 
farm survey and the data analysis, would reduce the risk of default. This default rate is assumed to 
be about 5%.62 The minimum loan size for a loan agreement decreases significantly to about 0.5 
million lei per loan contract with H = 11 and p = 0.95 under positive rates in real terms.    
                                                          
62 The farm income is uncertain and for the calculation of expected farm income this uncertainty is taken into account 
with a risk of default of 5% (q=0.5). 
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 4.6 Supply of and demand for capital 
A matching of loan supply through financial institutions and loan demand from farmers only occurs 
if there exists a functioning market with a market clearing price, the market clearing interest rate. 
This study developed a demand function for loans under profit maximizing behavior in relation to 
the costs of capital, taking into account the uncertainty of return and the collateral requirements. 
Further, it showed a bundle of offered loan sizes per borrower – a capital supply set based on the 
assumption of a profit of at least zero for the lender. To see the coincidence of demand and supply 
under varying interest rates, the demand function of an average individual farm and the supply set 
of a financial institution are compared under different loan conditions.  
First, the capital demand KD = KfD (Ko = 0) of an average individual farm63 is set against a set of 
offered loan sizes KfS both depending on the interest rates. The loan conditions are classified into 
four cases (1)-(4):  
1. Loan supply and capital demand are based on pure profit maximizing behavior under high 
inflation, so that interest rates are temporarily negative in real terms and the difference 
between the lending and deposit rates ranges at around 10 percentage points (NBR, 1998). 
The collateral requirements or asset values for the lender are the sum of the principal plus 
the nominal interest rate for one year (160% of the loan amount), that is ηF=1.6 and for the 
borrower (almost 300% of the loan amount) ηB=2.98 (see Chapter 4.2). The probability of 
default (1-q) for the lender rises in line with an increased lending rate (Annex 7.1). The 
average working hours (H) per loan contract are set at H=7 
2. As in case (1) except that inflation is low, the interest rates are positive in real terms and 
the difference between the lending and deposit rates ranges at around 5 percentage points. 
The collateral requirements or asset values for the lender are ηB=1.0 (100% of the loan 
amount) and for the borrower ηF=1.9 (see Chapter 4.2).  
3. As in case (2) except that the probability of default (1-q) for the lender for all interest rates 
reaches the level of q=0.95 due to improved screening efforts. The thorough screening 
requires more working hours (H), which are set to H = 11.  
4. As in case (3) except that capital demand is based on utility maximizing behavior.  
Second, the capital demand KD = Kf - Ko (Ko ≠ 0) from only external sources is set against the 
same set of offered loan sizes KfS.. The external capital demand is defined as the difference 
between optimal capital expenditure and available own capital Ko of an average individual farm. In 
order to reflect the availability of own capital, the share of Ko is set to three-quarters of the total 
capital input (Chapter 4.4.2). As before, three cases of loan conditions are identified: 
5. As in case (1). 
6. As in case (2). 
                                                          
63 Average farm: A = 6, L = 3, q = 0.95 
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 7. As in case (3). 
The demand of an average individual farm and the supply of capital are depicted in Figure 16 to 
Figure 18. The thick line represents the boundary of the capital supply set where the financial 
institutions’ profit reaches at least zero. The thin line reflects the capital demand function of an 
average individual farmer. The y-axis represents the loan size under varying negative and positive 
interest rates depicted along the x-axis.  
The different variables or parameters take the following values: H=7 or H=11 hours for low or high 
screening efforts, v=0.02 mn lei, F= 0.02 mn lei, α=0.25, β=0.52, γ=0.07, c=5.91, q=0.95, f=0.05, 
a,b=1, w=5.4 mn lei, r=1 mn lei, A=6 hectares, L=3 man power, and Ko share= 0.75. The 
abbreviations in the figures are: ‘KfS neg.’ or ‘KfD neg.’ for capital supply set or demand under high 
inflation, ‘KfS pos.’ or ‘ KfD pos.’ for capital supply set or demand under low inflation.  
Figure 16 Case (1) 
total capital demand and supply under high inflation
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Note: ηB=1.6 (value of the collateral requirement from the perspective of the bank), ηF=2.98 (value of the collateral 
requirement from the perspective of the farmer), varying p, interest rate as interest rate/100 p.a.  
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 Figure 17 Case (2) 
total capital dem and and supply under low  inflation
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Note: ηB=1.0, ηF=1.92, varying p, interest rate as interest rate/100 p.a. 
 
Figure 18 Case (3) 
total capital demand and supply under high screening efforts and 
low inflation
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Note: ηB=1, ηF=1.92, constant p=0.95, interest rate as interest rate/100 p.a. 
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 Figure 19 Case (4) 
capital demand under utility aspects and supply under high screening 
and low inflation
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Note: ηB=1, ηF=1.92, constant p=0.95, interest rate as interest rate/100 p.a. 
 
The external capital demand of an average farm, here defined as the difference between needed 
optimal capital expenditure and available own capital, is depicted in Figure 20 to Figure 22. 
Figure 20 Case (5) 
capital demand and supply under high inflation
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Note: ηB=1.6, ηF=2.98, varying p, interest rate as interest rate/100 p.a. 
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 Figure 21 Case (6) 
capital demand and supply under low inflation 
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Note: ηB=1, ηF=1.92, varying p, interest rate as interest rate/100 p.a. 
 
Figure 22 Case (7) 
capital demand and supply with high screening efforts and low 
inflation
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Note: ηB=1, ηF=1.92, constant p=0.95, interest rate as interest rate/100 p.a. 
 
The capital supply line in the figures above represents the boundary of a convex set of possible 
loan sizes under a zero-profit situation for financial institutions. Any loan size above the line yields 
profits larger than zero for the lender, except for cases (2) and (6). The capital demand line 
represents a loan demand function and all loans smaller than or equal to the function are accepted 
by the borrowers. 
In the first three cases the demand function is decreasing with increasing interest rates, cutting the 
y-axis at around the 25 million lei line. The supply set is rather large in case (1) since the expected 
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 profit of the financial institution relies on the ‘sale’ of the collateral, ignoring the selling costs. It 
hardly declines at all with increasing interest rates and decreasing probabilities of repayment and a 
matching of a wide range of loan sizes under given interest rates seems to be possible for the 
borrower and the lender. Under the actual conditions in Romania, however, enforcement of the 
loan contract, and thus the sale of the security, is costly and would shift the loan supply set 
upwards.  
In case (2) no matching between supply and demand occurs, since the supply set opens 
downwards, meaning that the actual loan offered must be smaller than the line of the supply set. 
Since at the interest rate between zero and ten the probability (p) of repayment is close to 0.5, the 
financial institutions are unable to offer a loan of any size. The different shape of the supply set 
compared to case (1) is due to the lower collateral requirement of ηB=1 instead of ηB=1.6, so that 
there is no profit but a loss with increasing interest rates and declining probabilities (p) of 
repayment. Under negative interest rates both demand and supply are rather unbounded.  
In case (3), the augmented screening effort leads to higher transaction costs but also to a higher 
probability (p) of repayment (here p = 0.95) and results in a supply set with unlimited loan sizes 
above the boundary. The highest payable interest rate where the financial institution only receives 
a zero profit in this case ranges at around 60%.  
In case (4), the demand for capital depends very much on the wealth level. Under a low asset 
endowment, the demand function is close to the x-axis and rather flat, while under a high asset 
endowment level the curve shifts upwards and becomes steeper. 
Cases (1) to (4) above assume that an individual farmer completely finances his capital 
expenditure from external funds. But, as soon as he disposes of own or quasi-own64 capital 
resources with opportunity costs equal to the deposit interest rate, the demand for external capital 
declines considerably as illustrated in cases (5) to (7). It is assumed that on average farmers’ 
capital expenditure originates to the greatest extent possible from own sources and that only the 
last quarter comes from external funds (Annex 7.3). Besides the quarter share of external capital 
input, no restrictions or limits on own capital are set. But under this limitation there exists no 
matching between the supply of and the demand for loans because the demand curve shifts 
downwards, so that the demand becomes negative (Chapter 4.4). External capital is simply too 
expensive compared to the available amount of own capital or quasi-own capital. However, 
external capital with interest rates below the opportunity cost for own capital (e.g., subsidized 
loans) may be demanded. Furthermore, lowering the share of own capital input also results in a 
higher demand for external capital and leads gradually to a matching of loan demand and supply, 
which occurs for an external capital input share of around 30% at an interest rate level of around 
zero per cent. The capital supply for cases (5) – (7) equals those of cases (1) to (4). 
The quantitative analysis shows that under the prevailing conditions in Romania the supply of and 
demand for loans in the private farm sector is limited to a certain loan size. However, the interviews 
and observation in Romania show that the refusal of financial institutions and individual farmers to 
                                                          
64Capital from family members, relatives or close friends 
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 agree to a loan contract is generally not only restricted to a certain amount of capital but also to the 
contract itself, in some cases regardless of the loan amount. Two other, qualitative approaches to 
explain the observed behavior are therefore discussed in the next sub-chapters. 
4.7 Financial sector and adverse selection 
This section discusses the effects of the tough collateral requirements and diverging asset 
evaluation between the lender and borrower on loan contract agreements. 
Banks use loan collateral in order to screen potential clients as a substitute for the lack of customer 
information and to enforce and foreclose loan contracts in the event of loan default (FAO, 1998; 
GTZ, 1998). Hence, securities fulfill two main functions. First, due to the uncertainty or risk of loan 
default, banks need collateral as a kind of 'insurance'. Second, due to asymmetric information with 
respect to the quality of the business (information) and the efforts put into the planned projects 
(actions) financed with the loan, collateral is used as incentive for the borrower to give true 
information and to exert effort to repay the principal and interest. Without secure loan collateral, it 
is expected that there will be a lower supply of bank credit resulting in reduced access of small 
farmers and rural clients to finance (Binswanger et al., 1987). 
The major factors that affect bankers’ and farmers’ behavior in farm-lending operations are the 
expected profitability and the risks related to on-farm investments or to working capital financing 
(FAO, 1998; GTZ, 1998). Financial institutions consider the farm sector as riskier and having 
greater asymmetric information than other sectors because of specific farm sector characteristics 
such as seasonal income, yield and price uncertainty and productivity and management risks. In 
addition, the lack of experience by banks in credit transactions with the agricultural sector 
represents another impediment to extend the loan business in this field. The offered market 
interest rates for loans to agriculture in Romania don’t reflect higher risks or the transaction costs 
associated with lending to this sector. Subsequently, the financial institutions have no incentive to 
provide loans to the farm sector. To compensate or minimize the risk of lending to agriculture the 
financial institutions apply other instruments. One common method is the portfolio management. 
This is based on loan diversification and upper loan limits to certain sectors65. Regarding the loan 
portfolio limit of the farm sector, the banks fill the small available portfolio with subsidized loans and 
this was confirmed in the bank interviews. High performing farms demanding loans at market 
conditions are cut off from the loan service by the combination of portfolio restriction and loan 
subsidy. This mechanism corresponds to pure credit rationing according to Jaffee and Stiglitz 
(1981). Another implicit method represents the security requirements and assets evaluation. The 
evaluation and acceptance of assets as collateral by financial institutions offers a number of ways 
to stop farmers from becoming a borrower. The evaluation and acceptance of assets as collateral 
as well as its effect on the lending business are analyzed below.  
In general, the assets pledged as security are evaluated differently by financial institutions and by 
their actual owners. These differences have their origin in differing information about the assets, 
                                                          
65 The agricultural loan portfolio consists to almost 100% of subsidized loans 
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 the alternative potential uses of the asset, the farm objectives and in the precautionary evaluation 
rules of the banks. 
The financial institutions’ evaluation procedure of (farm) assets are described first. In Romania the 
banks hire an expert for asset evaluation. This expert’s evaluation gives an average asset value (v) 
corresponding to the expected value of all similar assets. This expected value is based, if existent, 
either on market values, construction values or on discounted values of expected returns. 
According to the principle of precautionary estimation, the expert also, takes into account a 
‘prudential’ margin (ê). This margin reduces the average value (v) to S = v (1-ê)66. This value (S) is 
given to the financial institution. The financial institutions, in turn, accept only between 50-80% of 
this security value (S) as loan security67 since it is common practice to incorporate some form of 
risk margin (x) in the security value (S). For example, a specific tractor minimum average market 
value, if any, is (v). The external expert’s evaluation of the asset with a ‘prudential’ margin (ê = 
0.168) leads to the security value (S), in this example being 90% of the average asset value (v).  
(55) S = v (1- ê)          
  = v (1-0.1) = 0.9 v 
where S: security value or estimated asset value by the expert, 
 ê: reduction of the average minimum value v as security margin for the external expert, 
 
The bank, however, accepts only 60% (x = 0,6 for machinery) of the evaluated asset value (S) as 
collateral. Therefore, the value of the tractor and hence the loan security value (B) reaches only 
v(1- ê) x = S x. Subsequently, the loan security value (B) is 54% of the initial average asset value 
(v). 
(56) B = S x = 0.9v *  0.6 = 0.54v 
where: x: share of value accepted as security value (risk margin) 
 
To secure a loan, however, the banks require loan coverage to be at least 160% of the loan value 
which includes the nominal interest rate of say 60%69 for one year and the principal (K). Since the 
collateral should cover these requirements, the condition for K is 
(57) jK = B     and 
1.6 K = 0.54v,      or 
(58) K = B/j      and 
 K = 0.54v/1.6 = 0.34v 
and for v 
(59) v = 1.6 K / 0.54 = 2.96 K. 
                                                          
66 Where ê is a small number e.g. 0.1 representing the evaluation security margin for the external expert 
67 bank interview 1997 
68 arbitrarily large margins are possible 
69 here j = (1+0.6) 
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 where K: loan amount 
 j:  1+nominal interest rate/100 
B: security value, based on the expected asset value (v) minus a prudential margin (ê) and minus 
a risk margin (x) 
 v: expected asset value, based on a pool of similar assets 
 
The financial institution accepted collateral-loan ratio is typically just sufficient to cover about one 
third of the loan amount as collateral. In other words, the borrower has to dispose of about three 
times the initial asset value (v) for a loan size (K). Using the tractor example , the farmer has to 
provide collateral this is three times the value of the tractor while only being able to purchase one 
tractor with the approved and secured loan amount (K). The estimated expected asset value (v) 
‘reduces’ to 0.34v which is 34% of the initial value (v) (Figure 23) The asset pledged as collateral 
experiences a high depreciation through the financial institutions. This results in a large gap 
between the initial average asset value v and the finally accepted value of 0.34v. (Figure 23).  
Figure 23 Collateral value 
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Note: B=security value, K= loan amount, v=expected asset value. 
The x-axis represents the asset units a, the y-axis the loan units L. The line Ov shows a loan-
asset ratio of one to one (L=a=v=K), which says that the average asset value v equals the loan 
amount K. The evaluated loan security value B, line OB, shows  a ratio of one to two 
(L=2a=0.54v).Finally the loan coverage, line OK, displays a ratio of one loan unit to three asset 
units (L=3a=0.34v). 
 
 
The farmer’s perception on the asset values, however, differs from that of the financial institution’s. 
The reasons for this divergence are:  
1. The farmer has more detailed information about the real quality and thus the real value of the 
collateral (asymmetric information).  
2. Due to the specific use of the asset on the farm in combination with other agricultural 
equipment, the internal/intrinsic value of the pledged machinery/land is higher than its external 
value (alternative uses) since secondary markets or land markets are not well developed. This 
in turn, leads to a higher value assessment of the machinery e.g. tractor by the farmer than by 
the bank.  
3. The farmer evaluates his assets according to its contribution to household utility. Since the 
utility function is assumed to be a concave function, the lower the asset endowment level of a 
farm, the larger the loss of one additional unit of utility, for instance, the loss of a tractor if there 
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 is only one tractor on the farm. In this context, the farmer’s utility estimation of the tractor is 
called a subjective value which is generally higher than the asset’s market value since the 
tractor helps to secure the farmer’s primary needs such as food and housing security. 
The combination of the above evaluations results in an individual asset value (vn) for each farmer 
(n). This value (vn) ,however, is seldom equal to the estimated expected value (v). The divergence 
caused by asymmetric information (before contracting) on the quality and utility of assets between 
borrowers and lenders leads to adverse selection. This was first mentioned in Akerlof's lemon 
markets. Adverse selection arises because farmers have uncertainty about their repayment ability 
or capability. Since uncertainty in prices and natural disasters prevail in agriculture and extends to 
agricultural income then, even a 0.1% chance of failure may cause a considerable loss of assets. 
For the individual borrower this potential loss corresponds to a loss of utility for the pledged assets. 
However, adverse selection would not exist if farmers were certain about their ability to repay the 
principal and interests.  
In Figure 24, the effects of the divergence in asset evaluation is considered with the uncertainty 
problem excluded. And in this context the collateral represents the equivalent price for a loan. The 
vertical line in Figure 24 represents the loan units (L) and the horizontal line is asset units (a). The 
v-line (= 100% - line) shows that the worth of one asset unit a (a=v) equals to one loan unit L 
(L=K); and the ratio is 1:1. The line OK represents the asset units required as security for one loan 
unit by the financial institutions. Using the previous example, the OK line represents the 0.34v 
value, where one asset unit (a) is worth approximately one third of the loan unit (L), or one loan 
unit (L) requires three asset units (a). Since the potential borrower’s evaluation differs from the 
bank’s evaluation, the line OFU (upper value) and OFL (lower value) indicate the farmers’ 
evaluation range of their assets (vn), where for example vn may range between 0.5a and 6a 
(0.5a<vn<6a). Farmers are only willing to accept the required collateral amount for a loan if their 
evaluation of the asset (vn) is lower than or equal to the bank's final asset evaluation 0.34v, that is, 
only if  
(60) vn   ≤ 0.34v. 
Therefore, the farmer will only pledge those assets whose value lies below or on the line OK 
(Figure 24). However, these assets are either poor quality or have low intrinsic/internal values due 
to the poor financial performance of the farm. Being aware of getting only the “worst” assets as 
security, the lenders/evaluators re-evaluate the expected asset value (v) according to the 
remaining set of assets, which is the total asset pool minus the assets values (vn) above the 
expected value (v), in the graph ranging between OK and OFL. The loan coverage value (K) 
becomes K' and only those farmers whose individual values (vn) are lower than the OK' line are 
potential borrowers. This is because only they are willing to give their assets (vn) in exchange for a 
loan of size (K). Again, the financial institution adapts the expected asset value (v) to the remaining 
set of values. The resulting coverage corresponds to the OK'' –line and once again only those 
assets with values (vn) below the OK'' line are given as securities to the banks.  
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 Figure 24 Adverse selection 
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to a lower asset unit a (e.g vn=a) than an additional asset (e.g. vn=6a). The convex lines reduce the 
area between the OK and OFU line particularly for larger loan sizes. By taking into account 
adverse selection, the downwards move of the OK line results in (i) a demand for small loan sizes 
and (ii) for larger loan sizes no reconciliation between the borrower’s and the lender’s asset values. 
Subsequently, the practiced collateral evaluation process as well as the collateral requirements in 
Romania lead to the small scale private farm sector being rationed out of the loan services. 
Figure 25 Adverse selection and risk aversion 
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 its assets and abandoned the planned economy, it no longer could provide these securities or 
facilities (Honkkila, 1996). Private ownership initiated through the privatization process replaces the 
role of the socialistic state as the provider of secure food and dwellings. Thus, at the beginning of 
the development of the market economy, the economic behavior of farmers was aimed at securing 
their source of income and food, as it was the only one available. Consequently, the willingness of 
farmers to take risks through investments or seasonal loans to enlarge the farm and their potential 
income is not great. They refuse or hesitate to put at risk their assets (land, machinery) which are 
essential to maintain a minimum livelihood. However, as a next stage in the transformation process 
progresses, individual farmers should optimize the available factor inputs and begin with small 
investments financed externally or through their own capital to increase farm income. These 
investments, in combination with credit and collateral, require the willingness to take small risks. 
This is, because to approve a loan application financial institutions require farm assets of 
approximately 160% of the loan amount for collateral.  
Assets are described in the system of national accounts as entities over which ownership rights are 
enforced by institutional units, individuals or collectives; and from which economic benefit may be 
derived by holding or using them over a period of time (System of National Accounts, 1993). By 
applying a simple classification, assets can be divided into land, buildings, productive assets 
including real capital like machinery and equipment, and financial assets mainly deposits and 
shares (Honkkila, 1996). The assets referred to in this study are land, buildings and real capital of 
the farm sector. Since there is a thin market for agricultural land, building or farm equipment, the 
market value of used farm assets, if any, is uncertain. 
If the farmers take the risks and fail they lose the pledged assets resulting in a loss of food and 
housing security. This loss appears to be significant for the farmer because their asset endowment 
level is low and the collateral requirements are at least about twice the loan amount. Therefore, the 
farmer exhibits risk averse behavior, a result of the concave utility function.  
Maslow, a psychologist, developed a theory on the human need hierarchy based on the 
assumption that the fundamental motive for all activities and actions of a human being is the final 
need of self-realization.To approach and achieve this core need several other needs must be 
satisfied in order to be able to fully develop and enjoy the principal need. Thus, he divided needs 
into five level, where the proceeding need has to be fully satisfied before the next level of need 
matters. According to him, the five levels of the need hierarchy are (1) physiological needs, (2) 
independency/security needs, (3) social needs, (4) prestige and (5) individual needs like self 
reliance (Krech, 1992). These need levels can be further divided into sub-levels. With respect to 
small individual farms in Romania, the need level they strive for corresponds to food and housing 
security, first on a subsistence level, which can be achieved and secured through a small amount 
of money earned from small scale farming activities. Then after having secured the subsistence 
level, the farmers gradually increases the capital expenditure and takes small risks to shift from 
subsistence farming to market oriented farming. They are willing to take small risks and intensify 
cultivation, to invest in new techniques, machinery or buildings and to enlarge the farming business 
and income, and consequently their wealth level. At this stage of development the private farmers’ 
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 actions shift from security dominated risk averse behavior to a profit oriented behavior with low risk 
aversion since the risks taken to increase the wealth become smaller in relation to the available 
wealth and do not endanger any more their food and housing security. However, many households 
in agricultural areas produce for the market and for their own consumption. They purchase part of 
their inputs on the input market and the rest comes from their own resources. Any change in 
policies will therefore affect not only production but also consumption and the supply of goods. This 
is because agricultural households combine two units, the household and the firm. To analyze its 
behavior, an appropriate analytical framework is a recursive model with utility maximization under 
certain profit maximization (Meier, 1995). However, to understand the model, some special 
characteristics of Romanian farm households and their utility have to be emphasized. 
Concavity of the utility function: The less assets, consumption goods, etc. a person disposes of, 
the higher it evaluates the marginal utility of each single asset or good. With an increasing 
availability of assets or goods the additional utility of one more unit good decreases (Nicholson, 
1995). This is reflected by the concavity of the utility function. Thus, if a farm household has 
sufficient food or housing security because they have a large farm, high farm income or non-farm 
income, the willingness to take risks (investments) increases. 
Contingency of the preferences: Any well behaved preference ordering can be represented by a 
utility function (Varian, 1992). According to Maslow, the highest preference are those actions which 
support self realization. To achieve this, the individual must have reached a relatively high wealth 
level. But this high ordered preference is contingent on the satisfaction of the previous needs. If the 
primary needs are not assured, the highest preferences are first to secure these needs.  
Risks: To enlarge the farm business actions involving risks have to be taken by the farmers. The 
farmers, in general, make many decisions under uncertainty conditions entailing the risk of failure 
and bankruptcy. Although different types of uncertainty prevail, the individual farmer as a single 
entity without significant market power is unable to influence prices or other market conditions and 
makes his decisions based on some estimated probability of the occurrence of unfavorable events. 
Most situations involving such behavior under risk can be put into a lottery/game framework 
(Varian, 1992). 
Expected utility and risk aversion  
This section illustrates the implications of contingent preferences, uncertainty and concavity of the 
utility function for farmers’ behavior. The model includes small scale farm households with a 
minimum initial endowment (Ws) of assets that assure housing and food needs are met and farm 
households with higher endowment levels (Wb ) that allow some risk taking. Under uncertainty 
conditions the outcome, h, of an action, i, may lead to a gain (hi1) or loss (hi0) of the asset 
endowment with a probability of q or (1-q). Not taking the action implies no change in the 
endowment level. Two features of the farmers’ behavior can be illustrated with the model, (a) the 
risk aversion towards any kind of investment involving loan collateral and (b) the necessity of a 
high probability of success q to induce any action e.g. seasonal loans for herbicide, quality seeds 
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 input, etc.. Both features result from the concavity of the utility function, the uncertainty of the 
outcome and the contingent preferences. 
Any action involving external capital input represents a kind of risk since the farmer is obliged to 
repay the loan amount and the interest unless he wants to lose the part of his assets pledged as 
loan security. Any action i is assumed to have two possible outcomes (hij , for j=1: gain, or j=0: 
loss) The expected utility of the action i is demonstrated in this study using the von-Neumann-
Morgenstern equation. According to this equation, the utility of different expected endowment 
levels Wn is defined as the expected utility (U(Wn)) of an action under uncertainty. That is:  
(62) U(Wn) = q  u(Ws + hi1) + (1 - q) u(Ws + hi0).  
(63) U(Wn) = q  u(Wb + hi1) + (1 - q) u(Wb + hi0) 
U(.):  expected utility, 
Wn:  wealth level, {s,b}  ε  n 
hij: possible outcomes of an action, with a gain (hi1, j = 1) or a loss (hi0, j = 0) of wealth, 
q: probability of  outcome hi1 occurring, where q: 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, 
1-q: probability of outcome hi0 occurring 
u (.): utility, 
Ws: minimum initial wealth level to secure primary (physical) needs, 
Wb : wealth level greater than  Ws. 
 
Since the utility function is assumed to be a concave function, under uncertainty conditions the 
expected utility U(Wn) is less than the utility of the expected outcome q(Ws+ h i1) + (1-q)(Ws+ h i0) of 
the action. The greater the curvature of the utility function the more the expected utility and the 
utility of the expected value differ from each other. This divergence is called risk aversion and is 
depicted in Figure 26. The more concave and steeper the utility function is around the minimum 
endowment level Ws , the more risk averse farmers are and the more they refuse any action with a 
risk of assets loss (Figure 26).  
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The y-axis represents the utility of wealth and the x-axis the wealth level W. The drawn curve 
represents the utility of wealth as asset bundles and the straight line indicates the expected utility 
of the two possible outcomes (resulting wealth levels). As illustrated, the steeper the utility function, 
the steeper is the cord between (Ws+ h i1) and (Ws+ h i0) and the larger the potential utility losses 
u(Ws + h i0) or gains u(Ws + hi1). Clearly, farmers tend to maximize their utility under the initial 
minimum wealth level of Ws, but are subject to the restriction: 
(64) Ws + (1-q)h i0 = Ws . 
This restriction implies that either hi0 or 1-q equals zero. As this restriction is not possible under the 
actual conditions in Romania, the farmer with wealth Ws is not willing to take any action that 
involves the risk of giving up his minimum wealth level necessary to secure his primary needs. In 
other words, achieving a gain h1 means less to farmers than losing h0. 
Taking the derivative of the expected utility function U(Wn) with respect to Ws and re-arranging, 
shows that maximizing expected utility depends on its slope δu(.) and the probability q: 
(65) q / (1 - q) = - δu (Ws+hi0) / δu(Ws+hi1).  
(66) q / (1 - q) ≡ ∞   for infinite steep slope around (Ws+hi0). 
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 Since the slope of the utility function below the minimum wealth level (Ws+hi0) approaches infinity, 
while the slope around (Ws+hi1) is much flatter, the ratio of (Ws+hi0) to (Ws+hi1) is very large and 
close to infinity. Therefore, the probability q must be extremely large (q « 1) in order to induce the 
farmer to take the credit risks. In contrast, at wealth level Wb the slope of the utility function at 
((Wb+hi0)) and ((Wb+hi1)) are flatter but because of the small denominator the probability q of the 
outcome hi1 may also need to be large in order to induce the farmer to take any action even at a 
wealth level Wb.  
Risk aversion and indifference curve 
The boundary of the convex acceptance set which represents the set of all probable outcomes 
(bundles of assets) the farmer would accept at a given wealth level shows the set of outcomes 
where the farmer is indifferent. The boundary of this set can be given by the indifference curve, 
h1(h0) depicted as implicit function (Varian, 1992). This means that the possible bundles of 
outcomes (q∑
=
n
1i
i hi1+(1-qi) hi0) along this line provide the same level of utility to the farmer. It is 
assumed that the farmers’ behavior can be described by the maximization of the expected utility. 
Using an algebraic expression, the expression h1(h0) and must satisfy the identity (Varian, 1992): 
(67) q u(Wn+hi1(hi0))  + (1-q) u(Wn+hi0) ≡ U(Wn) 
where: Wn:  any kind of (initial) wealth level, {s,b} ∩ n 
Wb : wealth level higher than Ws and Ws’,  
Ws’: wealth level, just  above Ws, 
hi1: outcome gain of  action i 
hi0: outcome loss of action i 
 
The slope of the indifference curve can be found by differentiating the expected utility with respect 
to h0 and evaluating this derivatives at different wealth levels. The slopes of the implicit function 
equals the ratio of the probabilities and of the marginal utility. The slope of the indifference curve at 
a certain wealth gives the probability at which the farmer is just willing to accept the small risk for 
the action in question (Varian, 1992). 
(68) q δu1 δh1(h0)/δh0 + (1-q) δu0  = 0 
(69) δh1/δh0 = -(1-q)/q δu0/δu1 
where δu0 = δu(W0)/δh0 = δu(Wn+h0)/δh0  < 0 
  δu1 = δu(W1)/δh1 = δu(Wn+h1)/δh1 
 
Since the final wealth level under a loss is less than in a profit situation (W0>W1, where W0= Wn+h0 
and W1=Wn+h1) and since the utility function is assumed to be strictly concave, the marginal (dis-
)utility under a loss hi0 situation is larger than the marginal utility under a profit situation hi1, that is 
|δu(W0)| > δu(W1). Therefore, the ratio of the marginal utilities in equation (69) is larger than one. 
Changes in the final wealth level leads to the results expressed in equations (70). 
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For high initial wealth levels with relatively small changes in outcome the ratio approaches one 
while large changes give a ratio larger than one. Hence, under a given probability ratio the slope of 
the indifference curve is rather steep for low wealth levels with all outcomes and high wealth levels 
with large changes in outcome, and flat for high wealth levels with relatively small changes in 
outcome. Where the probability q approaches one for outcome hi1 the probability ratio in equation 
(69) approximates zero, and infinity for where the probability q equals zero. Then, the slope of the 
indifference curve is steep for small q and flat for the large probability q (equation (71)).  
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At low endowment levels Ws the individual farmers’ primary objective is to secure their basic 
needs, and the implicit function is likely to be a point at wealth level Ws, and the convex 
acceptance set just a line (gray line in Figure 27). This indifference curve and the acceptance set 
at Ws indicates that the only outcomes accepted are an increase of wealth with no loss at all. 
These results are depicted in Figure 27 where along the x-axis the possible loss hi0 increases as it 
approaches the y-axis and wealth Wn decreases, and along the y-axis the outcome hi1 increases 
with the distance from the x-axis. The loss hi0 can be not greater than the initial wealth Wn. The line 
of the two gray sets of possible asset bundles represents the indifference curves. The lower q and 
W are, the larger a loss and the steeper the slope of the curve. It becomes clear from Figure 27, 
that at low wealth levels the range of potential actions is relatively small. However, at a wealth level 
Wb the indifference curve is flat at the beginning with a slope close to one giving equal probabilities 
of success or failure. It points out that the farmer is willing to put at stake a share of his wealth 
(Wb+hi0) equal to an eventual gain in wealth (Wb+hi1). The acceptance set of farmers with wealth 
Wb (large gray area) is larger than those with Ws’ (small gray area) or Ws (gray line). Since the 
‘slope’ of the indifference point around Ws’ is rather steep, and around the wealth level Wb relatively 
flat, the probability q for the outcome hi1 must be one for the wealth level Ws’ in order to induce the 
farmer to take an action.  
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Figure 27 Acceptance set  
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The results of this model can be transferred to a Romanian farmer operating on a low endowment 
level Ws and who has the possibility to increase production through a higher capital expenditure 
financed by a loan. The outcome of the so called small investment may be a gain hi1 in wealth with 
a probability of success q or a loss hi0 with probability 1-q of almost all assets used as collateral in 
the loan contract. Due to housing and food security needs the utility function and indifference curve 
are rather steep and/or curved around the asset endowment level Ws. Thus, the farmer is very risk 
averse and a probability of one for the outcome hi1 is necessary to induce the farmer to take any 
action. Therefore, even a very small probability of failure leads to a refusal of a loan contract which 
requires at this wealth level almost all farm assets as credit security. Subsequently, under the 
given liquidity constraints in the private farm sector investments are hardly taken.  
In contrast, a farmer with a high endowment level Wb, less curvature on his utility function and 
indifference curve shows a much higher readiness to take risks to the excess satisfaction of his 
primary needs at wealth level Wb. Thus, the farmer displays a lower risk aversion and even a 
probability q smaller than one does not deter some actions. Further, a possible loss of wealth 
reduces his utility less than a farmer with endowment level Ws. Since the private farm sector in 
Romania consists mainly of small scale farming the demand for loans with tough loan security 
requirements is, therefore, close to zero.  
However, the question arises of what is the actual extent of the possible loss or gain of wealth that 
result from the actions. It is clear, that the potential loss depends on the collateral requirements 
108 
 and diverging assets evaluations of the financial institutions and farmers as well as on the 
enforcement of the loan contract. The possible benefit of short-term investment (increased capital 
inputs) depends on the expected profit function of the individual farm. 
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 5 Conclusion  
This chapter summarizes the findings and analytical results and formulates policy conclusions. It 
attempts to apply a holistic view and considers rural financial markets as one part of the financial 
system. However, the ideas discussed in this work are not designed to give detailed 
implementation advice on policy. Rather, they are meant to provide a simple conceptual framework 
for some policy areas, to help to understand the problems in this field of finance and to identify 
further research areas to focus on.  
5.1 Financial sector 
Banking business in Romania faces many constraining factors, including macro-economic 
uncertainties, a weak legal and institutional system, information and dissemination problems, 
legacies from the past, and structural problems in the financial sector. The extent of the difficult 
financial and economic conditions in which the financial institutions have to operate is reflected by 
the recent bankruptcy or liquidation of some large state banks and private banks. 
The former structure of the banking sector has not yet completely disappeared in Romania. At the 
end of 1997, the banking sector is still dominated by a few large state banks. The restructuring or 
enlargement of banks' know-how, technology and networks that formerly focused on particular 
sectors or groups of clients and offered only one main product is under way but is making slow 
progress. Therefore, the banking services offered in 1997 are not suited or accessible to all groups 
or types of clients in all regions or areas and especially not for small-scale farms in rural areas. 
The services offered through financial institutions encompass savings, sight and short-term 
deposits, as well as a variety of consumption loans, short-term production loans, and a few 
investment loans. Loan security requirements include two guarantors and at the very least the 
financed product/object as collateral, but in many cases other assets too. The financial sector's 
activities as regards the individual farm sector are restricted to subsidized or state-guaranteed 
loans and to deposit services. The lending business of a financial institution has to deal with 
information asymmetries, in particular in rural areas. These information asymmetries lead to high 
risks and consequently to high collateral requirements. On the other hand reducing information 
asymmetries causes high transaction costs often not covered by the market interest rate along with 
the small amount of loans often requested. The subsidized lending policy actually in operation, 
which aims to support development in the agricultural sector, in fact hinders the development of 
competitive and efficient agricultural lending schemes. Furthermore, the allocation of subsidized 
capital takes place according to criteria based not on efficiency but on what is politically and 
socially desired. This leads to an inefficient allocation of capital. 
The paperwork and processing time needed to finance working or investment capital for legal 
entities is high in comparison with that required for consumption loans to natural persons. 
Furthermore, small-scale enterprises demand small loans, so that the interest received hardly 
covers the costs incurred by the financial institution. In particular, lending to agriculture is costly. 
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 First, the loan procedure for a farmer, from the initial loan application to the complete repayment of 
the principal, requires a great deal of paperwork for the financial institutions by comparison to 
consumption loans for individuals. In addition, the loan size demanded in the small farm business 
is too low to cover the high transaction costs associated with on-farm lending. Second, lending 
costs are high due to the risky nature of agricultural business, and this has not yet been 
incorporated into the interest rates. Consequently, the new private banks’ focus is to service first 
the private clientele or well-known large enterprises. 
The share of the capital and insurance market in the volume of capital transactions is still small and 
at this stage of development has no significance for the development of financial markets. 
5.2 Agricultural sector 
The agricultural sector comprises private farms, associations and state farms. The private, 
individual farm sector consists of a large number of small private farms which provide employment 
and food to their farm household members, many of whom can find no employment in the non-
agricultural sector. Not surprisingly, in comparison to the total agricultural sector, labor productivity 
on individual farms is low. The land rental or lease market is hardly functioning which in turn 
hinders the allocation of agricultural land. The small land market, together with the collapse in the 
labor market in Romania, delays or even impedes the restructuring of the private farm sector 
necessary to enable it to become more productive. Furthermore, capital expenditure, as the third 
production factor, hovers at a low input level. This is because the banking sector on the one hand 
fails to provide loans to these farms due to the high risks, and, on the other hand, there are many 
small-sized and overstaffed private farms which are often not very productive and any kind of 
capital investment is likely not to be profitable. The income situation of the interviewed farms 
implies that around half of the farmers interviewed would fail to repay their loans made to finance 
investments. The farm associations with or without legal status are often downsized successor 
organizations of former productions cooperatives or new foundations made up of family farms. The 
subsidized state farms have to cope with obsolescent farm equipment and building and a low 
capital and equity cover often resulting in a low productivity.  
For the agricultural sector, and in particular the individual farm sector to develop, it needs impulses 
from the non-agricultural sector and support from a well-functioning infrastructure that includes 
functioning institutions, markets, information and physical infrastructure in rural areas, a good farm 
management and access to capital through an efficiently functioning rural financial market.  
5.3 Rural financial markets 
Since the privatization process the agricultural sector in Romania has faced sever problems 
ranging from a lack of adequate supply of production inputs, marketing, production technologies 
and know-how to a lack of financing working capital or investments. As regards rural financial 
markets in Romania, the financial sector is confronted with a twofold task: (i) efficiently providing 
sufficient financial means for the agricultural sector to develop and (ii) reforming itself, its 
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 structures, organization, technology, know-how, service and products to an efficiently functioning 
financial market. This chapter summarizes the factors affecting the demand for capital of individual 
farmers and the supply of capital through financial institutions in rural areas in Romania. First, the 
demand side dealt with is based on economic and financial data from over 180 farms, followed by 
an analysis of capital supply provided by financial institutions. In this context, this work also 
discusses risk aversion and information asymmetries and their influence on loan transactions in 
rural areas. 
5.3.1 The capital demand of individual farmers 
The capital demand analysis of individual farmers relies on a production function, obtained from of 
a multiple regression analysis with the variables capital, land and labor input. The first derivatives 
of the profit function which is composed of the production function as well as the production costs, 
delivers factor demand functions which show the demand for capital of individual farmers under 
different conditions. Further, to take into account the farm household, the demand for capital is 
calculated by integrating the profit function into an concave utility function of a farm household. For 
the calculations the following conditions or factors are distinguished: (i) farm output without 
(certainty conditions) and with price and production risks (uncertainty conditions), (ii) instable and 
stable economic situation with high inflation (real negative interest rates) and low inflation (real 
positive interest rates), (iii) total capital expenditure from own sources, external sources or a 
combination thereof, (iv) farm decisions under utility aspects and (v) different levels of fees and 
collateral requirements for a loan.  
The production function 
The regression results give a production function with decreasing returns to scale. The 
differentiation of the farmer sample into sub-samples according to the farmer’s age, specialization 
and managers’ education and the regression of each of the sub-samples shows some small 
differences of the input coefficients of the production functions. However, the differing values of the 
input coefficients do not explain the large differences in farm output and hence farm income 
depend on further factors such as organization and management. 
Capital demand 
The demand for capital, land and labor under certainy conditions shows that the labor demand is 
relatively low while the labor supply is high. Moreover, it shows that the demand for land is high. 
This result emphases the need for farm size restructuring through a functioning and open land 
market. As anticipated, the demand for capital is large under real negative interest rates and 
moderate under real positive interest rates.  
Assuming an uncertain income situation (uncertainty conditions) and high collateral requirements 
the demand for capital is significantly less than under certainty outcomes. The high collateral 
requirements of financial institutions thought to overcome part of the information asymmetry 
between the lender and borrower, cause a significant reduction of capital demand. 
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 In Romania, under the current conditions, the financing of working capital or investments from 
external sources, e.g. bank credit, is more expensive (interest rates, fees) than from own sources. 
Therefore, individual farmers prefer own capital or capital from relatives to bank loans. Based on 
an average external capital use of the interviewed farmers, the analysis assumes that about 25% 
of the capital use of a farm comes from an external source, e.g. financial institutions. 
Consequently, the difference between optimal capital input under profit maximization and available 
own capital represents the demand for external capital in this analysis. Accordingly, the external 
capital demand depends on the margin between the deposit and loan interest rates and the 
availability of own capital. In an environment with high inflation like in Romania, the margin 
between the deposit and borrowing rate is large and hence the use of own capital is strongly 
preferred. Not surprisingly, the actual practice in Romania confirms this finding. Farmers 
predominantly ask for and financial institutions often approve only loans with interest rate subsidies 
and state guarantees for the private farm sector. In a scenario calculation with relaxed collateral 
requirements, low fees and a small interest margin between deposits and loans, the demand for 
external capital increases, although only slightly. 
Capital demand under utility aspects 
A large part of the individual farms in Romania are rather small farm units with a low asset 
endowment level. They can be considered as farm households which display a great risk aversion 
and hence low willingness to finance, for example, working or investment capital through external 
funds. To adequately illustrate the situation of farm households, the profit function is integrated into 
a concave utility function from which the capital demand is derived. The model shows that a 
doubling of the collateral requirements reduces the total capital demand in the model by about one 
third. Halving the wealth of a farm in the lower range leads to a large decline of capital demand. 
The results demonstrate that the low asset endowment level of the individual farm sector, 
combined with the tough collateral requirements and the existing risk of default, enormously 
reduces capital demand. 
5.3.2 Capital supply 
The capital supply from banks is based on a linear partial profit function, partial, because it 
considers only the lending business. The supply represents a set of possible loan sizes with a 
boundary. Beyond the boundary the financial institution’s profit becomes negative.  
Overall, the model shows that the loan supply is rather low in a situation with low inflation and high 
when there is high inflation since the large margin between the lending and deposit rates in 
Romania leads to a rather high profit for the bank. Furthermore, the collateral represent real values 
and the collateral resale costs are not completely acknowledged and incorporated in the model. 
Thus, even under relatively high default rates the supply of loans is still relatively high because of 
the high collateral value in real terms70. According to the model, under stable macroeconomic 
                                                          
70But also because the costs of loan contract enforcement and collateral resale are not completely incorporated in the 
model 
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 conditions (positive interest rates in real terms) the supply of loans increases in line with a 
decreasing probability of default.  
If financial institutions increase their screening efforts which are positively linked to transaction 
costs they simultaneously reduce the default rate. The required increase of the minimum loan size 
for a positive profit is partly compensated by the increasing probability of repayment. Hence, loan 
supply is low under positive real interest rates and high default rates but rises slightly with 
increasing screening costs and decreasing default rates in the model. 
5.3.3 Capital demand and supply 
In summary the results of the analysis are: (i) a high demand for capital under high inflation, a 
relative low demand for capital under low inflation; (ii) with tough collateral requirements a high 
supply of capital under high inflation, but a low supply under low inflation. The supply increases 
with a decreasing probability of default; (iii) there is a matching between loan demand and supply if 
moderate collateral requirements prevail, if the margins between deposit and loan interest rates is 
not too large and if the availability of own capital71 or informal loans72 is limited73.  
The prevalence of credit contracts only in context with state intervention in the Romanian financial 
rural markets seems to support these findings. Collateral requirements, demanded loan sizes as 
well as the uncertainties in income and hence in borrowers’ repayment capacity represent 
restrictions for the supply and demand of loans. However, in Romania the supply and demand of 
capital in rural areas occurs only with subsidized lending. Even under high inflation and tough 
collateral requirements contrary to the model, there can hardly be observed a credit contract 
without subsidies in Romania. This gap may be explained partially with the problems of collateral 
enforcement or resale which are not incorporated in the model as well as with the high volatility or 
uncertainty of agricultural income. For these reasons, it appears to be an unbearable risk for the 
individual farmers as well as for the banks to provide or demand loans at market conditions. It 
seems that not the required loan size but the loan contract is refused. From the point of view of the 
financial institutions, the principal reasons are legal and financial uncertainties as regards asset 
and farm performance evaluation, and collateral enforcement and resale. From the perspective of 
the farmer, the risk aversion of potential borrowers with low asset endowment may inhibit the 
actual credit demand because of the potential loss of assets pledged as collateral. In this context, 
the results of the two qualitative analyses may contribute to a better understanding of the actual 
behavior of the potential borrower and lender.  
5.3.4 Information asymmetry and collateral value 
Financial institutions value the assets pledged as collateral lower than the potential borrower does. 
Furthermore, the collateral has to cover 160% of the loan amount. The potential borrower 
                                                          
71 Own capital also includes capital from family members and relatives 
72 Informal loans refer here to cheap loans or grants from close friends, neighbors or far relatives 
73 Availability of own capital or informal loans is restricted if financial institutions offer attractive deposit facilities and 
hence attract the otherwise available capital of families, relatives or friends. 
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 compares the value of his pledged assets with the loan size. Under certainty conditions, the size 
and value of collateral is irrelevant to the decision whether to take or give a loan. But under an 
uncertain income situation such as prevails in the agricultural sector in Romania, the collateral 
value represents a possible loss for the borrower or a possible/alternative revenue for the financial 
institution in case of default. Hence, the farmer as borrower considers the pledged asset as a 
potential cost of lending and the loan amount should at least be equal to the value he estimates for 
his assets. It follows then that any asset value which, in the farmer's estimation, is smaller than or 
equal to the loan size is available as collateral. Thus, only ‘bad’ assets are pledged as collateral, 
resulting in an adverse selection of collateral. Since the financial institution is aware of this 
process, it may re-evaluate the remaining pool of ‘bad’ farm assets, but again they select the ‘bad’ 
ones from this ‘bad’ asset pool. Finally, this results in the refusal to accept any kind of farm asset 
as collateral and no loans are offered for the small-scale farm sector. 
5.3.5 Risk aversion and farm households 
The farmers’ economic behavior are driven by their economic situation or wealth of the farm 
household. The basic needs comprise food and dwelling security that is maintained and secured 
through farming. In contrast to farmers with large farms, the small-scale farmers’ household values 
more highly individual farm assets (Nicholson, 1995) that contribute significantly to their needs. A 
potential loss of any kind of farm asset counts much higher than a potential gain. Consequently, 
the aversion against risk is high for these farmers74. Furthermore, the scope of their business 
actions is rather small since they are not willing to put at stake any part of their wealth. 
Subsequently, they refuse to engage in risky activities such as financing investments or working 
capital with loans involving the provision of collateral. Finally, this behavior results in an inflexible 
farm sector that is slowly developing or restructuring. 
5.4 Policy options 
The topic of this study discusses the constraints of capital demand and supply in three fields, the 
financial sector, the agricultural sector and rural financial markets, in which small-scale farmers are 
considered as the representatives for small-scale enterprises in rural areas. Moreover, the issue of 
credit demand and supply is embedded in three levels, the macroeconomic, the sectoral and the 
microeconomic level, but only the micro-level is analyzed in detail in this work.  
Overall, the macro-economic level comprises the budget and financial policies, economic and 
monetary policy and the legal, institutional and infrastructure framework. Stabilization, amelioration, 
reorganization and efficiency on this level, and consequently confidence of the economic agents in 
the economic and political situation so that deposits become attractive, is a very necessary pre-
condition for the functioning of rural financial markets.  
On the sectoral level, it becomes clear that a restructuring of the agricultural sector and of financial 
institutions has to occur:  
                                                          
74 In this model it is assumed that the utility function is concave (Varian, 1992, Mas-Colell, 1995). 
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 - In the banking sector, the concentration on particular client groups or sectors and on certain 
products or services has to be overcome. The services of the banking sector, as well as its 
business strategies, technologies and know-how should be adapted to the needs or demand of 
potential clients as well as to the changing situation in Romania. This is already occurring in 
some small business segments, but not in rural areas. Further, the banking sector should 
restructure its loan portfolio by depreciating or readjusting the values of weak loans. An 
information network needs to be established to provide information on the special needs of the 
rural population and to reduce the risks or information asymmetries and the costs of 
information for the financial intermediaries. 
- The small-scale private farm sector has to develop through a restructuring process and the 
input of ‘new’ technologies, and to increase the quality and quantity of output. This can occur 
through a vibrant land market, the withdrawal of redundant labor forces from this sector, 
through better supply of input factors and through the availability of external capital for 
production purposes. Policies such as subsidy schemes which support the persistence of the 
current agricultural structures should be changed so that they pave the way for the necessary 
restructuring process. Instead, measures like pre-retirement support, job procurement 
programs, retraining programs have to be elaborated that support the abandon of small scale 
farming. Special guarantee programs which take over part of the required loan securities may 
ease the reluctance of farmers to provide collateral. However, this restructuring can only go 
hand in hand with the development of the non-agricultural sector in rural areas. 
Changes on the microeconomic level comprise activities and decisions of the financial institutions 
as well as of individual farmers:  
- Financial institutions should try to reduce their costs of the administrative procedures, and at 
the same time increase their screening efforts to select the productive enterprises and hence 
reduce the risk associated with lending. This may be achieved through the assignment of 
agricultural credit specialists. Further, they should boost the confidence of potential savers in 
their institution and try to attract more savings by offering attractive conditions and products 
and by simplifying their procedures. To increase the activities of rural financial markets, special 
products and services for rural areas need to be designed and developed. Moreover, the loan 
coverage ratio could be adjusted since collateral represents a real value, while the interest 
rates applied are nominal values. Although Holmstrom (1993) suggest collateral lending to 
overcome information asymmetries, in Romania the lending policy should first concentrate 
more on screening and less on collateral values because assets usable for collateral are rather 
limited on small scale farms and the asset (market) value, if any, of agricultural assets is low. 
When the farm sector has been restructured, the farm sizes increased, farm assets are 
available and marketable, the lending policy may be to reduce the screening costs and apply 
collateral lending. To overcome the capital bottleneck, a borrower default insurance, an 
efficient functioning risk fund for banks or a kind of security market which pools the credit risk 
and shares the risk equally among investors could be established. 
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 - Through the restructuring of the private farm sector, the income and correspondingly the farms’ 
asset endowment has to increase, so that farmers are willing to take some risks. Farmers need 
to learn to face risks in a market economy. Therefore, special training programs may reduce 
the high risk aversion among farmers and enables them to deal with risk. To smooth the 
relatively high risks in agriculture, a risk fund or efficient risk insurance could be established, 
such that farmers are willing to accept the risk of loans. Further, farmers should learn 
appropriate farm management methods, to built up an efficient organization and to adopt the 
most appropriate production technologies. Farmers of non-profitable farms with little future 
prospects should be induced to give up farming, i.e. sell or rent out their farm and take jobs in 
the non-agricultural sector. In general, the farm size has to increase parallel to the 
development of markets for agricultural assets (land, equipment, machinery, building, stocks), 
so that the risk aversion of farmers decreases and the size of financial transaction augments. 
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 7 Annex 
7.1 Annex: Distributions 
Distribution of capital input Distribution of land input Distribution of labor input Distribution of output Distribution of return to capital
K < or =, in 
million Lei frequency
A < or =, in 
ha frequency
L < or =, in 
man power frequency
Y < or =, in 
million Lei frequency
X100  < or =
frequency
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3 0
10 20 1 3 2 18 10 5 -2.5 1
20 44 2 33 3 59 20 18 -2 4
30 33 3 25 4 59 30 22 -1.5 2
40 25 4 20 5 35 40 27 -1 5
50 20 5 20 6 6 50 19 -0.5 24
60 11 6 18 7 3 60 20 0 48
70 11 7 6 8 1 70 12 0.5 57
80 5 8 9 9 0 80 11 1 22
90 5 9 8 90 9 1.5 11
100 1 10 10 181 100 7 2 6
120 3 11 2 110 11 2.5 1
160 3 12 4 120 5 3 0
200 0 13 3 130 4
14 0 140 5 181
181 15 2 150 5
16 2 190 1
17 5 200 0
18 2
19 2 181
20 3
21 1
22 2
23 0
24 0
25 1
26 0
181
Source: own calculations  
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 7.2 Annex: Sub-samples 
 
Influence of education, specialization and farm foundation on output  
 low 
education 
high 
education 
livestock crop mixed old 
farms 
new 
farms 
N 72 109 55 53 73 25 151 
R² 0.67 0.82 0.86 0.52 0.84 0.79 0.77 
Residual sum -31.59 -52.62 -35.72 -7.04 -13.12 -31.40 -59.19 
Residual variance 483.40 308.26 363.01 443.37 99.20 390.59 374.35 
constant 1.77 1.95 1.92 2.49 1.50 2.24 1.67 
K -parameter 0.62 0.40 0.45 0.32 0.64 0.41 0.56 
A -parameter 0.11 0.40 0.37 0.27 0.13 0.32 0.24 
L -parameter 0.02 0.07 0.14 0.07 -0.05 0.08 0.04 
t-value constant 6.64* 10.26* 8.36* 8.19* 7.52* 6.66* 8.09* 
t-value K 8.74* 6.86* 7.36* 3.59* 8.38* 3.19* 10.20* 
t-value A 1.84* 7.15* 6.38* 3.10* 1.93* 2.38* 5.19* 
t-value L 0.18 1.22 2.31* 0.81 -0.53 0.40 0.77 
Mean of K 
expenditure 
35.4 35.3 39.3 44.5 25.7 25.9 37.3 
Source: Own calculations, 1999 
Note: The significance level * is α = 0.01 or α = 0.05.  Low education reflects a school education of up 
to 9 years. Specialization in livestock or crop production is anticipated if the farm income from one 
field exceeds the other by more than 10 million lei per year. Old farms are those founded before 
1990, new farms in 1990 or later. 
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Livestock revenues 
NAME        N   MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
 K           55    39.334       34.833       1213.4       5.5900       166.23 
 A           55    5.4816       4.8605       23.624       1.5000       22.000 
 L           55    3.3682       1.2208       1.4904       1.0000       7.5000 
 
Crop revenues 
NAME        N   MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
 K           53    44.529       23.652       559.43       9.7600       151.82 
 A           53    10.178       5.4975       30.223       1.4500       25.000 
 L           53    3.2642       1.2074       1.4577       1.2500       6.7500 
 
Mixed revenues 
NAME        N   MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
 K            73    25.666       19.927       397.09        2.5000       89.650 
 A            73    4.1468       3.5241       12.419        1.0000       18.880 
 L            73    2.8562      0.91848      0.84361       1.0000        4.750 
 
 
Low education up to 3 (from 1 to 3) 
NAME        N   MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
 K           72    35.387       24.802       615.14       4.9100       116.90 
 A           72    6.4879       5.1148       26.161       1.0000       21.000 
 L           72    3.2986       1.1656       1.3585       1.0000       6.7500 
 
High education (from 4 to 8) 
NAME        N   MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
 K          109    35.314       29.141       849.19       2.5000       166.23 
 A          109    6.2064       5.3166       28.266       1.0000       25.000 
 L          109    3.0206       1.0834       1.1738       1.0000       7.5000 
 
 
Old farms (before 1990) 
NAME        N   MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
 K           25    25.941       23.154       536.11       5.5900       91.760 
 A           25    5.3828       4.9050       24.059       1.5000       20.000 
 L           25    3.8300       1.1197       1.2537       2.0000       7.5000 
 
New farms 
NAME        N   MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
 K          151    37.266       28.123       790.91       2.5000       166.23 
 A          151    6.5647       5.3239       28.344       1.0000       25.000 
 L          151    3.0298       1.0843       1.1758       1.0000       6.7500 
 
 
Extract from results in Shazam: file5e-1, file5d1-3, file5f1-2 
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7.3 Annex: Loans 
Farm ID Loans in Lei 
at constant 
prices Dec. 
1997
Nominal 
interest 
rates in % 
p.a.
Official 
monthly 
average 
nom. loan 
rates in % 
p.a.
Difference 
between 
actual nom. 
and officially 
advertised 
nom. interest 
rates
Real 
interest 
rates p.a. 
in %**
Capital 
input in 
million 
Lei
Ratio 
loan size 
/ capital 
input
BM01 10,409,245 73.3 91.4 -18.1 -37.5 25.4 0.41
BM03 4,000,383 36.7 112.7 -76.0 -50.6 15.2 0.26
BM04 2,179,870 25.0 48.1 -23.1 -53.6 27.7 0.08
BM05 6,392,430 55.0 109.0 -54.0 -43.4 16.1 0.40
BM07 3,749,226 50.0 91.4 -41.4 -45.9 42.7 0.09
BM08 6,248,710 30.0 91.4 -61.4 -53.1 41.9 0.15
BM10 10,227,888 19.0 109.0 -90.0 -56.6 17.4 0.59
BM24 6,392,430 40.0 109.0 -69.0 -48.9 30.0 0.21
BV07 6,792,500 30.0 50.5 -20.5 -51.0 58.4 0.12
BV13 2,901,952 37.5 49.8 -12.3 -47.4 54.1 0.05
BV18 1,438,904 32.5 52.8 -20.3 -48.9 39.1 0.04
BV27 1,045,000 30.3 50.5 -20.2 -50.9 103.8 0.01
DI21 3,835,458 48.9 109.0 -60.1 -45.7 25.2 0.15
DM01 6,964,685 65.0 49.8 15.2 -36.9 11.6 0.60
DM02 16,001,531 75.0 112.7 -37.7 -36.8 82.8 0.19
DM07 6,248,710 60.0 91.4 -31.4 -42.3 22.7 0.28
DM09 10,227,888 65.0 109.0 -44.0 -39.8 35.9 0.28
DM11 6,392,430 60.0 109.0 -49.0 -41.6 21.1 0.30
DM22 18,746,129 68.9 91.4 -22.5 -39.1 25.9 0.72
DM24 2,556,972 0.0 109.0 -109.0 -63.5 14.6 0.18
DM25 11,990,865 70.0 52.8 17.2 -34.4 29.1 0.41
DS01 10,667,687 60.0 112.7 -52.7 -42.2 68.1 0.16
DS06 12,784,860 31.0 109.0 -78.0 -52.2 39.6 0.32
DS11 666,730 45.0 112.7 -67.7 -47.6 10.9 0.06
DS14 666,730 52.5 112.7 -60.2 -44.9 11.1 0.06
DS15 3,333,652 30.0 112.7 -82.7 -53.0 11.5 0.29
DS24 3,196,215 40.0 109.0 -69.0 -48.9 20.3 0.16
T023 3,723,164 0.0 69.0 -69.0 -61.5 59.9 0.06
T050 12,497,420 0.0 91.4 -91.4 -64.0 51.2 0.24
T053 66,673,046 40.0 112.7 -72.7 -49.4 104.4 0.64
T063 21,002,009  112.7  153.8 0.14
Number 31 30 30 31
Min 666730 -109.0 -64.0 0.01
Max 66673046 17.2 -34.4 0.72
Mean 9030797 -49.0 -47.7 0.25
Stand. Dev. 11915638 30.8 7.7 0.19
** calculated according to Fisher's equation
Source: own calculations 1999  
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 7.4 Annex: Regressions 
Cobb-DouglasOLS Lin-Log Quadratic Polynomial Exponential Compound Mitscherl.-B. Trans-Log
R² 0.75 0.74 0.71 0.76 0.77 0.65 0.65 0.012 0.85
log-like-function -800.23 -804.86 -815.38 -796.62 -794.46 -833.43 -833.43 -926.33 -794.63
Residual sum -79.07 -3.30E-13 -9.30E-06 1.30E-12 4.10E-12 -218.83 -218.83 -1.00E+02 -3.66E-06
Residual variance 405.24 432.11 479.07 405.03 402.43 584.82 584.82 1632.4 7.50E-02
Absolute Errors sum 2525.4 2622.1 2896.8 2460.7 2416.7 3323.7 3323.7 5809.7 38.53
constant 5.91 3.76 -63.51 3.29 2.88 26.99 26.99 -0.96 0.59
parameter for K 0.52 8.83 31.38 1.32 2.06 0.007 1.01 6.32 1.04
parameter for A 0.25 2.83 14.06 3.63 -0.66 0.038 1.04 -0.296 0.47
parameter for L 0.07 3.18 -0.21 -2.11 -1.34 0.076 1.08 -0.958 -0.09
parameter for K² -0.0039 -0.016 -0.04
parameter for A² -0.055 0.36 0.13
parameter for L² 0.55 0.15 0.13
parameter for K³ or KA 4.90E-05 -0.13
parameter for A³ or KL -0.011 0.08
parameter for L³ or AL 0.051 -0.22
yield plateau m 60.86
t-value constant 6.21 0.75 -7.08 0.32 0.14 10.84 10.85 -0.96 1.53
t-value K 11.22 10.66 9.07 6.64 4.57 9.71 1294.5 64.85 3.69
t-value A 5.8 6.95 4.25 2.96 -0.24 8.04 210.61 -0.29 1.83
t-value L 1.56 2.3 -0.05 -0.38 -0.074 3.77 49.84 -0.96 -0.32
t-value K² -2.94 -2.26 -0.88
t-value A² -1.07 1.31 2.16
t-value L² 0.72 0.03 1.23
t-value K³ or KA 1.66 -1.32
t-value A³ or KL -1.41 0.68
t-value L³ or AL 0.12 -1.67
t-value m 20.27
Cobb-Douglas: Y = c Kb *
  .... Exponetial: Y = c * e 
(bK) * e 
(aA) * ... Source: own calculations, 1999
OLS: Y = c + bK + .... Compound: Y = c * bK * ...
Lin-Log: Y = c + b ln K + .... Mitscherlich-Baule: Y = m * (1 - e 
( -c - bK - aA - lL))
Quadratic: Y = c + bK + bbK² + aA + aaA² + ... Trans-Log: logY = c + b(log K) + bb(log K)²+ ba (logK logA) + bl(logK logL) + ....
Polynomial: Y = c + bK + bbK² + bbbK³ + .....  
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7.5 Annex: Multicollinearity 
 
Correlation of Variables
Variables Y K A L
Y 1
K 0.81 1
A 0.75 0.68 1
L 0.12 0.05 0.01 1
Revised Version of Frisch's Confluence Analysis
Variables K A L K   A K   L A   L K  A   L
R² 0.703 0.590 0.008 0.749 0.704 0.590 0.752
log likely.-function -816.9 -845.7 -925.6 -801.2 -816.5 -845.7 -800.2
residual sum -130.70 -53.15 3.15 -92.78 -124.15 -54.02 -79.07
residual variance 487.39 670.05 1,619.50 409.77 485.26 669.89 405.24
sum of absolut errors 2,779.3 3,340.1 5,723.0 2,552.6 2,757.9 3,334.0 2,525.4
c 1.704 3.065 3.919 1.892 1.629 3.047 5.909
b 0.693 0.515 0.699 0.523
a 0.608 0.247 0.608 0.25
g 0.173 0.049 0.016 0.073
t-values c 12.188 32.609 23.011 13.878 9.869 23.763 6.213
t-values b 20.147 11.438 19.548 11.226
t-values a 15.227 5.926 15.182 5.804
t-values g 1.188 0.889 0.211 1.559
Source: own calculation, n = 181
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 7.6 Annex: Heteroscedasticity 
 
File:f5h2.sha 
 
******* DIAGNOSIS-TEST FOR HOMOSCEDASTICITY **************** 
 
file screen f5h2.out 
read (DIFfile5.dif) Y K A L D F E  X100  X200 / dif 
 
***** VARIABLE K ************** 
sample 1 181 
ols Y K / hatdiag=s2 
ols Y K / hetcov 
 
nl 1 / ncoef = 2 rstat  resid=e1  sigma=s1 weight=s2 
eq Y = exp(b0)*K**(b1) 
coef  b0 1.5  b1 0.6   
genr e11 = abs(e1) 
sort K e11 Y e1 A L /desc 
genr u1 = e1**2 
print s1 
 
plot e11 K 
plot e1  / histo groups=12 range nowide nopretty 
 
genr K1= log(K) 
genr K2= K**2 
genr ee11=log(e11) 
ols e11 K 
ols e11 K1   
ols e11 K2  
ols ee11 K1 
 
genr YY=Y/K1 
genr KK=K/K1 
nl 1 / ncoef = 2 rstat   
eq YY = exp(b0)*KK**(b1) 
coef  b0 1.5  b1 0.6   
 
end 
stop 
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File f5ha.out 
 FINAL STATISTICS : 
  
  
 |_plot e11 K 
  
 REQUIRED MEMORY IS PAR=   19 CURRENT PAR=  500 
 FOR MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY USE AT LEAST PAR=    22 
       181 OBSERVATIONS 
                    *=E11 
                    M=MULTIPLE POINT 
    80.000        | 
    75.789        |       *    *  * 
    71.579        | 
    67.368        |              ** 
    63.158        | 
    58.947        | 
    54.737        | 
    50.526        | 
    46.316        |      **   * 
    42.105        |      *  *   *               * 
    37.895        |      *   * **   * 
    33.684        |    * M *  *M  * *    * 
    29.474        |     * *            * 
    25.263        |    *M ** 
    21.053        |    * **M* 
    16.842        |  *   M  MM     **   * 
    12.632        | MM*MM*MMM * 
    8.4211        | MMMMM**M * *  M * 
    4.2105        |MMMMMM*** ***                   * 
  -0.17764E-14    |*MMM*MMM M*M           * 
                   ________________________________________ 
  
               0.000    50.000   100.000   150.000   200.000 
  
                                K 
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  |_plot e1  / histo groups=12 range nowide nopretty 
  
  
 GROUP COUNTS 
 GROUP       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8 
 GROUP       9      10      11      12 
 COUNT     10.      7.     26.     59.     41.     14.      5.      8. 
 COUNT      4.      2.      0.      5. 
 HISTOGRAM - E1 
   PCT.    N 
  0.403   73  I 
  0.387   70  I 
  0.370   67  I 
  0.354   64  I 
  0.337   61  I 
  0.320   58  I               XXXXX 
  0.304   55  I               XXXXX 
  0.287   52  I               XXXXX 
  0.271   49  I               XXXXX 
  0.254   46  I               XXXXX 
  0.238   43  I               XXXXX 
  0.221   40  I               XXXXXXXXXX 
  0.204   37  I               XXXXXXXXXX 
  0.188   34  I               XXXXXXXXXX 
  0.171   31  I               XXXXXXXXXX 
  0.155   28  I               XXXXXXXXXX 
  0.138   25  I          XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
  0.122   22  I          XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
  0.105   19  I          XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
  0.088   16  I          XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
  0.072   13  I          XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
  0.055   10  IXXXXX     XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
  0.039    7  IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX     XXXXX 
  0.022    4  IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX          XXXXX 
  0.006    1  IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX     XXXXX 
              I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I 
             -45.0    -24.3     -3.57      17.2      37.9     58.6     79.3 
 
 
 
 
File: file5h.sha 
 
******* TEST FOR HOMOSCEDASTICITY **************** 
 
file screen file5h.out 
read (DIFfile5.dif) Y K A L D F E  X100  X200 / dif 
 
***** VARIABLE K ************** 
sample 1 181 
nl 1 / ncoef = 2 rstat  resid=e1  
eq Y = exp(b0)*K**(b1) 
coef  b0 1.5  b1 0.6   
 
*Spearman - rank - correlation-test (coefficient) 
genr e11 = abs(e1) 
sort e11 K Y e1 A L /desc 
stat K e1 /  prankcor 
 
 
****** VARIABLE A ************* 
sample 1 181 
nl 1 / ncoef = 2 rstat  resid=e2  
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 eq Y = exp(b0)*A**(b2) 
coef  b0 3.5  b2 0.7  
 
*Spearman-rank-correlation-test 
genr e22 = abs(e2) 
sort e22 A Y e2 K L / desc 
stat A e2 /  prankcor 
 
 
***** VARIABLE L ***** 
sample 1 181 
nl 1 / ncoef = 2 rstat  resid=e3 
eq Y = exp(b0)*L**(b3) 
coef  b0 2   b3 0.2  
 
*Spearman-rank-correlation-test 
genr e33 = abs(e3) 
sort e33 L Y e3 A K / desc 
stat L e3 /  prankcor 
 
stop 
 
File: file5h.out 
|_****** VARIABLE K ************* 
|_*Spearman - rank - correlation-test (coefficient) 
 |_genr e11 = abs(e1) 
 |_sort e11 K Y e1 A L /desc 
 DATA HAS BEEN SORTED BY VARIABLE E11 
 |_stat K e1 /  prankcor 
 NAME        N   MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
 K          181   35.343       27.425       752.15       2.5000      166.23 
 E1         181 -0.72212       22.126       489.57      -45.001      79.301 
  
 SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION MATRIX -       181 OBSERVATIONS 
 K          1.0000 
 E1        0.65208E-01   1.0000 
              K            E1 
  
 
 |_****** VARIABLE A ************* 
   |_*Spearman-rank-correlation-test 
 |_genr e22 = abs(e2) 
 |_sort e22 A Y e2 K L / desc 
 DATA HAS BEEN SORTED BY VARIABLE E22 
 |_stat A e2 /  prankcor 
 NAME        N   MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
 A          181   6.3184       5.2247       27.298       1.0000      25.000 
 E2         181 -0.29366       25.955       673.68      -65.469      108.30 
  
 SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION MATRIX -       181 OBSERVATIONS 
 A          1.0000 
 E2        0.44814E-01   1.0000 
              A            E2 
  
 |_****** VARIABLE L ************* 
|_*Spearman-rank-correlation-test 
 |_genr e33 = abs(e3) 
 |_sort e33 L Y e3 A K / desc 
 DATA HAS BEEN SORTED BY VARIABLE E33 
 |_stat L e3 /  prankcor 
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  NAME        N   MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
 L          181   3.1312       1.1219       1.2587       1.0000      7.5000 
 E3         181  0.17427E-01   40.354       1628.4      -51.791      135.62 
  
 SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION MATRIX -       181 OBSERVATIONS 
 L          1.0000 
 E3        0.11643E-01   1.0000 
              L            E3 
|_stop 
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 7.7 Annex: Farm profit 
Farm profit with negative real interest rates 
Profit as a function of the interest rate, in million lei 
i = 0.53 (average monthly real interest rate for deposits) 
Input of 
A in ha 
Input of L in man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 
1 17.21 19.04 20.20 21.06 21.76 22.35 22.86 
5 39.80 44.03 46.71 48.71 50.33 51.68 52.86 
10 57.10 63.18 67.03 69.90 72.21 74.15 75.84 
20 81.93 90.65 96.17 100.29 103.61 106.40 108.82 
j = 0.62 (average monthly real interest rate for loans) 
Input of 
A in ha 
Input of L in man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 
1 14.52 16.06 17.04 17.77 18.36 18.86 19.28 
5 33.58 37.15 39.41 41.10 42.46 43.61 44.60 
10 48.18 53.30 56.55 58.97 60.92 62.57 63.99 
20 69.13 76.48 81.14 84.62 87.42 89.77 91.81 
    
    
Source: Own calculations 
Note: The capital opportunity costs correspond to the real average deposit interest rate of – 47% 
p.a., i = 1 - 0.47, and to the real average loan interest rate of – 38% p.a., i = 1 – 0.38, the 
opportunity costs for labor and land use are considered as zero, r=0, w=0. 
Farm profit with positive real interest rates  
Profit as a function of the interest rate, in million lei 
i = 1.05 (supposed monthly real interest rate for deposits) 
Input of 
A in ha 
Input of L in man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 
1 8.20 9.08 9.63 10.04 10.37 10.65 10.90 
5 18.97 20.99 22.27 23.23 23.99 24.64 25.20 
10 27.22 30.12 31.96 33.33 34.43 35.36 36.16 
20 39.06 43.22 45.85 47.82 49.40 50.73 51.88 
j = 1.10 (supposed monthly real interest rate for loans) 
Input of 
A in ha 
Input of L in man power per year 
 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 
1 7.80 8.63 9.16 9.55 9.86 10.13 10.36 
5 18.04 19.96 21.18 22.08 22.81 23.43 23.96 
10 25.89 28.64 30.38 31.69 32.74 33.62 34.38 
20 37.14 41.09 43.60 45.47 46.97 48.24 49.33 
Source: Own calculations 
Note: The capital opportunity costs correspond to a supposed real deposit interest rate of + 5% p.a., 
i = 1 + 0.05, and to the supposed real loan interest rate of + 10% p.a., i = 1 + 0.10, the 
opportunity costs for labor and land use are considered as zero, r=0, w=0. 
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 7.8 Annex: Loss and profit situation 
Profit and loss situations under negative real interest rates  
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Source: Own calculations, 
Note: Collateral coverage of 160% η=1.6, real loan interest rate of –38%, f=0.05, b=1, w=5.4 mn lei,  
 r=1 mn lei, profit = h1, loss = h2 
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